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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Healthy Minds: Mental 
Health Practice and Perception  
in the Twentieth Century
Steven J. Taylor and Alice Brumby
introduCtion
Writing in the 1980s, Peter Barham noted that ‘in 1985 the average 
number of psychiatric beds occupied each day in England and Wales was 
64,800, a return to the occupancy level last witnessed in 1895’.1 In a 
local case study of the Exeter region, the number of inpatient beds in 
mental hospitals had fallen from 2070 in the middle of the twentieth 
century (1949) to only 100 beds in 1996. Ten years later, this num-
ber had dropped again to only 40 beds.2 Similar figures can be found 
for different regions across the UK.3 This reduction of provision in the 
country’s mental hospitals and the narrative of deinstitutionalisation 
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communicates only a part of the history of mental health care over the 
course of the twentieth century.4 While there was a sea change from 
institutional to social care in the provision and treatment of men-
tal health, there was also a move beyond metaphorical walls that saw 
 concerns about mental health penetrate previously untouched aspects of 
everyday life. The contributions to this book are an attempt at providing 
historical context to this change, as well as revealing some of the new 
physical and cultural spaces that mental health now occupies.
In economic, military, medical and social arenas, the twentieth cen-
tury was one of change and development. As the century progressed, 
advances in surgery and medicine meant that people were living into 
older age, while, on the other hand, political and military situations 
demonstrated a prolificacy in destroying human life. The early decades 
of the century also saw a re-emphasis on the importance of the individ-
ual, their place in society and, alongside this, their health and well- being. 
Individuals were now tasked with an expectation of social efficiency that 
meant providing for themselves and their families but also, in their own 
way, contributing to the national project—whether through work, ser-
vice or reproducing healthy stock. In this climate, minds considered to 
be ‘unhealthy’ were represented as a unique threat and took on a par-
ticular status that combined concern with stigma. From the degenera-
tive worries of eugenic discourse through to the stresses and strains of 
modern living in the late-twentieth century, there was ever more aware-
ness on preserving ‘healthy’ minds. Consequently, medical practices 
of removing the ‘insane’ from society and confining them in specialist 
institutions largely subsided and increased scientific, medical and soci-
ocultural investment led to better understanding of conditions such as 
epilepsy, ‘shell shock’ and depression, as well as the emergence of new 
conditions such as schizophrenia, autism and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.
Throughout this volume, the terms ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ have 
no fixed meaning and are deployed subjectively in relation to the men-
tal health of individuals and groups. The definitions have subsequently 
been determined by contributing authors in relation to a range of fac-
tors such as time, place and space. On the whole, the healthy/unhealthy 
dichotomy aims to identify instances where mental health was demar-
cated from what was considered socially, medically, culturally or legally 
‘normal’. Therefore, there is no single example of a healthy mind nor 
is there one of an unhealthy mind. To complicate the situation further, 
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it might be that a mind might be considered unhealthy in some scenar-
ios, and yet not in others. An example is that of learning disabilities; in 
Chapter 5, Jan Walmsley discusses some of the negative connotations 
and stigma attached to such conditions. Yet, in Chapter 8, authored by 
Dyck and Russell, the passage of time and changing cultural landscape of 
the twentieth century had shaped the experience of living with learning 
disability into something considered to be healthier, or socially accepted 
with the coming of the neurodiversity movement.
As the shifting understanding of what was considered to be a healthy 
mind suggests, and the chapters that follow will attest, the nomenclature 
of mental health was fluid and contested throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. Thus, it is worth observing at the outset some of the terminologies 
that will feature. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the medi-
cal lexicon of mental health included terms such as ‘lunatic’, ‘imbecile’ 
and ‘idiot’ that all fell under the catch-all umbrella of ‘insanity’. By the 
time that the century had ended, all of these medical terms had taken 
on derogatory connotations and were laced with stigma. The fate of 
these labels was not unique and the twentieth century saw language of 
its own—‘feeble-minded’, ‘schiz’ and ‘cretin’ related to mental health 
that fell into wider, negative, social use. As these terms feature in the 
academic analysis of this volume, it is worth observing that they are 
used by authors to demonstrate their arguments and with no malice or 
negativity in mind. Instead, terminology is used to reflect the historical 
nomenclature of the time period discussed.
The evolving language of mental health over the course of the 
twentieth century also reflects a widening social awareness of men-
tal illness and disability. It was within this context that psychiatrists 
and medical experts became increasingly concerned with preventative 
mental health care, or the need to keep minds healthy. This fascina-
tion was the impetus behind a range of twentieth-century innovations, 
from charitable bodies to government policies, and societal doctrines. 
The preoccupation with maintaining and perpetuating healthy minds 
informed Eugenic discourse, the neo-hygienist child guidance move-
ment, psychiatric social work and a host of legislation passed during the 
twentieth century—from the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, to the pol-
icy of transition from treatment in mental hospitals to care in the com-
munity in the latter-half of the twentieth century. Nineteenth-century 
alienists, working in the field of mental health, often argued that late 
admittance to the asylum, and with it delayed treatment, led to the 
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growing population of hopeless chronic cases, who languished in the 
institution uncured until their deaths.5 In the twentieth century, there 
was a move away from cure, amelioration and modification, and the con-
tributions to this volume from Dyck and Russell, Walmsley, and O’Reilly 
et al. reveal an advocacy and shared-identity towards mental health that 
would have been unimaginable a century before.
PLaCes of Care for the ‘unheaLthy’ Mind
By the early to mid-twentieth century, overcrowding in asylums had 
highlighted, what appeared to be, the failure of institutionalisation. 
Subsequently, a range of other options emerged that attempted to 
ease pressure on over-crowded Victorian institutions.6 To many, the 
late-nineteenth century symbolised a time of pessimism and decline in 
psychiatric services.7 The argument that an increase in uncured chronic 
patients at the end of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries sym-
bolised a period of stagnation within the walls of the asylum has been 
popularised by Andrew Scull.8 Such a view has found traction in the lit-
erature, and Peter Bartlett stated that ‘historians tend to view the asy-
lum in the later-nineteenth century as a failure, full of incurable cases and 
unable to fulfil the humanitarian promise of the reformers’.9 Echoing 
this perspective, Melling and Forsythe argued that the asylum model had 
‘exhausted its potential for innovation’ long before 1890.10 The growing 
demands upon care and the medical inability to cure the chronically ill 
are not disputed within this volume, nor is the idea that this growing 
‘underclass’ of chronic patients can be seen, at some levels, to represent 
a failure in psychiatry at this time. Despite this, however, not all psychia-
trists were negative and they saw ample reason for optimism in the range 
of new spaces for care in the twentieth century.11 It is in these nascent 
spaces of treatment such as dedicated epilepsy services, special schools, 
sheltered employment, and patient and caregiver advocacy groups that 
contributions to this volume focus on.
Many of these newly emerging spaces were promoted and packaged 
as vehicles for reforming the field of psychiatry, which remained a con-
tentious issue throughout the twentieth century. Critics writing in the 
second half of the twentieth century highlighted the regulatory nature 
of traditional asylums, branding them as being ‘total institutions’.12 
Revisionist histories of asylum expansion in the late-nineteenth and early- 
twentieth centuries have tended to focus on issues of power and social 
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control exerted by medical professionals over their patients.13 These 
accounts modified older interpretations, which highlighted a humanitar-
ian narrative focusing on psychiatry’s progressive nature.14 Critics argued 
that to focus solely on the humanitarian objectives of psychiatry was 
nothing more than an effort to legitimise and historicise the profession.15 
Arguably, creating new spaces of treatment and cure was an attempt not 
only to legitimise the psychiatric profession, but also to influence the 
(de)stigmatisation of mental illness across the long twentieth century.16
Despite the lingering images of mental institutions in the cultural 
imagination, historians have shown that the locus of care and treatment 
for those with mental health issues was never limited to the pauper luna-
tic asylum and, even in the nineteenth century, the economy of care 
sprawled across a range of settings in which the healthy and unhealthy 
mind could be presented, contested and represented.17 These spaces and 
places included familial homes, boarding out with foster families, early 
mental health clinics, general hospitals and workhouse wards to name 
but the most popular.18 Historians have come to accept that institutions 
were not closed, medicalised dumping grounds, but instead were porous, 
contingent and occasionally even temporary spaces where patients, staff, 
families and other stakeholders interacted.19 Scholars have meticulously 
begun to show how the walls of the asylum were more permeable than 
our previous understanding suggests.20 It is within the pluralistic land-
scape of care that this volume positions itself in an attempt to better 
understand the diverse physical and conceptual spaces that mental health 
came to penetrate in the twentieth century. In accordance with this 
broad and ambitious approach, the contributions to this volume span 
academic fields such as history, arts, literary studies, sociology and psy-
chology, mirroring the diversity of the subject matter.
Healthy Minds, as a volume, contributes a new dimension to the study 
of mental health and psychiatry in the twentieth century. It takes the 
present literature beyond the ‘asylum and after’ paradigm to explore the 
multitude of spaces that have been permeated by concerns about mental 
well-being and illness. Unlike previous studies, the chapters in this vol-
ume consciously attempt to break down institutional walls and consider 
mental health through the lenses of institutions, policy, nomenclature, 
art, lived experience and popular culture. It also adopts a broad inter-
national scope covering the historical experiences of Britain, Ireland and 
North America.
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MentaL heaLth in the twentieth Century:  
PoLiCy and PraCtiCe
The Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, signalled a continuation of the 
 nineteenth-century obsession with classifying and segregating individ-
uals according to their mental health.21 This legislation, dealing with 
so-called mental defectives, emphasised the dangers posed to society by 
those who previously might not have been the focus of medical experts. 
Subsequently, the new legal category of the ‘feeble-minded’ provided a 
label for individuals considered less severely disabled than ‘idiots’ and 
‘imbeciles’, but ‘weak-minded’ enough to be more susceptible to crime, 
promiscuity and idleness.22 Furthermore, the Act also established the 
Board of Control as a national body with overview of local authorities 
and their running of ‘mental deficiency’ services. Contributions to this 
volume by Jan Walmsley and Steve Taylor explore the impact of  labelling 
and the consequences for individuals that this legislation targeted in 
more depth, both demonstrating the significance and lasting impact 
of its scope. Despite the eugenic appeal of this legislation, the pace of 
implementation was hampered by the First World War, restricted finances 
resulting from this conflict and the oncoming depression.
The Great War led to a crisis in the asylums of England and Wales as 
27,778 permanent civilian beds were cleared and loaned to the Military 
Authorities to cater for injured personnel.23 The result was devastating 
overcrowding in the remaining hospitals and a massive upsurge in asylum 
deaths.24 Despite medical officers’ best attempts, the 1920s continued to 
see an ever-increasing rise in the numbers of patients institutionalised.25 
It has been widely argued that the predominance of soldiers  breaking 
down on the front led to some changes in the public view of men-
tal illness.26 However, the apparent inability of medical professionals to 
cure these men meant that any changes in attitudes were short-lived.27  
By the late 1920s, unrecovered ‘shell-shocked’ ex-servicemen found 
themselves languishing in asylums often alongside the chronically ill civil-
ian population.28
By the time that the Mental Treatment Act, 1930, was passed, over-
crowding in the nation’s institutions for mental health had reached dire 
proportions.29 Demand on services was so severe that hospital treat-
ment was not always possible, and as such, patients often did not receive 
treatment until they reached an incurable stage of their illnesses.30 
The Mental Treatment Act, 1930, sought to prioritise early treatment 
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by setting up categories of mental health care, which could bypass the 
lengthy certification process associated with previous experience. The 
act made provision for temporary and voluntary patients to be admit-
ted to a mental hospital without the need for certification.31 Importantly, 
it also championed the use of outpatient clinics and changed the name 
of the institution from an ‘asylum’ to a ‘mental hospital’ and reclassified 
‘pauper lunatics’ to ‘rate-aided’ patients’. The change in nomenclature 
was clearly an attempt to remove the stigma from mental illness.32
Despite the hopes of the Mental Treatment Act, the Board of 
Control’s desire to see mental health services reach parity with physical 
health did not occur properly until the founding of the National Health 
Service (NHS) in 1948. Even after services were officially aligned, men-
tal health continued to remain the ‘poor and embarrassing relative’ of 
physical health in the popular imagination.33 The Mental Health Act, 
1959, attempted to alter this perception by repealing previous legislation 
relating to the Lunacy, Mental Treatment and Mental Deficiency Acts. 
By doing so, the distinction between psychiatric and other hospitals was 
fully removed.34 However, the 1959 mental health legislation continued 
to justify compulsory detention for patients ‘who may not know they are 
ill’ and therefore may be unwilling to undergo treatment.35 It was not 
until the Mental Health Act, 1983, where the ideas of consent were fully 
considered. Prior to this, in 1962, Enoch Powell produced his Hospital 
Plan for England and Wales, formally promoting the government’s 
desire to dramatically reduce the number of inpatient mental hospital 
beds, and close down the hospitals by the end of the twentieth century. 
Of the 130 psychiatric hospitals in England and Wales in 1975, by 2005 
only 14 remained open.36
Coinciding with a move towards non-institutional care in the 1960s 
was the emergence of the influential and popular anti-psychiatry  
movement.37 In 1961, Thomas Szasz in his book The Myth of Mental 
Illness argued against the forcible detention of those who, he suggested, 
merely deviated from established societal norms.38 Similarly, schol-
ars such as Erving Goffman, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari offered 
critiques of psychiatry’s social influence and power and objected to the 
use of models and terms, inclusive of ‘total institutions’ that served to 
‘other’ elements of the population.39 Perhaps most famously, Michel 
Foucault in his seminal work Histoire de la Folie charted how attitudes 
towards the insane shifted with changing social values. He argued 
that psychiatry functioned as a tool of social control that began with 
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a state-sponsored ‘Great Confinement’ of deviant populations.40 
Deinstitutionalisation evidently occurred at a time when arguments 
against psychiatry, and its social purpose, were gathering traction with 
more effective popular media vehicles.
Yet, while the closing of hospitals and focus on care in the commu-
nity might sound unprecedented, it really was unique in size and scale 
alone. The move towards extramural forms of care was not exclusive 
to the mid-twentieth century, with outpatient departments available 
to those who did not require inpatient care pioneered as early as the 
1890s.41 Throughout this plotted history, we can see a desire to maintain 
the healthy mind, by classification and control, early treatment and the 
attempted removal of stigma, by endeavouring to bring mental health 
services in line with physical health. Whatever the legislation, there was 
an increasing focus on maintaining healthy minds and in doing so, main-
taining a healthy society. If Bartlett and Wright’s volume taught us that 
‘the boundaries between the asylum and the community are vague and 
uncertain’,42 then this volume identifies that throughout the twentieth 
century the boundaries between illness and wellness and the unhealthy 
and healthy mind can be similarly contested.
KeePing Minds heaLthy: about the ChaPters
Recent work has identified the importance of preventing mental illness 
and identifying its potential triggers, with Despo Kritsotaki et al. 
observing the modern nature of this particular focus.43 In part, this 
volume seeks to answer the call for more research into this area, as the 
twentieth-century concentration on the healthy mind fits within this 
wider agenda of improved well-being and preventative mental health 
care. The objective of this book is to explore, what might be described 
as, the sprawl of mental health over the course of the twentieth century. 
This might be inelegant language, but there is a focus in the twenty-first 
century, at least in the Western world, on making sure that we are doing 
our best to keep our minds healthy. Cases in point are present-day con-
cerns about the amount of time children, and adults, spend looking at 
digital screens; the negative effects of social media on everyday lives; anx-
ieties about the body and self-image; and the consequences of substance 
abuse, particularly the emergence of synthetic drugs that are affordable 
and readily available. The contributions to this volume adopt an histor-
ical lens to help understand this present preoccupation with the healthy 
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mind. Such an approach has meant that author contributions feature a 
diverse range of content, from traditional pauper lunatic asylums through 
to popular visual culture. Nevertheless, three broad themes, amongst 
others, emerge across the chapters that follow.
The first of these is the legal and medical classification of mental 
illness and disability, which has been a recurrent theme in the litera-
ture. At the beginning of the twentieth century, psychiatrists were fasci-
nated with the distinction between mental health and learning disability, 
increasingly finding new ways of classifying those that they described 
as mentally defective and developing various gradations of the condi-
tion. The solutions that emerged to this supposed social problem were 
segregation of the afflicted, from society, as well as other populations of 
the insane, in order to create new physical spaces for their education and 
treatment.44 Chapters by Steve Taylor and Jan Walmsley focus heavily on 
these emerging classifications and their significance. Walmsley, in particu-
lar, identifies the importance of labelling from a social perspective, while 
demonstrating the fluidity of language and the unintended legacies of 
medical classification.
With the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1968, and its subsequent iterations, psy-
chiatrists were buoyed by an international classificatory system that was 
grounded in science and data. The contributions from Erika Dyck and 
Ginny Russell, Michelle O’Reilly et al. and Alice Brumby all explore how 
the new medical confidence in classification affected perception, stigma, 
treatment and lived experience of learning disability, autism and schiz-
ophrenia throughout the twentieth century. O’Reilly et al. discuss the 
evolution of autism, or as it has been described the ‘twentieth-century 
disorder’. Their chapter highlights contested definitions, the challenges 
of applying labels to spectral disorders and the fractured nature of lived 
experience for those identifying as ‘autistic’. Building on this, the chapter 
from Dyck and Russell examines how, in some circumstances, the iden-
tities created by medical classification fed into disability rights activism 
and the emergence of the Neurodiversity Movement (NDM) in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. The growth of the NDM represented 
a complex relationship with medical labels, often appropriating medical 
languages such as ‘patient’, ‘mad’ and ‘autistic’ and redefining meanings 
to meet the specific needs of individuals at certain times and places. The 
nature of identity and experience is developed further in Alice Brumby’s 
chapter. This contribution explores the growth of a relative’s support 
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organisation, which became the National Schizophrenia Fellowship, 
established in the 1970s. It aimed to meet the support needs of rela-
tives and families by providing coping strategies that covered a variety 
of issues, ranging from stigma to caring for a family member. The use 
of oral history and archival material enables this chapter to argue that 
the friendship and support networks established by the Fellowship were 
an important way of dealing with the illness in the ‘healthy minds’ of 
non-schizophrenic relatives and caregivers.
The second theme that emerges is the plethora of places and spaces 
occupied by those living with unhealthy minds. These were mostly con-
ceived by professionals or other stakeholders in a belief that they would 
be well-suited to treating or observing mental illness or disability. The 
volume opens with Alice Mauger’s discussion of alcohol addiction in 
Ireland and the treatment of inebriates inside three institutions for luna-
tics. This chapter charts debates about alcohol-related lunacy and how 
it was best treated in a climate of nationalism and religion, and it par-
ticularly draws out the complicated relationship between alcoholism 
and the medical community’s role in treating it. Moving outside of asy-
lum walls, Rachel Hewitt considers diversifying institutional approaches 
to epilepsy treatment through an examination of specialist services in 
Britain and the USA between 1905 and 1965. She observes the similar-
ities between epileptic colonies and open-air schools, marking a depar-
ture from asylum treatment and confinement for this class of patient. 
In these new spaces of well-being, walls were permeable, admission 
voluntary and treatment designed to improve the whole self. The colo-
nies were about providing stigma-free employment and maintaining the 
healthy mind in spite of illness. This relationship between employment 
and the healthiness of the mind recurs in a number of chapters. Steve 
Taylor’s chapter highlights how special education emerged at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century as a mechanism for classifying and filtering 
those who could maintain independent lives from those that could not. 
In essence, state-sponsored education functioned as a measure of sur-
veillance that sought to establish a healthy workforce while preventing 
the reproduction of unhealthy families. Moving later into the twentieth 
century, maintaining stigma-free employment in a safe space, despite an 
individual’s disability, is central to the contribution from Andy Holroyde. 
Remploy was established in the UK in 1944 as part of the provision of 
the Disabled Persons Employment Act. It operated as a government- 
funded organisation that provided sheltered employment schemes for 
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the disabled. Although it has been assumed that Remploy was  originally 
for those of sound mind, Holroyde’s chapter suggests that those with 
mental disabilities always had a role in the sheltered employment scheme. 
Allowing the mentally ill access to these services became increasingly 
important during the 1980s, to meet the need to provide care services, 
as an ever-increasing number of psychiatric institutions were closed 
down. Subsequently, sheltered employment became an important space 
in which healthy minds were promoted.
The final two chapters in the volume, from Imogen Wiltshire and Rob 
Mayo, link the theme of space with that of treatment. They focus on art, 
literature and film, as an important source of healing and well-being, and 
showcasing how the healthy mind has been represented and contested in 
the arts. Looking at a range of artistic and cultural practices, Wiltshire’s 
contribution argues that these artistic movements were often at the cen-
tre of defining and creating healthy minds. The chapter identifies that in 
the first half of the twentieth century, the practice of viewing, making 
and creating art was associated with mental well-being. With a discussion 
that stretches from Surrealism to occupational and art therapy, the chap-
ter illuminates a variety of historical relationships between art and men-
tal health care. Moving into the world of popular science fiction in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, Rob Mayo’s work focuses on inner 
space and dream-hacking as an important and influential sub-genre that 
focused upon the inner workings of the mind. The texts and films fea-
tured in Chapter 11 present popular twentieth-century understandings 
of how the mind works, the damage it can sustain and how it might be 
fixed. Many of the texts identify a hierarchy between the unhealthy mind 
and the healthy mind attempting to understand it. Echoing other chap-
ters in the volume, the spaces that feature in the texts include a variety 
of locations, from the walls of a traditional abandoned asylum to non- 
institutional or non-psychiatric spaces.
ConCLusions
Collectively the contributions to this volume look at a plurality of 
domains, spaces and places in which healthy and unhealthy minds have 
been represented, dissected and treated throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. As the twenty-first century develops and a raft of new records 
becomes available, the twentieth century will become even more fruit-
ful to historians. Perhaps the accessibility of sources has led to the 
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dominance of studies into eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, predom-
inantly institutional, mental health care. Historically, the rules on confi-
dentiality and the destruction of records make twentieth-century records 
more difficult to access than nineteenth-century counterparts.45 Despite 
this, however, research into twentieth-century institutions and loci of 
care are becoming more frequent within the historiography. Focusing on 
the twentieth century, and building on the work of Bartlett and Wright’s 
influential edited collection Outside the Walls of the Asylum, this vol-
ume aims to look beyond the walls of psychiatric institutions. Certainly, 
throughout the twentieth century, health care professionals and policy-
makers have broadened and diversified the role of mental health care and 
opened up new spheres and centres for creating healthy minds. From 
the opening of child guidance and outpatient clinics to experiments with 
drugs, the twentieth century created new ways of policing and assessing 
the mind. This volume seeks to shed new light on these practices and 
centres which aimed to maintain the healthy minds of the collective and 
individual in a transnational context.
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introduCtion
In 1904, members of the Medico-Psychological Association (MPA) 
met at a conference in Dublin. On one point, attendees were practically 
unanimous, as evidence was produced ‘from every side’ of the ‘disastrous 
effects everywhere observed’ of drink. In response to this event, the 
Journal of Mental Science issued a rallying cry:
It may cause some searching of conscience to ask whether our profession 
as a whole, and particularly our speciality, have up to the present taken a 
sufficient leading part in the holy war against alcohol. It is high time for 
our Irish colleagues to make themselves heard upon this subject, when in 
at least one asylum one third of the male admissions are attributed chiefly 
to this cause.1
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Their shared sense of urgency—even culpability—is understandable. By 
now, Irish asylums had come to serve, among their catalogue of func-
tions, as major receptacles for inebriates.2 But this situation had never 
been deliberate. In spite of their outward preoccupation with the Irish 
‘drink problem’, medical practitioners, late Victorian reformers and 
the state had reached little consensus on how best to deal with the 
chronically drunken. The short-lived system of inebriate reformatories, 
consigned to the shadows of criminality and the penal system, did lit-
tle to tackle the professed ‘epidemic’ of inebriety sweeping through 
pre-Independence Ireland.3 Meanwhile, members of the medical com-
munity contemplated alternatives ranging from treatment at home to 
physical force. While these practitioners continued to debate whether 
alcoholism was a cause of insanity—or insanity itself—by 1900, ‘intem-
perance in drink’ accounted for one in ten asylum admissions.4 This 
chapter explores the evolution of medicine’s role in framing and treating 
alcoholism in Ireland, from the 1890s until the creation of the Irish Free 
State in 1922.5 Centring on medical discourses and asylum records, it 
queries how, why and to what extent medical practitioners came to influ-
ence the treatment, care and rehabilitation of alcohol-related admissions 
to Irish asylums.
This investigation marks a new departure in histories of alcohol use 
and misuse in Ireland. It also contributes to international discourses 
surrounding the role of medicine and particularly psychiatry, in under-
standing and treating alcoholism. Although Irish drink consumption 
patterns have been variously attributed to economic, legal, social and 
recreational changes, there has been little consideration of the rap-
idly professionalising medical community’s attitudes towards excessive 
drinking and alcohol addiction at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Likewise, the long-held ‘drunken Irish’ stereotype, still prevalent, has 
been assessed from several viewpoints, but there has been no investi-
gation of how the Irish medical community interpreted and informed 
this labelling. As this chapter demonstrates, Irish medical practitioners 
remained conscious of this racial typecasting. On the other side of the 
seemingly pervasive heavy drinking culture in Ireland, was the endurance 
of various temperance organisations boasting staggering membership 
figures.6 Like their British colleagues, some Irish doctors were heavily 
influenced by temperance ideology. Meanwhile, as this chapter reveals, 
several asylum patients admitted for alcohol-related causes would take or 
had previously taken an abstinence pledge. The Irish relationship with 
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alcohol was further complicated by the notion that sobriety was essential 
for successful national self-governance,7 a position that was not lost on 
certain Irish doctors. As will be argued, while alcoholism was very much 
on the medical agenda internationally during this period, in Ireland it 
became imbued with a discrete set of cultural and political ideas.
Patient records for the Enniscorthy District Lunatic Asylum in the 
southeast of Ireland, the Belfast District Lunatic Asylum in the north 
of Ireland and St. Patrick’s Hospital in Dublin are a key source in this 
study. Enniscorthy and Belfast were two of the twenty-two district 
(public) asylums which, by 1900, collectively housed almost 16,000 
patients.8 The state had authorised the creation of these institutions 
in 1817 for the ‘lunatic poor’, and they continued to serve that group 
almost exclusively.9 St. Patrick’s, meanwhile, was one of four voluntary 
asylums, all Dublin-based, which offered both private and non-private 
care. Founded from the bequest of Irish writer and dean of St. Patrick’s 
Cathedral, Jonathan Swift in 1757, St. Patrick’s initially received patients 
from all social classes but as the district asylums grew, fee-paying patients 
from the ‘middling classes’ increasingly came to form the patient popu-
lation there. Importantly, there were also, by 1900, 13 private asylums, 
providing mostly expensive accommodation for the wealthiest mem-
bers of society. Their role in caring for Ireland’s inebriates is examined 
through official records, including the annual reports of the lunacy 
inspectors. From 1845, the inspectors—all medical men—were required 
to visit all ‘receptacles for the insane’ and reported annually on their 
observations. These doctors, who remained central figures in lunacy 
administration, also commented on the role Irish asylums played in treat-
ing alcohol-related disorders.
MediCaL disCourses
By the 1890s, there is little question that Irish medical practitioners, like 
their European and American colleagues, had come to redefine what we 
now term alcoholism as a disease rather than a vice.10 Although the key 
features of the disease concept were in place by the 1770s, physicians 
including Thomas Trotter in Britain and Benjamin Rush in America have 
historically been credited as ‘discovering’ the disease view at the turn of 
the nineteenth century.11 As Roy Porter has shown convincingly, this was 
because wider social developments at the dawn of the nineteenth cen-
tury, including Evangelical Christianity, the temperance movement and 
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the increasing status of medicine, were a crucial setting within which the 
disease concept could thrive.12 It was at this point that doctors began 
outlining a specific medical condition. The term Trunksucht, literally 
meaning ‘manic thirst’, was coined in 1819 by the German-Russian 
doctor, C. von Brühl-Cramer, and was translated as ‘dipsomania’: a 
pre-existing condition giving rise to a craving for alcohol.13 While for 
Brühl-Cramer, this was a disease of the nervous system, twenty years 
later, the renowned French alienist Jean Étienne Esquirol, contended 
that dipsomania was a mental disease, manifested by the inability to 
abstain from intoxicating liquor. Esquirol classified dipsomania as a form 
of partial insanity—monomania—a category he invented to diagnose 
patients who were unable to reason properly on one particular subject 
but were otherwise lucid.14
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Swedish doctor, Magnus Huss, 
provided the first clinical description of the disease he called ‘chronic 
alcoholism’. By now, some form of disease theory had gained accept-
ance among many British doctors, including Alexander Peddie.15 Yet 
while Peddie favoured Esquirol’s conception of habitual drunkenness as 
a specific mental disease—dipsomania—Huss saw chronic alcoholism 
as a disease of the nervous system with a primarily physiological origin. 
These divisions were not clear-cut, however; in fact, the fluidity of medi-
cal thought in this era led to the terms often being used interchangeably. 
By the 1880s, another term—‘inebriety’—had entered the fray, following 
its popularisation by the Glaswegian doctor, Norman Kerr. Inebriety dif-
fered in that it described an inability to resist all drugs rather than  simply 
alcohol; meanwhile, Kerr tended to oscillate between ‘alcoholism’ and 
‘dipsomania’ when discussing alcohol, while others often used ‘inebriety’ 
when referring solely to alcohol.16 Kerr was the leading British champion 
of the disease (rather than ‘vice’) view. In 1884, he became a founding 
member and president of the British Society for the Study of Inebriety and 
soon after, published his Inebriety, Its Aetiology, Pathology, Treatment and 
Jurisprudence (1888), which became the standard text on the topic.17
In Ireland, the disease view gained currency in public arenas, as 
 evidenced in the national and regional press.18 Yet the belief, shared by 
many, that the drunkard was to blame for their condition and therefore 
deserved punishment was resilient.19 As a review of Kerr’s famous work 
Inebriety published in the Dublin Journal of Medical Science in 1888 
illustrates concisely, this shift met with some resistance from Irish medi-
cal commentators. The review began:
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The main object of Dr Kerr’s work seems to be to establish Inebriety (why 
not call it “Drunkenness”?) as a recognised disease, the prevention and 
treatmenttreatment of which comes within the province of medical men.
Although the reviewers subscribed to the importance of establishing a 
‘disease’ framework, they criticised Kerr for seeming ‘to neglect the moral 
responsibility of the intemperate, and their power of avoiding the excit-
ing and continuing cause of the disease condition’.20 As will be seen, 
while Irish doctors frequently looked to European and American exam-
ples when trying to solve Ireland’s ‘drink problem’, they were not simply 
blind followers of international thought. Rather, they engaged with and 
informed wider international debates on inebriety, leaning on evidence 
gathered from practising medicine in Ireland. In the case of Kerr, now 
widely recognised as having been a leading specialist on inebriety,21 the 
Irish medical community quickly warmed up. Just a year later, a review of 
the second edition of Inebriety in the same journal conceded that it had 
‘rapidly been adopted as a handbook’, lauding the doctor’s ‘long and var-
ied experience’ and the ‘illustrative and interesting cases’ he presented.22
By the 1890s, Irish medical men, including Ephraim MacDowel 
Cosgrave, began publishing vigorously on inebriety and its treatment. 
Cosgrave, who trained in Ireland at Trinity College Dublin and quali-
fied as a medical doctor in 1878, initially practised medicine in England. 
He later returned to Dublin, becoming a fellow (1887) and then presi-
dent (1914–1916) of the Royal College of Physicians of Ireland, as well 
as physician to several Dublin hospitals.23 Like Kerr, who was a member 
of the Church of England Temperance Society, Cosgrave was an enthu-
siastic temperance advocate and served as president of the Irish branch 
of the British Medical Temperance Association.24 In 1897, he published 
a brief history of the Dublin Total Abstinence Society and in 1901, a 
book outlining experimental proofs on the role of alcohol.25 In the 
meantime, he had become an active contributor to the Dublin Journal 
of Medical Science, which would later become the official organ of the 
Royal Academy of Medicine in Ireland.26
Cosgrave’s views on inebriety were explicit in his presidential 
address to the Section of State Medicine at the Royal Academy of 
Medicine in Ireland in 1892 on ‘the Control of Inebriates’. He advo-
cated for extended powers for the treatment of inebriates and, perhaps 
predictably given his allegiance to temperance, recommended total 
abstinence as the only course for either class.27 Sceptical of proposals 
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that inebriates were best treated in their homes, he warned that due 
to their ingenuity, unscrupulousness and help from others, it would be 
difficult to keep them from drinking. Drawing on his personal expe-
rience as a hospital physician, Cosgrave determined that even in that 
environment, patients managed to acquire alcohol. He therefore urged 
the confinement of inebriates in institutions ‘where they can be con-
trolled – not allowed to have drink sent in, not allowed to go out for 
it’.28 Like many of his contemporaries, Cosgrave was keenly aware of 
developments abroad citing legal developments in England, Scotland, 
America and Germany. For Cosgrave, inebriate homes, reshaped by 
new legislation, held the wonder-cure, though he insisted that power 
should be given to family, friends and public authorities to send people 
to them.29 This marked a renewed campaign from the Irish medical 
community and the press for further institutional measures for chronic 
drunkards.30
It also mirrored developments in Britain. A key aim for Kerr’s 
Society for the Study of Inebriety was to secure state-supported legisla-
tion which, it hoped, would establish medical treatment for inebriates 
and generate the expansion of the inebriate homes system. As Virginia 
Berridge has observed, the disease concept assumed hegemony in this 
period not due to the discovery of new medical ideas but because of 
a particular combination of social forces.31 Thus, medical approaches 
to alcohol use were at least partly rooted in late Victorian ideologi-
cal assumptions, as the disease model’s entry into the public domain 
was not the achievement of a politically neutral scientific encounter but 
via the creation of quasi-penal institutions for the restraint and reha-
bilitation of the habitual drunkard.32 For some historians, influenced 
by the ideas of Michel Foucault, these developments are evidence 
of the extension of the ‘clinical gaze’: the control of populations by 
pathologising and medicalising deviancy. Yet the lack of a unified dis-
ease theory of drunkenness, partly arising from the fact that inebriety 
sat uneasily with theories of rationality and reason, undermines this 
interpretation.33
Not all members of the Irish medical community were convinced of 
the need for further coercive legislation. In a particularly indignant back-
lash, the reviewers of the third edition of Kerr’s Inebriety book wrote in 
the Dublin Journal of Medical Science in 1895:
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We object to the grandmotherly legislation and coercion. The liberty of 
the subject is sufficiently restricted already, and the patience with which 
millions of law-respecting citizens tolerate the curtailment of their personal 
liberty lest a weak brother should offend is a marvellous testimony to our 
inborn respect for law. Restrictions and pledges cannot create an Utopia.34
This tirade was almost certainly a reaction to the Intoxicating Liquors 
(Ireland) Bill and Irish Sunday Closing Bill, intended to introduce further 
restricted weekend opening hours for public houses. The reviewers’ con-
cerns resonated with contemporary nationalist sentiment at a time when 
Irish politicians were making strides towards Home Rule for Ireland.35 
In 1891, Charles Stewart Parnell, the then leader of the Irish Home 
Rule Party, had denounced the Intoxicating Liquors Bill as ‘a patronising 
attempt on the part of the majority of English members in the House of 
Commons to make the Irish people sober’.36 In fact, by this time, most 
Irish nationalists perceived ‘attacks on Irish drinking habits as attacks on 
the Irish people’, claiming that parliament was spending too much time on 
the drink question at the expense of more pressing concerns. The general 
consensus at this point was that the related issues of temperance and liquor 
licensing could be dealt with by an Irish legislature.37
While the reviewers of Kerr’s book were not totally opposed to his 
arguments, they protested that he was a ‘well-known advocate of teeto-
talism’, ‘pledges’ and ‘legal restriction against the consumption of alco-
hol’. They also condemned the author’s use of his ‘favourite illustration’, 
the eradication of ether-drinking in County Tyrone, suggesting that it 
was the influence of Father Mathew’s temperance campaign during the 
1840s which had caused this problem in the first place:
Thus from Cork to Belfast, Ireland is made a sober kingdom. But the 
peasant took neither to tea, coffee, nor Bovril. At fairs, wakes, and  
dances he found the so-called cordials, consisting of raw corn whisky and 
flavoured syrup in the south; and, in the thrifty north, methylated ether, 
was his panacea for trouble.38
Although they were pleased to observe the decline of ether consumption 
in the area by some 90%, a result of it being scheduled as a poison, the 
reviewers were anxious that alcohol should not follow suit and evoked 
the spectre of prohibition in the US state of Maine:
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Are we to christen publicans “druggists?” And are we, as in Maine, USA, 
to call on our pharmaceutical chemist for a “mint pick-me-up” instead of 
going to our hotel or public-house?39
The tirade did not end there. They concluded that:
Reform never came from faddists. Their exaggerations disgust the unbi-
ased. The work of making Great Britain and Ireland a sober nation is the 
work of the broad-minded common sense people in our midst.40
Alarm over the potential intrusion of further restrictive laws was slow to 
be realised, however. In fact, it was not until 1906, after twenty-eight 
years of debate, that a partial Sunday Closing Act was made permanent 
in Ireland.41
In spite of the Draconian spirit of some of Cosgrave’s suggestions, the 
physician concluded by affirming his belief that:
in many cases inebriety is a disease closely allied to insanity and susceptible 
of successful treatment, if power is given to keep the patient from drink for 
a sufficiently long period; and believing that the sooner the case is taken in 
hand the more is the probability of cure.42
There was nothing remarkably new about Cosgrave’s alignment of ine-
briety with insanity. In fact, the belief that drunkenness caused madness 
had its roots in the late eighteenth century, where it was discussed in the 
works of physicians including Trotter and Rush. As we have seen, many 
influential alienists had adopted this framework and by the 1850s, it was 
widely accepted by medical men.43
Cosgrave’s paper spawned mixed reactions. While the doctors pres-
ent were unanimously courteous and expressed their gratitude to him 
for raising the topic, many offered contrasting solutions. Among them, 
one practitioner, a Dr. Davys, suggested that the only successful treat-
ment or cure for the intermittent drinker was for a physician to recom-
mend (with the family’s approval) a strong male attendant who could be 
employed to ‘wait on the inebriate, and by physical force prevent him 
taking any alcohol, the patient to be kept in the house’. According to 
Davys, this gave families much greater privacy and was bound to cure the 
drunkard within about three days. The same course should be adopted if 
(and often when) the ‘patient breaks out again’. Apparently once patients 
returned to their sober state, they fully approved their treatment.44 
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The Medical Inspector of the Local Government Board, Edgar Flinn, 
diverged in his approach, urging that inebriates should be removed from 
the home and ‘in some instances, they might with propriety be placed 
in asylums’.45 This proposal was contentious and did not meet with 
agreement from most asylum doctors. Rather, as Mark Finnane has rea-
soned, the failure of inebriate reformatories and retreats gave rise to a 
scenario where the ‘asylum was an easy last resort’.46 In France, alienists 
were equally unsure about the suitability of asylums as treatment centres 
for alcoholics, who they blamed for the silting up of asylums, especially 
in Paris.47 This issue gained increased attention in nineteenth-century 
Ireland, where the significance of alcoholism as a cause of insanity was 
contested.48
aLCohoLisM and asyLuMs
While the Irish psychiatric community had strong professional ties with 
its British counterpart, including several Irish members of the MPA49 and 
Irish participation in the Journal of Mental Science, Irish asylum doctors 
did deviate from the frameworks of their British colleagues.50 Coinciding 
with their appointment as lunacy inspectors in 1890, Drs. George 
Plunkett O’Farrell and E. Maziere Courtenay hastily warded off sugges-
tions that asylums might offer care for those considered intemperate but 
not mentally ill.51 But they were soon forced to recognise that voluntary 
patients no longer deemed insane but who wished to remain in private 
asylums hoping to recover from alcohol dependence could do so. Because 
voluntary boarders could neither be detained against their will, nor reg-
istered as lunatics, the inspectors concluded that their admission would 
benefit those unable to care for themselves at home.52 By this time, some 
private asylums had clearly assumed the role of rehabilitation centres for 
those who could pay the high fees charged to lodge in them.
This is unsurprising, given that private asylum care was almost 
exclusively the preserve of the wealthy. Evaluating the feasibility of 
creating ‘receptacles for dipsomaniacs’ in 1875, the former lunacy 
inspectors, John Nugent and George William Hatchell,53 speculated that 
drunkenness among the ‘lower orders without social position or means’ 
was treated as an offence or misdemeanour, while among the ‘better and 
richer classes’ it was often perceived as an ‘incipient malady’.54 For the 
rich, then, a tendency to overindulge in drink may have been viewed 
as more deserving of asylum care. In fact, during the late nineteenth 
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century, private asylum patients were more likely to be admitted due to 
alcohol than the poorer patients sent to voluntary and especially district 
asylums. The reverse is true for Britain, where drink was less often iden-
tified as a symptom of illness among private asylum patients in England 
and was usually associated with the working classes in Scotland.55
If the lunacy inspectors were quite content for private asylums to 
function in this way, the ever-expanding state-funded district asylums 
were a different matter. In 1893, Courtenay and O’Farrell issued a circu-
lar to the resident medical superintendent (RMS) of each district asylum 
asking them to account for the alleged increase of insanity in Ireland. 
In response, they mostly concurred that insanity was not directly caused 
by alcohol.56 This diverged from contemporary discourses in France 
and Britain where alcohol was cited as a chief cause.57 In Ireland, some 
medical superintendents recognised excessive drinking as a manifesta-
tion of existing insanity, others cited adulterated alcohol as a cause, and 
still more believed that the habitual drunkard produced offspring liable 
to insanity, including epileptics.58 These views had also been expressed 
by Cosgrave, who argued that the heredity fallout from inebriety caused 
neuroses in the descendants including hysteria, epilepsy and inebriety 
itself.59 This was to be expected, given the well-established links between 
alcohol and degeneration which occupied much of the contemporary 
dialogue on the alleged increase of insanity in Ireland and elsewhere.60 
The rise of eugenics had influenced the campaign for Irish inebriate 
reformatories, where much of the attention was directed towards wom-
en’s drinking.61 Similarly in Britain, the major concern about alcohol was 
with the impact of women’s drinking on the future of the race.62
While consensus had apparently been reached as to the hereditary 
nature of alcoholism, asylum doctors working in rural and urban  districts 
made contrasting observations about the consequences of excessive 
drinking. In his response to the circular, L. T. Griffin, the RMS at the 
Killarney asylum, claimed:
I cannot consider that with our rural population its abuse is a very prom-
inent cause of insanity in this district. The peasant drinks to excess occa-
sionally at fairs, weddings, wakes, & c., but he is not a habitual drinker, 
rather he is a total abstainer except on such occasions. However, this occa-
sional debauch with its consequent poverty and insufficient food to the 
family, probably exercises an injurious influence, and so far the abuse of 
alcohol must be held to be a cause.63
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By contrast, Edward D. O’Neill, the RMS at the Limerick asylum, wrote: 
‘there is not a shadow of a doubt abuse of alcohol swells our asylum pop-
ulation, not so much in country districts as in large towns and cities’.64 
In a similar vein, Conolly Norman, the renowned RMS of the Richmond 
asylum in Dublin (later known as Grangegorman), stated that in asylums 
which contained large urban populations, many cases were admitted 
directly due to drink while ‘doubtless very many more’ were indirectly 
related.65 These responses support Catherine Cox’s finding that while 
Irish asylum doctors’ explanations for the alleged increase of insanity in 
Ireland were mostly in line with the British and European intellectual 
climate, they also drew upon their personal and cultural understandings 
of their patient populations.66 Although those in the British country-
side also tended to drink less than those in British towns and cities,67 
Ireland’s overwhelmingly rural character posed a different paradigm for 
medical practitioners working in these areas.
The same can be said for the wider Irish medical community, for 
whom these arguments still resonated a decade later. In 1904, a reviewer 
of an issue of the British periodical, The Medical Temperance Review for 
the Dublin Journal of Medical Science, remarked:
That a more than dimensional proportion of the interest of the alcohol 
question is justly due to Ireland is well known to its every intelligent 
inhabitant. The evils of alcoholism are spread out before our pain-stricken 
vision in every lane and alley of our metropolis; and, to a slighter degree, 
in all our towns and villages.68
The notion that sobriety was essential for successful national 
self-governance also coloured medical opinion. The reviewer went on to 
articulate the well-worn ‘Ireland Sober, Ireland Free’ dictum:
One of the heaviest blows which a patriotic Ireland could possibly inflict 
on its neighbouring British rulers would be given by taking the pledge all 
round – old and young – and keeping it! Why, we often say to ourselves, 
do not patriotic politicians utilise this fact?69
This interpretation was by no means peculiar to Irish medicine. As 
Diarmaid Ferriter has shown, temperance campaigners were also 
alarmed by the recognition that the terms ‘drink’ and ‘Irish’ were 
becoming interchangeable in a caricature which was seen to diminish 
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and downgrade Irish claims to independence.70 Adherence to the well-
known stereotype of the ‘drunken Irish’ was certainly visible among non-
Irish contributors to the Journal of Mental Science. In 1900, an article 
described the year’s ‘statistics of drink’ as ‘puzzling’ and appearing
to prove some facts oddly at variance with common notions; for instance, 
that a luxurious use of intoxicating drinks is increasing in some circles in 
these islands, and that Englishmen are very much more drunken than 
Scottish or Irish folk.71
The Irish press seized upon statistics of this nature as evidence that they 
‘remove from our country the slur which British moralists would cast 
upon her’. Nonetheless, they were careful not to deny that ‘intemper-
ance is a terrible evil in our midst’.72 Irish contributors to the Journal 
of Mental Science, however, did not respond to such findings, appar-
ently choosing instead to remain largely silent on the issue. This per-
haps reflected the distance many Irish asylum doctors perceived between 
themselves and their largely peasant patient population, pointing to class 
differences within the drink question more broadly, which were permeat-
ing psychiatry.
Calls for the Irish psychiatric community to engage in the ‘holy war 
against alcohol’ also reverberated with Irish temperance rhetoric. In 
1899, Archbishop John Ireland had delivered a thundering address to 
the Irish Sunday Closing and Early Saturday Closing campaign in which 
he had incited a ‘modern holy war’ against excessive drinking and cas-
tigated the considerable number of public houses in Ireland.73 At the 
1904 MPA conference, the eminent RMS at the Enniscorthy District 
Lunatic Asylum, Thomas Drapes,74 echoed the Archbishop, when he 
pointed out that ‘there is one lunatic or idiot in Ireland to every 178 
of the present population and one public-house to every 176!’ Drapes 
observed that for the ‘neurotic’ and the person disposed to drink, every 
one of these ubiquitous public houses was an ever-recurring tempta-
tion.75 While Drapes was especially resolute about the damaging effects 
of alcohol and showed keen support for temperance activities in his local 
community,76 his views were also representative of a large segment of 
the Irish medical community. The doctor’s apparent preoccupation with 
drink is predictable, given he, like many of his colleagues, was a prot-
estant, Trinity-educated doctor of Anglo-Irish extraction. Following 
the demise of Fr Theobald Mathew’s remarkably successful temperance 
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‘crusade’ in the 1840s, the temperance movement had come to be seen 
largely as the ‘preserve of middle-class, pro-British protestants who used 
it to bolster their own position while at the same time denigrating the 
customs and habits of their Catholic social inferiors’.77 Yet by the early 
twentieth century, some increasingly militant Irish nationalists were find-
ing much in common with the new Catholic temperance movement, the 
Pioneers’ Total Abstinence Association, particularly the renewed belief 
that sobriety held the key to Irish independence.78 Thus, while Drapes 
was an unlikely ally of the nationalist cause,79 some members of the Irish 
medical community were absorbing and even propagating their ideology. 
The heavily politicised nature of the Irish drink question in this era was 
clearly giving rise to multiple interpretations among doctors.
In spite of appeals to engage in the ‘holy war’, the Irish psychiatric 
community made little further remark on alcoholism in the ensuing dec-
ades. In 1912, two new lunacy inspectors, Drs. Thomas I. Considine 
and William R. Dawson, carried out a nationwide survey which exam-
ined the correlation between asylum committal rates and a range of 
social behaviours including alcohol consumption. Their findings led 
them to conclude there was no significant connection between asylum 
size and rates of drunkenness.80 In their subsequent reports, they made 
no comment on the high rates assigned the cause of alcohol, although 
they continued to measure them. By this point, alcohol was coming to 
be viewed as a ‘stumbling block’ for the already ‘unstable brain’, again 
mirroring shifts in European contexts.81 Discussion of the links between 
alcoholism and heredity also ground to a halt in the early twentieth 
century. In 1910, degeneration theory had become hotly contested when 
Karl Pearson and Ethel Elderton at the Galton Laboratory for National 
Eugenics at University College London found ‘no discernible connec-
tion between parental alcoholism and mental defects in their children’.82 
Meanwhile, the ‘increasing influence of the Freudian movement also 
hastened the end of degenerationist thought’.83 The collapse of the ine-
briate homes system both in Ireland and in Britain also undermined med-
ical authority, given the very public medical support for this initiative. As 
debates on the physiological and psychological effects of alcohol raged 
on in Britain throughout the First World War,84 and in the United States, 
the seeds of prohibition were actively being sown, in Ireland, any further 
medical involvement in the drink question was apparently deferred until 
after the War of Independence (1919–1921) and subsequent partition 
(1922–1923) of the island into two separate states.
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diagnosing aLCohoLisM
In spite of the Irish psychiatric community’s inertia in solving the drink 
question, in their daily practice asylum doctors regularly identified and 
attempted to treat alcohol-related illnesses. Asylum admissions related 
to alcohol remained consistently high in the decades leading up to inde-
pendence. According to the lunacy inspectors, in 1890 one in eight 
men and one in twenty-two women were admitted to district asylums 
for ‘intemperance’.85 In December of that year, one in eleven men and 
one in twenty-six women were in voluntary and private asylums owing 
to ‘intemperance in drink’.86 In the last report published prior to inde-
pendence in 1919, alcohol was considered the chief cause for one in six-
teen patients and one of multiple factors for almost one in ten, with rates 
remaining higher for men than for women.87
While drink was very often identified as a cause of insanity, alcohol- 
related diagnoses were far less common. Among those admitted to 
 district asylums in 1890, just one in seventeen men and one in thirty-five 
women were diagnosed with mania a potu, a form of insanity attributed 
to excessive alcohol consumption, which, like mania itself, was charac-
terised by excited or violent symptoms and sometimes identified with 
delirium tremens.88 Reflecting the approval of private asylums as suita-
ble establishments for inebriates, mania a potu was more commonly diag-
nosed in patients admitted to voluntary and private asylums; in the same 
year, one in thirteen men and one in fourteen women were diagnosed 
with this disorder.89 By 1909, the last year for which figures for mania 
a potu or any other alcohol-related disorder were included in the annual 
reports, this pattern was reversed with one in sixteen of men and one 
in fifty-six women sent to district asylums diagnosed with this disorder, 
compared to one in eighteen men and only one in 143 women sent to 
voluntary or private asylums.90
The trends are similar for patients admitted to Belfast, Enniscorthy 
and St. Patrick’s asylums. Nearly all of the alcohol-related admissions to 
these institutions were attributed to alcohol. Of these 901 patients, 524 
were assigned alcohol only, a further 246 were assigned the additional 
cause of heredity, but only 160 were diagnosed with an alcohol-related 
disorder. Instead, almost half were diagnosed simply with mania. This 
departs significantly from trends in the Sainte-Anne asylum in Paris, 
where diagnoses of alcoholism made up almost a quarter of male admis-
sions, and was said to have contributed to a further 7.3%.91 These 
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divergences in diagnostic and aetiological categorisation in the Irish case 
reflect different medical understandings of alcoholism as a contribut-
ing factor of mental disorder rather than mental illness itself. Of course, 
the causes assigned tell us as much about lay, as they do medical defini-
tions. The medical certificates which accompanied patients on admission 
allowed certifying doctors—usually not psychiatrists—to record cause 
of illness, and this was heavily based on information provided by family 
and friends. On admission, asylum doctors could then choose to con-
firm or alter this information.92 While medical rather than lay authorities 
therefore had the final say over what was recorded, there is little doubt 
that the attitudes towards alcohol of those committing patients, includ-
ing poor law and judicial official, friends, relatives and even the patients 
themselves, were represented.93
Case notes for individual patients shed light on the diverse criteria 
applied when citing alcohol as a cause of illness. Both the quantity of 
alcohol taken and the length of time a patient had been drinking varied 
widely. At Belfast, one patient assigned the cause of ‘drink’ had report-
edly ‘been drunk all his life’, yet another had been drinking hard for only 
two weeks prior to taking ill, consuming ‘110 glasses of whiskey in the 
fortnight’.94 Meanwhile, an Enniscorthy patient told his doctor that ‘he 
occasionally drank a good deal of porter, up to 7 or 8 bottles in the day 
if he was out on duty or with friends but this would not incapacitate him 
from business’.95 The criteria were equally eclectic at St. Patrick’s. While 
Patrick D. was described as ‘very intemperate – 1 pint at least of whiskey 
being taken for years daily’, Patrick C. was said to have ‘been drinking 
but not recently’.96
It is striking how frank many patients were in conversations with asy-
lum doctors. This contradicts the general consensus among many Irish 
medical practitioners, discussed above, that the drunkard could not be 
trusted and usually denied their drinking. Patients and their relatives 
often attempted to rationalise why they drank to excess. As will be dis-
cussed later, the sheer number of public houses and resultant availabil-
ity of drink was cited as a frequent cause for relapse among patients. 
Another common theme was the death of a loved one.97 Maria D., 
admitted to St. Patrick’s with ‘alcoholic insanity’ in 1904, was ‘reported 
to have taken 1½ pints of brandy per day for some time’. She later stated 
that ‘her intemperance was due to shock consequent upon the sudden 
death of her son’.98 In a particularly heart-wrenching set of circum-
stances, Anne L. was admitted to Enniscorthy in 1904 for melancholia 
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caused by the ‘death of child and drink’. Anne had buried five or her six 
children who had all died under the age of eighteen months, and her 
husband stated that after the last child died, ‘she fretted after him and 
he says people gave her whiskey. He can’t say how much but too much’. 
Anne later confirmed her husband’s explanation and was discharged 
recovered the same year.99 Links between excessive drinking and mourn-
ing were not confined to female patients. When Patrick H. was admitted 
to Enniscorthy in 1909, diagnosed with acute melancholia, the causes 
assigned were ‘predisposing: heredity; exciting: death of wife and chil-
dren – drink’. Patrick presented himself at the asylum and asked to be 
taken in saying that his ‘“head was wrong” since the death of his wife 
and he feared he would do some harm to himself and thought of drown-
ing himself in a hole of water’. Patrick’s wife had died while giving birth 
to twins who both died nine days later.100 Another patient, James J., told 
his doctor that ‘ever since his father was drowned in the Noir [river] he 
has “been a fearful man for drinking”’.101
In a number of cases, both halves of a married couple reportedly 
drank to excess and were seen as a bad influence on one another.102 The 
brother of one Enniscorthy patient told Drapes that ‘he thinks it was his 
wife get him deranged, as she drinks too … he did a splendid business 
and was most popular, but thinks that it has gone more or less to [?] 
since both he and wife took to drink’.103 Similarly, the brother-in-law of 
another patient, William McN, told Drapes he believed the patient’s:
Drinking and derangement were all due to his wife “who ought to be in 
the asylum instead of him”. She drinks twice or thrice times what he’d 
drunk. Used to go away from him for 3 or 4 months and then when he 
had no comfort at home he would go to the publics [public houses] and 
drink mostly beer: little or no whiskey”… He says that he (patient) was 
convinced that his wife was trying to poison him. That he is a right good 
fellow and that every one of the neighbours “would die for him.”
When William was discharged less than a month later and his wife 
came to collect him, Drapes noted that she had ‘the aspect of a drink-
ing woman’.104 These examples correspond to Holly Dunbar’s finding 
that women, and especially wives, were expected to steer men away from 
vices and towards sobriety.105 Yet, at least in Enniscorthy, criticism of a 
patient’s spouse was not limited to one gender. In 1906, patient Barbara 
B.’s illness was ascribed to both ‘drink’ and ‘husband’s intemperance’ 
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and the patient told Drapes that ‘her attack was caused by annoyance of 
her husband drinking’. She did, however, admit to drinking up to ‘two, 
four or even six bottles of porter’ when they were given to her. On a 
visit from her husband, the assistant medical officer, Dr. Hugh Kennedy, 
clearly sympathised with the patient, writing of her husband that ‘he had 
drink taken and attempted to beat her – when prevented by Attendant 
Hanna Fenlon became very cheeky and abusive’.106 Cases like these 
demonstrate that in the eyes of medical staff, both husbands and wives 
were potentially corrupting influences on their spouses.
Insight into the type of people admitted to asylums for excessive 
drinking or alcoholism can also be gleaned from patient records. A typ-
ical case for the period from 1890 to 1921 was a man in his thirties or 
forties, who had usually been married, was Roman Catholic and had 
worked in either the agricultural or industrial sector. The much higher 
level of male admissions is expected, given that alcoholism has histori-
cally been viewed as a male problem.107 Thus, while men were often 
over-represented, especially among those committed to rural asylums,108 
they were considerably more likely than women to be described as suffer-
ing from alcohol-related illnesses (between 67.7 and 87%). Prestwich has 
found similar in her study of alcoholics committed to the Sainte-Anne 
asylum in Paris, reflecting the lack of public medical attention geared 
towards female alcoholism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.109 By the First World War, however, there was well-documented 
alarm over female alcoholism, in both Ireland and abroad. Dunbar has 
chronicled the contemporary revulsion for women who drank excessively 
during the First World War in Ireland, a theme which Prestwich has 
identified in the French context.110 These anxieties have been linked to 
women’s changing role in society, while alcoholism in women was often 
associated with sexual immorality.111 Notably, women’s excessive drink-
ing may have more frequently been seen as criminal, as they were more 
likely to be sent to inebriate reformatories than men.112
The occupational profile of male patients in this study contrasts 
somewhat with Prestwich’s characterisation of male alcoholic patients 
admitted to the Sainte-Anne asylum in Paris, who ‘with the exception 
of those in the wine and alcohol trades, were more likely to be vaga-
bonds and unskilled or skilled workers and less likely to be drawn from 
the petty bourgeois categories of clerks and shopkeepers’.113 Predictably, 
the ‘agricultural class’114 made up three-fifths of rural Enniscorthy’s 
male alcohol-related admissions. The ‘industrial class’, which includes 
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dealers, publicans, shoemakers, carpenters, shopkeepers and tailors, was 
well represented in both Enniscorthy (21%) and Belfast (36.8%), while 
the professional and commercial classes were over-represented among 
patients sent to Belfast (12.8%) and St Patrick’s (14.3%). In fact, those in 
the ‘indefinite and non-productive class’ are a good deal lower than the 
national picture.115 While this may tell us more about the recording pro-
cess than implying higher levels of employment among alcohol-related 
admissions, the figure of 40% unemployment among (male and female) 
alcohol-related admissions to St. Patrick’s is at odds with Malcolm’s 
finding that by 1884, nearly two-thirds of the general patient popula-
tion had no occupation.116 What is clear is that the men committed to 
the asylums studied were by no means unproductive layabouts, who had 
long ceased to provide for themselves and their relatives. To use the dic-
tum of the time, they might be considered those who had fallen on hard 
times or the ‘deserving poor’.
The same can be said for the female patients, who were 
over-represented in the industrial classes at both Belfast (27.6%) and 
Enniscorthy (19.1%) compared to the national figure of 8.1% in 1911. 
This group included weavers, dressmakers, spinners, dealers and mill-
workers. In international contexts, occupations like ‘dressmaker’ have 
been revealed as euphemisms for prostitute and some known prostitutes 
in Ireland were returned in the 1901 census as dressmakers, house-
keepers, waitresses and milliners.117 However, given that the occupa-
tions of seven patients (3.8%) in this study were explicitly recorded as 
prostitute, it is unlikely that this was the case here. The proportion of 
women recorded as having ‘no occupation’ is also low by the stand-
ards of total district asylum populations, for whom this was usually 
the largest category, followed by those in the agricultural class.118 This 
high level of employment mirrors that of women admitted for alcohol-
ism to the Sainte-Anne asylum, who were also disproportionately likely 
to have worked outside the home. In the Parisian context, women in 
certain occupations, including cooks, laundresses and male and female 
wine traders, were reported to have regularly ‘drank on the job’.119  
Again, this could be seen as reflecting anxieties about increased activity 
of women in the workplace and by extension, in the public sphere.120 
This line of thought has been visible in modern discourses, where since 
the 1980s the growing visibility of women in the workforce has given 
rise to the stereotype that women performing ‘men’s work’ have come 
to replicate ‘men’s vices’. Conversely, and as Prestwich has argued, given 
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their knowledge that working-class women led ‘hard lives’, French psy-
chiatrists accepted that women, like men, might develop job-related or 
occupational alcoholism.121
Another defining characteristic of alcohol-related admissions to 
asylums was the short periods of time they tended to remain incarcer-
ated.122 Like most asylum patients, half the patients in this study stayed 
for less than six months. Longer stays of five years or more accounted for 
only 17.6% compared to over a quarter of all asylum patients.123 Those 
admitted to St. Patrick’s stayed the shortest length of time, with almost 
three quarters released within the first year. Gender apparently impacted 
on rates of discharge: women were slightly less likely (58.2%) than 
men (66.5%) to be released within a year while they were more likely 
(15.3%) than men (10.1%) to become long-term patients of ten years or 
more. Those who stayed longer had much higher chances of dying in 
the asylum, with 71.1% of those staying between five and ten years and 
93.2% of those staying ten years or more doing so. Short-term patients, 
on the other hand, had very high chances of recovery: 73.1% of those 
released within six months were described as ‘recovered’ and a further 
12.3% as ‘relieved’. Repeated admission, a substantial characteristic in all 
Irish asylums, was also a remarkably strong trait among those suffering 
from alcohol-related illness, both in Ireland and internationally.124 While 
tracing readmissions is not an exact science, at the very least, one in ten 
patients in this study was returned to the asylum and references to previ-
ous confinements in other institutions were not infrequent. Unlike those 
readmitted to the Sainte-Anne asylum, who after two or three times were 
deemed incurable, readmissions did not seem to impact negatively on the 
outcome of patients’ stays.125 In fact, many of those admitted repeatedly 
were likely to be discharged recovered.
treating aLCohoLisM
The high level of readmissions speaks volumes about the lack of effective 
treatment and implies that the general lack of medical consensus about 
alcoholism and mental illness translated to asylum practice. Similar to the 
regime at the Ennis State Inebriate Reformatory,126 treatment for alco-
holic excess or addiction largely followed the ordinary asylum regime of 
good feeding, fresh air and exercise, and occupational therapy.127 Given 
the overcrowding in most district asylums, there were less recreational 
facilities for patients at Belfast and Enniscorthy. Life in a voluntary 
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asylum like St. Patrick’s was apparently more varied, and patients were 
occupied at games like billiards and draughts, playing the piano, cycling 
and going for drives.128 There were a number of commercial cures on 
the market both internationally and in Ireland, especially at the turn of 
the century, ranging from hypnotism to Dr. Keeley’s infamous ‘gold 
cure’ (injections of bichloride of gold) to the ‘Normyl’ cure for Alcohol 
and Drug Addictions (twenty-four days of a medicine which was 75% 
strychnine).129 Yet, aside from the use of strychnine in Enniscorthy and 
St. Patrick’s asylum, such cures were apparently not administered.130 
Likewise, several of the treatments employed at German, Swiss and 
French clinics, including the traditional hydrotherapy and massage, and 
more experimental gymnastics and sunbathing, did not gain currency in 
Ireland.131
In contrast to the State Inebriate Reformatory, where there was very 
little recourse to drug therapy or specific cures, in Irish asylums a num-
ber of drugs, particularly sedatives, were given to patients, usually soon 
after admission when the effects of drink were at their height.132 These 
included hyoscine, mophia, digitalis, paraldehyde, trional, potassium 
bromide and sulphonal. When other treatments failed, solitary confine-
ment was used in some exceptional and usually violent cases. After John 
George F., a patient admitted to St. Patrick’s asylum ‘became violently 
delirious’ he was put into a padded room ‘in a typical state of delirium 
tremens’. When he was deemed to be ‘out of his deliriums’, he was 
released after a total confinement of fifty-nine hours and ten minutes.133 
Similarly in 1906, Enniscorthy patient Andrew S. was put in a padded 
room and given 1/96 grains of hyoscine.134 The need to manage vio-
lent patients did not apparently extend to mechanical restraint, however. 
When Thomas R. was brought in from the New Ross Workhouse in a 
straightjacket in 1909, Kennedy insisted it be ‘removed at once’.135
Abstinence was another important tenet of treating alcoholic excess 
or addiction and naturally one which patients found the most difficult 
to endure. Several patients requested alcohol while in the asylum. At 
St. Patrick’s, Cecelia Frances W. told her doctor ‘she would appreciate 
some good wine’, while William G. R. complained of not being given 
‘“Chablis & Chianti” wine … Frequently asks the writer [asylum doctor] 
for a drink out of the bottle of Port Wine which he says he sees in my 
pocket’.136 At the Ennis Reformatory, the minimum period of detention 
and therefore abstinence was eighteen months but as we have seen asy-
lum patients were frequently released within a few months.137 Moreover, 
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and in spite of the British and Irish medical communities’ increased hos-
tility towards drink and reluctance to prescribe it as medicine, several 
patients were given drink in the asylums studied.138 Surprisingly, it was 
the keen temperance activist, Drapes who most often recorded giving his 
patients drink. In 1891, he wrote ‘I tried substituting bot[tle] of por-
ter for 2 oz of wine but tho’ he said he would like it, he can with diffi-
culty be got to take even some of it’.139 Five years later, he gave another 
patient some ‘whiskey as she was deadly pale and her pulse very weak’.140 
This reflects the duality in medical attitudes towards alcohol in this era, 
wherein many doctors retained their faith in the therapeutic and restor-
ative qualities of alcohol, while acknowledging the dangers of alcohol 
abuse.141
Although more than half the patients in this study whose outcome 
is known were discharged ‘recovered’ and a further 11.7% ‘relieved’, 
the long-term effects of asylum treatment were clearly not succeeding 
in many cases. The lack of aftercare options in Ireland posed profound 
challenges for those released from asylums. While Germany boasted a 
‘network of support groups to assist former drinkers’, there were no 
such organisations in Ireland, save for a handful of philanthropic and 
state-funded societies for discharged prisoners.142 Prestwich has noted 
that in the absence of post-cure care in France, the re-education of the 
drinker was continued by families, support groups and abstinence organi-
sations.143 Similarly in Ireland, the only forms of support outside the asy-
lum were apparently families and the temperance movement, and patients 
were actively encouraged to take the pledge upon release. In fact, a con-
dition of release for several Enniscorthy patients was their promise to do 
so.144 Yet, a number of patients were evidently unable to remain absti-
nent. In 1902, James J., who had been admitted to Enniscorthy previ-
ously with mania a potu said he kept the pledge for two years, but had 
started drinking again in the two weeks leading up to his committal. He 
was again discharged recovered after less than one month in the asylum, 
and Kennedy later noted: ‘keeping very well lately. He took the pledge 
on Saturday and if he keeps it should be all right’. However, about two 
weeks later he provided the following update: ‘heard he is just as bad as 
ever and drinking again’.145 In the same year, William W. also diagnosed 
with mania a potu ‘said he had the pledge till lately, when he began to 
drink again; whiskey and porter and everything he could get: that he had 
been at work steadily up till then’. On discharge it was stated, ‘he appears 
quite well in mind and has taken the Pledge’.146 In some cases, patients 
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actually cited the pledge as the root of their mental distress. John K., 
who was admitted to Enniscorthy with alcoholic insanity, said ‘he drank 
freely up to a month ago when he took the pledge. That he has been 
feeling depressed since then, esp. about something he did wrong at con-
fession’.147 At other times, patients were coerced into taking the pledge. 
In 1908, Enniscorthy patient Peter C. spoke of how he was forced by 
his brother, a priest, to do so.148 This complicates our understanding of 
those who took the pledge in rural Ireland, especially the idea that Irish 
attitudes towards drinking were polarised between those who abstained 
and those who drank excessively.149
As we have seen, the Irish medical community was well aware of 
the temptation to drink in Irish society, not least because of the ready 
availability of alcohol in the abundant public houses. The father of one 
Enniscorthy patient, Philip F., told the assistant medical officer, Kennedy 
that he had asked ‘the Publicans in Kiltealy not to give him drink. When 
they refused to supply him, he used to walk about three miles to get 
it’.150 According to Dr. Oscar Woods, the RMS of the Cork asylum in 
1894, ‘in a large number of cases people who have just come out of 
the asylum are greeted with, “Oh! I am so glad to see you home; come 
and have a drink” and this is too often repeated, and a relapse brought 
on’.151 Woods’ interpretation was proven accurate time and time again 
among patients in this study. When Thomas McG was discharged from 
the Belfast asylum in 1914:
He immediately went to a Public House and became intoxicated, he then 
went home to his father’s house and threatened them. His father had him 
removed to the Union Infirmary and owing to his violent behaviour there 
he was re-certified.
He later escaped from the asylum:
Assisted by some unknown friend who came for him in a Taxicab and 
bringing a suit of clothing. He went home to his father’s house where he 
spent the night, leaving in the early morning to travel to Lisburn, Lurgan 
and Portadown. Unable to obtain work, he returned to Belfast and 
enlisted. Then becoming under [the] influence of alcohol returned to his 
father’s house and during a quarrel with his father attempted suicide. He 
was arrested by the police and after being charged was transferred to the 
[Belfast Union Infirmary] and ultimately was brought back to the District 
Asylum at 10.30pm.
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The same patient was discharged and readmitted to the asylum twice 
more before eventually being discharged recovered in 1917.152 Other 
patients managed to abstain for slightly longer periods of time. Richard 
C. L., a solicitor who was discharged from St. Patrick’s in 1911, 
‘resumed his former habits within ten days and as a result lost his 
appointment’.153 The following year, W. J. McM, a bank clerk:
On being discharged he, prior to taking up duties in a new office in 
Londonderry, went to Queenstown for a week & resumed his  drinking 
habits there. On taking up his duties in Londonderry he gave up the 
drinking & after a few days became nervous and obsessed with a fear that 
he would make mistakes in money etc. & felt his memory going & so he 
returned at once.154
As Finnane has correctly contended, a publican’s occupation was per-
ceived as a specifically constant source of temptation.155 In 1894, 
Catherine G., a barmaid in her sister’s public house admitted to drinking 
porter while she worked there. As soon as she came into the asylum, she 
asked Drapes for a bottle of porter which he did not give her.156 In 1914, 
Peter C., a publican diagnosed with mania a potu had suffered several 
attacks of delirium tremens at home. He was readmitted to Enniscorthy 
in 1914 having left only a week previously. According to the case notes, 
he started to drink as soon as he got out: ‘He is drunk at present and 
staggering gait. Before leaving here he promised to go to a sister in the 
country for a few weeks but he went to his shop and began drinking’. He 
was discharged a few months later but less than a month after that was 
brought back ‘blind drunk on admission’, a pattern which continued sev-
eral more times. There is no record of his eventual outcome.157
This cycle of relapse and recovery proved highly frustrating for asylum 
doctors, who, like their European colleagues, questioned the suitability 
of asylums as treatment centres for alcoholics.158 By 1904, Drapes had 
become so exasperated by the repeated readmission of habitual drunk-
ards to Enniscorthy that he blamed excessive drunkenness in Wexford 
for an increase of insanity there.159 Drapes, however, appeared less frus-
trated than his predecessor, Joseph Edmundson, who had written of one 
patient: ‘An habitual drunkard whom in my opinion a month on the 
treadmill in gaol would have a more permanent effect on than a month 
under kind asylum treatment’.160 Edmundson was not alone in his rather 
harsh assessment. Some French doctors also recommended incarceration 
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over asylum treatment, while one argued that ‘amateur alcoholics’ 
treated the asylums as a ‘holiday retreat’ in periods of seasonal unem-
ployment.161 Asylum care was clearly the preferable option for some 
patients. In 1909, Charles Henry B., who had previously been in prison 
wrote to his friend from St. Patrick’s ‘I never had a better time in my 
life getting as fat as a bullock which you will see’.162 Even those who 
had not served penal sentences, like Mary C., a 50-year-old widow sent 
to Enniscorthy, appeared to almost enjoy their period of confinement. 
When Mary was discharged, it was noted that she ‘had got to like the 
place and cried at leaving. Said she would rather stay longer with us’. 
She was readmitted soon afterwards.163 By 1914, Drapes was replicat-
ing Edmundson’s sentiments, when, following the discharge of Peter C., 
he received a letter from the patient’s wife informing him ‘Peter is just 
as bad as ever again. He started the drink as soon as he got home’. In 
response, Drapes recommended that ‘if he got at all violent to have him 
arrested and sent to prison, which might have a more deterrent effect 
on him in future than a stay at the asylum. Otherwise told her she could 
send him back here’. As we have seen, the following year he was readmit-
ted to the asylum ‘blind drunk on admission’.164
Kennedy also grew increasingly weary. When Thomas C was brought 
to the asylum by the police, for having ‘attempted suicide by hanging 
when in the cell at Police Station’, Kennedy remarked scornfully:
This is his old game, he always “attempts” suicide when arrested for being 
drunk and gets sent in here instead of being sent to jail. He replied quite 
readily and rationally to all questions and appears just as well as when he 
left here. He has “a screw lose” but is not really insane and knows well 
what he is doing.
Two months later, although the patient was showing progress and work-
ing at painting seats for the asylum, Kennedy reasserted his belief that he 
‘should have been sent to Jail not here’.165 Kennedy was also resigned 
to repeated alcohol-related admissions. On the occasion of Thomas 
MacD’s seventh discharge from Enniscorthy in 1908, Kennedy wrote ‘as 
soon as he gets out he will start drinking again and be sent back here’. 
Kennedy was proven right when Thomas was again readmitted less than 
five months later.166
Aside from their lack of ability to permanently ‘cure’ alcoholism, and 
the professional embarrassment this must have entailed, a key issue for 
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district asylum doctors was most likely the additional strain these patients 
were putting on the already overcrowded asylum system.167 Notably, 
doctors at voluntary and private asylums demonstrated greater com-
passion towards alcohol-related cases. In 1920, the proprietor of the 
Lindeville private asylum in Cork, Dr. J. Osborne, wrote to the assis-
tant medical officer at St. Patrick’s Hospital’s, Dr. H. R. C. Rutherford 
following the transfer of a former patient to St. Patrick’s. In this letter, 
which was written to provide a case history for the patient, Osborne con-
cluded ‘I hope for his sake that he has recovered as he is quite a nice 
fellow. I should be very grateful if you would let me know in a week or 
two as I am most interested’.168 There is also evidence of asylum doctors 
keeping in touch with former patients. For example, Arthur Q., a patient 
who had been admitted to St. Patrick’s with alcoholic insanity, wrote to 
the hospital’s medical superintendent, Dr. Leeper in 1906 following his 
discharge:
Mr Dear Dr Leeper
Very many thanks for your kind letter it was good of you to write so soon. 
I am so glad you got good sport in Wicklow I only wish I had been with 
you … I must again thank you for all the kindness you showed to me and 
hope soon again to see you.
Very sincerely yours, Arthur Q[-].169
Of course, with a much smaller patient population to manage, it is likely 
that the pressure on those working in private and voluntary asylums was 
less.
ConCLusions
The sustained influx of alcohol-related admissions to Irish asylums 
sparked debate among the medical and psychiatric communities about 
the exact nature of alcohol addiction and how best to treat it. In line 
with wider European medical thought, for much of the two decades 
following 1890, most identified alcohol abuse as part of a greater trend 
towards degeneration. It is important to note, however, that Irish asylum 
doctors did not indiscriminately follow the commentary of their inter-
national colleagues. Guided by the differing social, cultural and politi-
cal contexts of practising medicine in Ireland, including the enduring 
caricature of the Irish as a ‘drunken’ race and associations between the 
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nationalist cause and the concept of healthy minds (in this case sobriety), 
they were quick to identify regional, cultural and class differences among 
their own patient populations. The taking of the abstinence pledge by 
many of the patients examined points to the influence of religion among 
the largely Roman Catholic populations in rural Irish asylums. In a 
largely rural country, where alcoholism was apparently more widely rec-
ognised as an illness among the rich and a vice among the poor, wealth-
ier individuals were more likely to receive treatment in an asylum, while 
even those committed to the state-funded district asylums tended to be 
drawn from the ‘respectable poor’.
Despite increased recognition of alcoholism as a disease in the  decades 
before Irish independence and in an era when medicine was rapidly pro-
fessionalising, the Irish medical community’s role in treating  alcoholism 
was apparently a reluctant one. This reflects the uncertainty shared by 
many asylum doctors as to the precise relationship between alcohol and 
insanity, the difficulties inherent in attempting to treat alcoholic cases 
and bearing in mind the seemingly relentless expansion of the district 
asylum system into the twentieth century. While this evident reluc-
tance allows us to dismiss Foucauldian notions of the clinical gaze being 
extended towards alcoholism, it is likely that the rising influence of med-
icine and psychiatry in this era was, at least partially, responsible for the 
pathologising of alcoholism both in Ireland and internationally.170
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Social Stigma, Stress and Enforced 




For many people with epilepsy, the central characteristic of their 
 impairment is fear. From a belief in supernatural possession to a ban 
on types of employment, people with epilepsy have historically faced 
stigma associated with the fear of seizures.1 As Penny Rhodes et al. have 
argued, epilepsy sits in an awkward position within disability studies and 
indeed within the history of mental health.2 The ‘impairment’ of epi-
lepsy is often one that is invisible. Many people with epilepsy are thus 
often able to ‘mask’ their impairment, only being ‘unmasked’ after expe-
riencing a seizure.3 For this reason, according to Rhodes et al., people 
with epilepsy occupy an awkward position within the disability studies 
movement. Barriers to employment, access to services and the main-
tenance of social relationships are and have historically been shaped by 
the stigma surrounding seizures, which in itself creates a unique concept 
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of ‘impairment’, one not unlike that experienced by people with men-
tal illness. The history of epilepsy has therefore largely been unwritten. 
Temkin’s assertion that the history is a triumph of ‘science over super-
stition’ relates largely to the development of neurology as a science and 
omits people’s experiences of specialist services, in spite of these services’ 
domination in constructing the scientific knowledge of epilepsy. This 
chapter reflects the complex interplay between a variety of nascent twen-
tieth-century scientific discourses, including psychiatry, psychology, and 
social policy, and their influence on people’s experience of epilepsy.
G. Berrios argued that at the end of the nineteenth century, epilepsy 
was seen as separate from insanity.4 Yet, people with epilepsy at the end 
of the nineteenth century were almost indistinguishable from those with 
hysteria and manic schizophrenia.5 Localisation by John Hughlings 
Jackson in the 1870s, in addition to Jean Charcot’s work in Paris, had 
created an explicit medical link between seizures and emotional and psy-
chological states.6 In particular, post-seizure states of automatism, con-
fusion and irritability had led to a development of the idea that epilepsy 
was a psychological as well as neurological phenomenon.7 The nine-
teenth century was the springboard for research into the medical causes 
of epilepsy—the twentieth century, however, saw a diversification of epi-
lepsy research and services into the issues surrounding stigma, access to 
medication, childhood experiences and the importance of well-being. 
The site of the majority of this research was specialist services, developed 
from the 1870s. This chapter draws on sources of three epileptic ‘colo-
nies’ in the UK and one ‘colony’ in Sonyea, NY, in the United States. 
The British colonies focused on in this chapter are now major UK char-
ities representing people with epilepsy—the David Lewis Centre, Young 
Epilepsy, Epilepsy Action and the Epilepsy Society. Records for these 
colonies are scarce and, where they have survived, give an incomplete 
picture of the true experiences of young people within the colonies. In 
part, this reflects the chaotic nature of service transition and the complex 
map of service provision for people with epilepsy in the twentieth cen-
tury. Extensive record-keeping allows for a more complete picture of life 
within the colony at Sonyea; however, there is limited data on transition, 
reflecting widely different approaches to institutionalisation and deinsti-
tutionalisation between the two areas.
Colonies focused on re-training, employment and social care, in par-
ticular training colonists for a life of agricultural labour in the country-
side.8 They were founded in part to mitigate the effect of people with 
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epilepsy falling through the gaps between services (the Poor Law, hospi-
tals, asylums and charities) and to provide residential education for chil-
dren under the age of sixteen.9 In addition to providing accommodation 
and training, the colonies were sites of extensive research into epilepsy, 
and the ability to control environmental factors which were thought to 
influence severity or frequency of seizures (including medicine, diet, rou-
tine and social relationships). Young people’s experience within the colo-
nies illustrates a change in scientific understanding of epilepsy, including 
those related to personality, trauma, stigma and a broad conception of 
‘stress’. Part of this experience, it will be argued, was an understanding 
of how the process of enforced transition—the experience of moving 
between services with nowhere else to go—could have a severe influence 
on the ‘healthy’ minds of colony residents.
soCiaL stigMa and stress in the CoLonies
The language used to describe the ‘epileptic personality’ was similar to 
that used to describe maladjusted children and was rooted in Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory. Freud’s influence on epilepsy had up to the 
mid-1930s been on the interpretation of seizures as a form of hysteria. 
Hysteria and neurasthenia were different from epilepsy in that the sei-
zures presented as something that the patient could control, where the 
patient did not bite their tongue or fall completely unconscious.10 Even 
in the early twentieth century, cases were still being presented in Maida 
Vale Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery which were diagnosed 
as being hysterical in nature, due in part to the psychological or emo-
tional root of the first seizure.11 The belief in ‘fright’ as a cause of sei-
zures altered the perception of people with epilepsy as being born with a 
disposition that was connected directly to their epilepsy. It suggested that 
even without direct hereditary factors, people could develop epilepsy fol-
lowing an emotional or psychological shock. Consequently, epilepsy fell 
between neurology, psychiatry and, later, psychology, in its diagnosis and 
treatment.
Following the First World War, many neurologists who had been key 
figures in the treatment of shell shock also developed an interest in epi-
lepsy, such as William Aldren Turner. The psychological and neurologi-
cal knowledge which resulted in the study of shell shock influenced the 
medical directors of the colonies. In 1920, Tylor Fox wrote:
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There are a large number of people who are declared epileptics, suffer-
ing from fits; and a number more who are potential epileptics, ready to 
develop fits if they are exposed to severe mental or physical strain. Thus 
many potential epileptics became actual epileptics under the strain of active 
service in the European War.12
In addition to severe mental and physical strain in later life, epilepsy 
could be worsened by childhood experiences. Epileptic colonies intended 
to provide a therapy based on overall well-being. As the first annual 
report for the Chalfont Colony, run by the National Society for the 
Employment of Epileptics, noted:
It is, in the view of the Committee, a matter of primary importance that 
everyone received at the Colony should be happy and contented, and, as the 
welfare of the Colony will always depend very largely upon the effects of the 
Colonists themselves, it is earnestly hoped that all Colonists will endeavour 
by industry, good temper, cheerfulness, and mutual kindness and forbear-
ance to promote the happiness and well-being of the whole community.13
The focus on community living was part of the colony’s purpose. This was 
steeped in a wider context of modernity and anti-modernity, with a strong 
emphasis on colonists returning to the countryside. In this way, colonists 
were more closely aligned to open air schools, or collective living, than 
asylums. Walls were permeable, admission voluntary, and treatment was 
designed to improve the whole self, rather than merely reduce the rate of 
seizures. In doing so, the colonies aimed to prevent long-term residency 
and to support people with epilepsy to find employment outside the colony.
The focus on unemployment stemmed from the colonies’ foundation 
as a means to alleviate urban poverty, in particular casual or precarious 
labour. Due to the highly variable nature of seizures, and the stigma 
and danger faced by many people with epilepsy in the industrial work-
place, the colonies were initially designed as a means to provide stable, 
stigma-free employment.14 Unlike other services, such as work colonies, 
specialist epileptic colonies explicitly tied the provision of stable work 
with a reduction in anxiety. An article in The Lancet noted:
The problem of unemployment was widespread and less easy to deal 
with. The whole question could be regarded as one of mental ill health. 
Continued unemployment, resentment and anxiety increased the fits, and 
increase of fits caused further mental deterioration. A vicious circle was set 
up with the destruction of personality as the end.15
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This drew a further explicit link between the experience of epilepsy and 
the experience of stigma, and its consequent effect on mental health, or 
self-image (described above as ‘the destruction of personality’). For chil-
dren and young people, this was especially pertinent. Tylor Fox wrote 
extensively from the Lingfield Colony of the difficulties faced by people, 
especially children, surviving outside the colony:
From the time of onset of the fits the epileptic member of the household 
is regarded as someone abnormal, and if, as so often happens, he shows 
mental peculiarities in addition to the fits, this impression of abnormality 
is strengthened […] An epileptic child is not wanted at Church, Chapel 
or Sunday School, at picture shows or other entertainments. The parents, 
bothered by having him repeatedly brought home after fits in the street, 
or naturally anxious about his safety from accident, tend to keep the child 
more and more within doors, with disastrous results to his health.16
Unlike the stigma faced outside the colony, the colonies aimed to pro-
vide a safe and secure environment for its residents. In effect, the col-
onists’ entire world within the colony walls was subject to scrutiny 
and prescription. For some, this had good results, with a doctor in 
Pennsylvania noting that ‘all patients now at the colony are distinctly 
improved in physical and mental health, and in a large majority there is 
a marked reduction in the number and severity of attacks’.17 This was 
echoed in the 1895 Annual Report for the National Society for the 
Employment of Epileptics, the governing body of the Chalfont Colony 
in Buckinghamshire, that stated, ‘The improvement in the general 
well-being of the Colonists has been most encouraging, and it is far 
greater than can be measured by the mere diminution in the frequency 
and severity of fits’.18
Unlike other colonies, the David Lewis Centre in Manchester stated 
in its first Annual Report that the aim was not to reduce seizures, but to 
improve the overall well-being of its inhabitants—regardless of whether 
they had more or fewer seizures.19 According to the 1912 Report of the 
Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education, most children with epi-
lepsy attended regular mainstream school. In cases where they did not, 
attendance at a special residential school was due to a number of factors, 
not all relating to the frequency or severity of seizures. In some cases, the 
child had been excluded from school following a seizure, or following 
a period of inattentiveness, hyperactivity or poor attendance.20 Quoting 
the neurologist David Ferrier, the Report noted that this was due to ‘the 
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occurrence of fits in a school causes all kinds of nervous disturbances on 
the part of other children, and the terror sometimes caused by epilepsy 
might induce it in others who had a predisposition…the whole school 
may be upset in consequence’.21 Yet, Ferrier argued epilepsy itself was 
not a reason for children not to attend school. He wrote:
I do not see apart from [the fear of other children] why epileptics should 
not be educated with other children, so far as their mental condition is 
concerned. Some are very clever. Many persons occupying responsible 
positions in society are suffering from epilepsy and are doing excellent 
work.22
The primary concern of the authorities was that children’s epilepsy was 
a source of fear for other people—necessitating exclusion of these chil-
dren from wider society. This was argued by Ferrier to benefit the child, 
also, whose confidence and ability were said to improve once he or she 
was in a situation which allowed ‘lively intercourse with other children’ 
rather than exclusion.23 As a result, the Defective and Epileptic Children 
Act put measures into place which provided a requirement for residen-
tial schools to be set up, linked with epileptic colonies.24 The Board of 
Education noted that:
A young epileptic child stands a better chance of arrest if taken in hand as 
soon as the fits declare themselves. It is detrimental to the young epileptic 
to keep it at home, where it becomes spoiled, remains uneducated, and 
where the chance of arrest from fits is deterred through petting and inade-
quate medical and open-air training.25
Even those who were against institutionalisation of children believed that 
the case of children with epilepsy was different. When in a community 
where seizures were the norm, children with epilepsy were enabled to 
reach their full potential, without fear of social isolation or exclusion. 
The irony of this was the same as other residential care schemes—in 
order for the children not to experience social isolation, the children 
were required to be cut off from mainstream society. M. K. Inglis argued 
in the Fortnightly Review in 1908 that removing children from the 
homes of poor families was detrimental to the long-term development of 
children as they lacked the stability and love that their family should be 
able to provide. Inglis wrote that ‘no institution system, however perfect 
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nor “Home”, however few the number of inmates it contains, can make 
up for the loss of the rough-and-tumble of family life, and for father and 
mother and sister and brother love’.26 Inglis noted, however, the special 
social status of the child with epilepsy:
There are, however, certain classes of children who must be taken from 
their homes and kept under special conditions if the best is to be made 
of their own lives, and if a healthy life is to be made possible for the other 
members of the family; such are most cases of epileptic and mentally defec-
tive children. For them the danger of the streets is manifold, and they 
require very special training and protection long after they cease to be 
children.27
Fifty years later, in 1962, de Haas reiterated that children with epilepsy 
faced social stigma. The stigma originated from teachers who lacked 
knowledge of seizures and lived in fear of a child experiencing a seizure 
in front of their classmates. Often, the fear other children experienced, 
in addition to the isolation felt by the child, was the main barrier for 
attending mainstream school.28 As with other aspects of life, only if the 
child was able to ‘mask’ their epilepsy would they be accepted socially. 
This in itself was thought to have a profound impact on the emotional 
state of the child—increasing their fear of seizures and impacting on their 
mental health.
ePiLePsy and the faMiLy hoMe
In 1906, William Gowers argued that epilepsy was often prevalent in 
families with a history of insanity or alcoholism. In addition to viewing 
these as inherited illnesses, Fox identified the impact that this environ-
ment may have on a child with epilepsy. He noted in 1920 that ‘the 
parents themselves so often show evidences of mental instability[…] 
evidences of minor mental derangement, whether they come under the 
heading of hysteria, neurasthenia, violent tempers or addiction to drugs 
are likely to be prevalent also’.29 He gave the example of a case where a 
girl aged twelve years old experienced violence at the hands of her par-
ents, involving violent tempers ‘which sometimes result[ed] in crock-
ery flying about’.30 Although Fox attributed some hereditary factors to 
the family’s history of mental illness, Fox noted ‘it is difficult to think 
of an atmosphere in which [seizures] are less likely to be controlled’.31 
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Ralph Crowley’s work on ‘the social care of the epileptic’ examined the 
rates of ‘broken homes’ among children with epilepsy, noting that in two 
cases out of sixty the child’s epilepsy was thought to be the cause of the 
separation.32 Reiterating Fox’s findings, Crowley noted that in many of 
the cases, the prevalence of ‘homes in which a parent was psychoneurotic 
had some form of mental illness was particularly high’.33 Therefore, it 
was not only the influence of wider society on the child’s psychological 
experience, but the experience in this home. The psychological impact 
of this was believed to have an effect on the number and frequency of 
seizures, and highlighted a growing discourse not only of the impact of 
stigma on mental health, but the impact of poor mental health on sei-
zure frequency.
The social stigma experienced by children with epilepsy was not con-
fined exclusively to their experience of seizures, but also to their experi-
ence of being ‘an epileptic’ and the impact this had on a chaotic family 
life. Part of this was the construction of the ‘epileptic personality’, where 
a set of negative personality traits or behaviours were attributed to chil-
dren who had seizures. An unknown author in The Lancet noted:
There is general agreement that epileptics, as a class, are more egocentric 
and more sensitive than the rest of the community-that they are poor in 
ideas and unstable in their emotions. Thus they are said to possess the epi-
leptic personality.34
This ‘epileptic personality’ was seen as the lesser form of the criminal 
epileptic. The epileptic personality suggested the potential for violence 
or uncontrollability and became further associated with poverty and 
delinquency. The family, and the child’s place within the family, became 
synonymous with the child’s place within society. The case of Robert, a 
patient in Craig Colony, NY, demonstrates the connectivity between cha-
otic lives, urban poverty, and an ‘epileptic temperament’. Robert’s case 
notes reported that he was raised by his mother (an alcoholic of ‘loose 
morals’), an uncle who taught him to steal, and his father who could not 
afford to care for him. After being abandoned by his mother, Robert was 
transferred into foster care in Long Island, yet gained a juvenile record 
and was transferred to Randall’s Island, an institution for feeble-minded 
children in New York at the age of twelve. Robert’s personality was 
recorded in detail during the mental examination:
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As a personality, he already displays the epileptic make-up. He has a pov-
erty of interests other than those directly related to himself, he is egotistic, 
refuses to play basketball with team work and is expelled. Unemotional, 
set forth by the teachers has no ideas of the rights of others. In addition 
to his personality of epileptic traits he presents as a psychopathic type of 
delinquent.35
By the 1960s, the influence of the Child Guidance movement and 
attachment theory was added to Freudian ideas of parental influence. 
Central to this was the parent–child relationship, and the role that the 
child’s epilepsy played in the development or stunting of that relation-
ship. Inter-family relationships were complex, and the position of epi-
lepsy within these relationships was seen to be no different from any 
other personality trait or attribute. In this way, the child’s epilepsy could 
either be part of the parent–child conflict or else the basis for a parent’s 
reaction to the child. This in itself served as a reason for removing chil-
dren from the home, noting that when removed from these parental 
conflicts, a child could thrive. As Lorentz de Haas, from the Meer en 
Bosch Epilepsy Centre in the Netherlands, wrote in 1962:
There are conditions under which the epileptic seizure becomes a weapon 
for the child in a difficult family situation, in which the seizure is inte-
grated in a neuropathic defence system, or in which, in reverse, the child’s 
epilepsy becomes a psychological necessity to the family, as a result of 
which a cure is unconsciously sabotaged. […] in 17 children with petit mal 
epilepsy found an impaired parent-child relationship as a cause. In every 
instance there was a conscious parental rejection with attending overt hos-
tility or unconscious parental rejection with attending compensatory over-
protection and thinly veiled hostility.36
The colony institution aimed to re-create the family atmosphere, 
but away from the chaotic or detrimental aspects of domestic con-
flict. In addition to removing the child from an environment of stigma 
or isolation, the colony could provide stability, which would prevent 
maladjustment:
Although during his stay in the institution, the child is somewhat more 
remote from normal society, we believe that personality development 
during a given period in relative peace can sometimes better prepare this 
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personality for meeting the exigencies of later life in society. Because epi-
leptic children rather often come from disturbed homes, it must also be 
remarked that they can lead “a sensible and stable life” in the epilepsy cen-
tres and colonies, away from their homes.37
Stress, childhood trauma and poor home life were often referred to as 
the cause of seizures, and the daily life at the colony was aimed to mit-
igate other triggers, such as heat. Residential schools offered medical 
superintendents the opportunity to draw links between seizure frequency 
among the children in schools and environmental surroundings. The 
logbook for the Soss Moss School (run by the Manchester Education 
Authority) frequently reported the weather as a cause of an unusual 
increase in the frequency of seizures in the classroom. In June 1903, the 
head–teacher noted, ‘The weather has been hot and thundery during the 
week and it seems to have had considerable effect on the health of the 
children, they seem to be more liable to fits’.38 Two weeks later, it was 
again noted, ‘the hot weather however appears to affect some of the chil-
dren so as to make them restless and to make them more liable to fits’.39 
This understanding of the physical environment’s impact on the mental 
health of the children further demonstrates how the twentieth century 
saw a diversification in the understanding of the experience and causes 
of epilepsy. Clearly removing children from their family home was just 
the first step in removing these children from the stresses of daily life and 
inculcating a philosophy of healthy minds.
CoLonies and after-Care
The Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Act, 1899 ensured 
that local authorities provided residential care and education for children 
with epilepsy. The Act stipulated that children would be under the remit 
of the Act until they were sixteen years old. This was above the leaving 
age of mainstream education, yet significantly below the average age of 
adult entries to the colonies. Colony schools were set up with the aim 
of either educating children for mainstream capital-labour markets, or 
else preparing them for colony life, significant amount of emphasis was 
placed on the outcomes of children upon leaving the colonies. This dif-
fered in the UK and the United States. In the UK, the emphasis was 
placed on the employment prospects of post-colony life. Advocates like 
Tylor Fox extensively studied this vulnerable period, campaigning for 
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more social care for young people with epilepsy.40 This may, in fact, be 
one of the central reasons why Lingfield’s legacy lay in the creation of a 
charity specifically aimed at the rights and abilities of young people with 
epilepsy.41 In the UK, the design of the colonies meant that young peo-
ple were expected to stay for significantly longer. Yet, many people left, 
due either to parents removing them (in the case of voluntary patients) 
or else being removed after parents obtained a court order.42
Epileptic colonies shared similar characteristics to post-war therapeutic 
communities, in particular their belief that treatment should be holistic, 
with the focus on the self.43 In the UK, the colonies were a short-term 
solution. The colony provided education, training and medical care so 
that colonists would leave and becoming sufficient. For this to be suc-
cessful, the colony needed to integrate itself with community medi-
cal settings so that work began at the colony would continue. In 1920, 
Hume Griffiths, medical director of the Lingfield Colony, noted:
[The children leaving colony schools] have been carefully looked after for 
years, even had their games organised, only be to pitch-forked into the 
outside world, to sink or swim […] when the age of sixteen is reached, 
[any] responsibility ceases and, unless he or she can be transferred to a 
Board of Guardians, the child is withdrawn, lives in unsuitable surround-
ings, the treatment is stopped, often suddenly.44
Griffiths highlighted that this enforced transition between the colony 
and the outside world, or between the colony and other services, had 
a profound impact on the mental health of young people with epilepsy. 
In 1921, Tylor Fox made several references to the link between stress, 
anxiety and seizures. While the routine of the colony served to reduce 
this stress by providing education, a stable home and employment, there 
were some instances where the colony itself often produced anxiety in its 
inhabitants. He noted:
In my experience one of the most potent factors in producing fits in one 
liable to them is continual worry or apprehension. When an epileptic child 
has some fear or anxiety on his mind, it seems almost useless to expect 
any improvement until that anxiety is removed. We have often noticed 
at Lingfield that as a child approaches his sixteenth birthday, and realises 
that we are deciding whether he must stay on the colony or be allowed to 
return home, his fits increase in number.45
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Through their analysis of enforced transitions, Fox and Hume Griffiths 
drew a direct link not only between transition and poor mental health, 
but between poor mental health and an increase in seizures. This, in 
turn, reflected a growing understanding that epilepsy was not only in the 
remit of neurologists, but required a more comprehensive and holistic 
approach to treatment.
Colony after-care therefore became a key area of discussion among 
those working in epilepsy medical and social research. The lack of infor-
mation on the outcomes of children leaving residential care was due in 
part to the difficulty in following-up cases. As the Chief Medical Officer 
of the Board of Education noted in 1912, this could be improved by 
‘a closer association between the authorities of the residential institu-
tions and the school medical officers and any after-care committee from 
whom the children are received’.46 Individual colony schools made 
some attempt to trace its alumni. In 1907, Soss Moss School, run by the 
Manchester Education Authority, yet tied to the David Lewis Colony, 
reported the end of the school career for children in the following two 
entries:
[One boy] who was admitted on Dec 13th last left the school on Saturday 
as he was sixteen years of age. He will remain in the adult part of the col-
ony. [one girl] who has been here for over two years left today. She has not 
had any ‘attack’ since she came. She is intelligent but inclines to be careless 
about the way she does things.47
In November of the same year, the logbook reported another two cases:
One boy […] left on Monday last, 28th inst. He was over 16 years of age; 
he has gone to the adult part of the Colony. He has been here nearly a year 
and a half. He had made good progress in reading, but he was very baby-
ish in many respects and very weak minded.48
[…] leaves tomorrow to go to the adult part of the Colony. For many 
months he got no benefit from being in school. Most of the time he sat 
in his desk without giving the last attention to what was going on with the 
class. Occasionally he had brief interest, when he was eager to take part in 
the class work, but as a rule he had to be left to do nothing.49
Many reports were given of young people aged sixteen who were seen 
as not progressing in the colony schools. The head–teacher (author 
of the report) noted frequently that many of the pupils in the colony 
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school were mentally not capable of benefiting from the colony educa-
tion. For many of them, this meant being transferred to the adult sec-
tion of the [David Lewis] colony in order to remain for a longer period 
of time. These young people were in a manner of speaking the ‘fail-
ure’ of the colony; although admitted, presumably, as sane or mentally 
developed, many of the young people presented symptoms of advanced 
deterioration.
In 1916, Hume Griffith attempted to trace school leavers from 
Lingfield. He contacted local authorities and received information on 80 
ex-colony residents in order to produce an after-care report, the major-
ity of whom had left the colony within four years. Out of these, 22% 
were ‘wholly or partially self-sufficient’. Griffiths noted that for this sec-
tion, many had been removed from the colony against medical advice, 
as ‘parents insist on parental rights’. The ‘sufficiency’ of those in this 
section was due to the cessation of seizures, which, Griffiths noted, was 
likely to be temporary. Those ‘partially self-sufficient’ were unlikely to 
be in work, due to ‘fear of the Workman’s Compensation Act’.50 Of 
those that were employed, one was employed in a shop, six in the army, 
eleven not mentioned, one handyman and one in the chemical works. 
Griffiths noted that ‘at present they take any job that offers, and go from 
one situation to another’.51 This pattern was also seen at Starnthwaite, 
Lingfield’s sister colony, where the vast majority of leavers from 1905 to 
1913 (ranging in ages from 14 to 24) were transferred to the adult part 
of the colony and employed as farm labourers. For those transferred to 
the adult colony, ‘mental weakness’ often led to subsequent transfers to 
workhouse or infirmaries. In a few cases, employment was gained out-
side an institutional setting. In one case, the person was ‘in partnership 
with a brother as a decorator and signwriter’. In another case, a person 
was described as, ‘able to assist a little in the printing office’ despite still 
having seizures, yet another was ‘taken home by parents on reaching age 
limit, working at a market gardener’s earning 10s a week’.52 This data 
was perhaps influenced by gender, with the population of Starnthwaite’s 
school leavers being boys. Records for both Maghull Colony and school 
leavers in the Leicester district demonstrate that a higher number of girls 
remained at home in the care of parents, with boys being more likely 
to be maintained in an adult colony or under the care of the Board of 
Guardians.53 This was due to economic patterns, as male leavers were 
able to gain precarious employment as labourers and were more likely 
(on a whole population level) to have higher earning power. The colony, 
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therefore, merely offered temporary respite from the precarious labour 
market and stigma faced outside the institution’s walls. The enforced 
transition for those school leavers was a stark cliff-edge between security 
inside the colony and precarity and stigma outside it.
For the most part, those transferred to the adult colony were trans-
ferred not on the basis of their mental capacity (though, these cases are 
from before the regular usage of intelligence testing). For many, it was 
the absence of self-sufficiency being demonstrated, either in their ability to 
perform tasks or in their communication or response to social cues. In the 
above cases, limited concentration or engagement with the colony school 
curriculum was enough to demonstrate to the school authorities that any 
young person was not only unfit for school life, but for life in the ‘outside 
world’. For their post-colony life to be successful, young people needed 
not only to demonstrate a life free from seizures, but to demonstrate a 
certain attitude, personality and work ethic. The young people resident in 
Soss Moss School followed the same pattern as those in Lingfield:
Lizzie M(-) who was sixteen years of age on the 17th inst left school yes-
terday. She is not free from occasional epileptic fits but she is otherwise 
strong and healthy, fairly intelligent and under suitable supervision would 
be very useful in domestic work. She is good at needlework.54
For many young people, success outside the colony depended on a com-
bination of personality, health and available support. In effect, young 
people as with the cases above had to demonstrate that they were ‘use-
ful’. In the same vein, colony proponents, educators and medical officers 
also had to demonstrate that the colony system could produce ‘useful’ 
people. For those that had little chance, the adult colonies were a final 
reserve. If unable to work, or to be self-sufficient, and (for many) in the 
absence of friends and relatives, transfer to the adult colony meant an 
escape albeit temporarily from the workhouse and asylum or homeless-
ness. The familiarity of the colonies often meant that those transferred 
to the adult colonies would often from the age of sixteen have worked 
and lived with their future home-mates, creating minimal upheaval in the 
transition from school to adult life.
The nature of the epileptic colonies was that adults who were admit-
ted were there for a long duration. Young people, however, were there 
to attend school, after which they were expected to find employment. 
Fox’s extensive efforts to maintain a link between the children’s and the 
adults’ sections of the colonies led to further research into the transition 
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between services, both between the colony and the community and 
between hospital departments and other services outside the colony. As 
Ralph Crowley, former senior medical officer to the Board of Education 
wrote in the Lancet in 1938:
The hospital doctor, the private practitioner, the mental welfare worker, 
and the aftercare visitor acting as a team and backed by the community 
could bring untold relief to the daily lot of the epileptic. Such a welfare 
organization must operate early if it is to prevent the maladjustments of 
adult epileptics.55
In 1948, the National Committee for Mental Health had a dedicated 
Committee for Epileptics, which was tasked with implementing measures 
to improve the lives of people with epilepsy. As reported in Epilepsia, one 
of these measures was the introduction of hostels, or halfway stations, 
between the hospital and the community. These hostels aimed to provide 
the kind of employment provided in the epileptic colonies, but maintain 
a close relationship with outpatient departments and mainstream ser-
vices. In addition, the Committee made reports to the Under Secretary 
of Labour that special clinics be set up for people with epilepsy ‘with 
an emphasis on social and vocational aspects’.56 By the mid-twentieth 
century, then, services for people with epilepsy recognised not only the 
strong psychological component of seizures, but the impact of enforced 
transitions between services.
ConCLusions
For children who were considered to have an ‘epileptic personality’, the 
colonies were a respite from chaotic homes and social stigma. Robert, 
a resident at the Craig Colony, was moved frequently from house to 
locked ward to house, both gaining and losing responsibility dependent 
on behaviour. Throughout this time, the boy’s reports were largely pos-
itive, with staff at the colony noting that he was charismatic, intelligent 
and got on well with many attendants. Some years after absconding from 
the colony, he wrote to the superintendent:
I ran away from Sonyea because I could only see my father once a year 
and it would cost him a whole lot to go from NYC to Sonyea […] I am in 
one of the biggest hospitals of N.Y and it is a lunatic asylum. That is the 
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nearest an epileptic can get to his locality hear [sic] in NYC […] two years 
ago my father passed off. I am now 30 sitting among full lunatics watching 
walls, with no freedom we had on Sonyea.57
Up to 1965, a growing body of research examined the ways in which 
the experience of social stigma and family conflicts could have an effect 
on seizures, largely by creating an environment of stress and insecurity 
for young people. The colonies were seen as places of stability, where 
young people were able to feel at home and where they were protected 
from the conflicts of the family. Yet, at age sixteen, many young people 
were no longer offered accommodation or support, and the enforced 
transition between the colony and the outside world often caused poor 
mental health and an increase in seizures. This led to a move towards 
greater integration of services, with an emphasis on social care as well 
as medical care. This association between stress and seizures was not 
necessarily new, but it did demonstrate that the treatment in the colo-
nies had moved away from a general belief in the benefits of fresh air, 
exercise and diet (that which categories most asylum regimes at the 
time) and instead created a direct and causal link between anxiety and 
seizures.
The psychosocial experience of epilepsy enabled the history of epi-
lepsy to be viewed within a wider history of mental health. This has a 
particular significance for the political position of epilepsy within the dis-
ability studies movement. As is the case with epilepsy services, the study 
of epilepsy also necessarily has to cross the bridge between neurology 
and psychiatry. People with epilepsy often categorise their psychosocial 
experience as one of fear: both the fear of seizures and the fear of being 
‘found out’ or unmasked. For a large part of the twentieth century, this 
fear was based on the social reality of isolation, of ‘being epileptic’ and 
the necessity of creating a whole new social enclave in which children 
were able to thrive. The International League Against Epilepsy’s empha-
sis on childhood experiences and stigma drew the discussion of epilepsy 
away from a medical model and towards a psychosocial model of sei-
zures. As Rhodes et al. noted, this in itself highlights the importance of 
the social model of disability and the history of social oppression expe-
rienced by people with epilepsy. Yet, the historical need to protect men-
tal health through a process of masking often led to an unwillingness to 
self-identify as disabled.
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Planning for the Future: Special Education 
and the Creation of ‘Healthy Minds’
Steven J. Taylor
introduCtion
This chapter turns to explore how special education developed in 
England to manage a population of children living with mental 
impairment. Focusing primarily on the years following the introduc-
tion of the Education Act (Epileptic and Defective Children), 1899, it 
explores the identification, observation, certification and methods of 
‘managing’ those deemed to not be mentally healthy enough to attend 
mainstream or, as they were referred to historically, ‘ordinary’ schools. 
The influence of government legislation and regulatory bodies along-
side the local experience of special education at the Sandwell Hall School 
for Mentally Defective Children, near Birmingham, is to be considered. 
Furthermore, it will examine the level of professionalisation and exper-
tise that emerged among those managing the school. The chapter thus 
seeks to deal with abstract conceptualisations of ‘healthy’ minds, as well 
as more tangible lived experiences.
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Special education at this time was embedded in legislative policy and a 
broader socio-medical discourse. Mathew Thomson has argued that the 
beginning of the twentieth century was a turning point when society came 
to see itself through a ‘psychological’ prism. Such a transformation had 
particular implications for children as they passed through the mainstream 
elementary education system and its psychology influenced pedagogy.1  
Ordinary schools began to offer a more child-centred approach to the 
curriculum at this time, which may have been more frustrating and less 
accessible for children with learning difficulties than the learning by mem-
ory and discipline of the nineteenth-century schoolroom. The special 
school thus was markedly different from the ordinary school.
Mark Jackson has conducted an in-depth study of Mary Dendy and 
the Sandlebridge School that she founded in Cheshire for mentally 
defective children.2 In his work, Jackson uses this school as a prism to 
gain a more thorough insight into ideas about ‘feeble-mindedness’ at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Dendy believed that mental deficiency 
lay at the root of social problems and subsequently she promoted the 
permanent segregation of the mentally deficient individual for their own 
good and that of society.3 Like Jackson’s work, this chapter uses a special 
school as a lens for its analysis but in a very different way. Here we delve 
more into the mechanics of special education through the experience of 
the Sandwell School for Mentally Defective Children, to examine issues 
of education, charity, policy and, to a degree, lived experience, whereas 
Jackson considered ideas about the nature of feeble-mindedness and how 
they were shaped by institutional experience.
As we find elsewhere in this volume, particularly the contributions 
from Jan Walmsley and Michelle O’Reilly et al., defining and classifying 
mental illness and disability have been important areas of discussion. In 
this chapter, classification is a particularly fluid issue as the Education Act 
(Epileptic and Mentally Defective Children), 1899, did not define the 
criteria for determining ‘defectiveness’ and the later Mental Deficiency 
Act, 1913, served as social rather than educational legislation.4 The 
measure applied in practice was the ability to benefit from education, but 
not being mentally disabled or ‘merely dull or backward’.5 Subsequently, 
there was a degree of subjectivity related to the type of children that 
were admitted to special schools, and Pamela Dale has observed that 
‘education was marginalized by other agendas that prioritized long-term 
care and control’.6 Subsequently, as we have seen in Rachel Hewitt’s 
chapter dealing with the work of epileptic colonies, this was a contested 
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area that focused on developing mentally defective children for inde-
pendent adult lives but also, if necessary, preparing them for a lifetime of 
care and control in specialised institutions.
These spaces of care were almost as ill-defined as the types of indi-
viduals they were built to accommodate. Looking at the Birmingham 
area more specifically, Rebecca Wynter, using the Monyhull Epileptic 
Colony as a lens, emphasises the importance of local lay individuals 
such as Ellen Pinsent, who features in more depth later in this chapter, 
in the process of identifying and separating ‘unhealthy’ minds from the 
healthy.7 Wynter concludes that definitions of mental defectiveness oper-
ated at local levels despite often being enshrined in national legislation. 
Therefore, when assessing the experience of the Sandwell Hall School in 
this chapter, both local and national definitions of healthy minds will be 
presented.
LegisLating for heaLthy Minds
Twentieth-century concerns about the intellectual abilities of children 
have their roots in the second half of the previous century. The Lunacy 
Acts of 1845 legislated on a mass-scale for the compulsory confinement 
and treatment of England’s insane population in publicly funded lunatic 
asylums. Yet, while there have been numerous scholarly studies that have 
explored the nature of institutional confinement for the insane,8 chil-
dren have received less attention.9 In the fifty years following the Lunacy 
Acts the number of people, children included, in Britain certified as a 
‘lunatic’, ‘imbecile’ or ‘idiot’ exploded. It was estimated that by 1909 
there were 271,000 certified lunatics and mentally defectives in England 
and Wales, ‘or very nearly one in every 100 of the population’.10 Despite 
the mass building of asylums and workhouse lunacy wards, authorities 
and doctors were ill-equipped to offer effective treatment to such large 
numbers.11 Subsequently, mental illness and disability became increas-
ingly important issues at a national level.
Coinciding with changing attitudes towards mental health, 
children, as a distinct population, also emerged as a specific concern of 
policymakers, reformers and philanthropists in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.12 Ideas of national efficiency and potential imperial 
decline were the driving force behind these changes. The young, and 
particularly the offspring of the urban working poor, were increasingly 
depicted as the future of both nation and empire within these discourses. 
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As the first Chief Medical Officer at the Board of Education, George 
Newman, observed ‘children determine the destinies of all civilisations, 
that the race or society which succeeds with its mammoth ships and its 
manufactures but fails to produce men and women, is on the brink of 
irretrievable doom’.13 At a national level, there was an increased focus 
on children, placing value on their education and the removal of factors 
detrimental to their development. Importantly, for the themes of this 
volume, there was a belief in the contaminating influence of unhealthy 
minds, which led to the segregation of those with learning disabilities 
from the mainstream school population. The academic capabilities of 
‘deficient’ and ‘defective’ children thus were linked directly to the social 
and economic potential of the nation.
These concerns led to a sustained medical interest in the training and 
management of children with supposedly unhealthy minds. Perhaps the 
most influential voice in this area was Dr. George E. Shuttleworth who 
worked as Assistant Medical Officer at the Earlswood Idiot Asylum 
and Medical Superintendent at the Royal Albert Asylum. In 1895, 
Shuttleworth published, what he described as, a ‘little Manual to the 
Medical Profession, and to the increasing number of the Public who 
take an interest in the special education of mentally deficient children’.14 
Aware of his professional and lay audience the ‘manual’ spanned an 
array of issues including social context, medical classification, aetiol-
ogy, treatment and education, while attempting to discuss gradations of 
impairment from the ‘dull’ to ‘idiots’, who were considered to be the 
most severe of cases.15 The section on education is most relevant to this 
chapter and volume. Shuttleworth subdivided this into three sections: 
‘educational’, ‘industrial’ and ‘moral’.16 Educational training was con-
cerned with the physical and mental development of the child and fol-
lowed the Froebelian philosophy of learning through doing. There was 
a focus on ‘sensory’ training over the ‘three R’s’ that formed the back-
bone of the mainstream school curriculum. The section on industrial 
education dealt with activities that could be adopted in special schools 
that would best prepare children for their adult lives as part of an indus-
trial workforce. Some examples include paper weaving—considered 
good preparation for the trade of sock darning, and the ‘pricker’, used 
for perforated pictures, that was seen as an introduction to cobbling.17  
Of course, many of these activities were gender specific and while boys 
were guided towards, depending on their ability, carpentry, woodcarv-
ing, gardening and farming, girls were ‘encouraged to take an interest in 
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domestic matters and to assist in the still-room’.18 The third strand, moral 
education, aimed to interweave with the academic and industrial elements 
of a child’s education in order to instil the core pillars of middle-class 
respectability. There was an underlying belief that the feeble-minded were 
susceptible to slip into vice and criminality and therefore effective moral 
education would help to prevent social decline.19 To reinforce the moral 
instruction Shuttleworth promoted a system of rewards (such as praise in 
front of peers and commendation) and punishment (which included cor-
poreal punishment, although the effectiveness was questioned, and with-
holding favourite foods).20 Thus, we can see from Shuttleworth’s work 
that shaping young unhealthy minds into future socially efficient and 
respectable citizens was paramount.
Despite the work and influence of Shuttleworth, debate continued 
about the nature of mentally deficient children and following the passage 
of the Mental Deficiency Act in 1913, Alfred Binet and Thomas Simon 
published their work on intelligence testing in France. Their attention 
was on children that they defined as ‘abnormal’ and they explained this 
classification to mean ‘those who are suitable neither for the ordinary 
school nor the asylum; for the school they are not sufficiently good, for 
the asylum not sufficiently bad’.21 It was from this population of suppos-
edly ‘abnormal’ children that the special schools were populated. Binet 
and Simon’s work was designed to provide an objective and scientific 
rationale for special education after criticising the subjectivity and ‘self-
ish interests’ of philanthropy in establishing the schools.22 The motives 
of those managing schools are something that we will turn to later in 
this chapter. Binet and Simon measured the abilities of an individual to 
those of a supposedly ‘normal’ child of the same age and then divided 
the mental age by the actual age to reveal the intelligence quotient or 
IQ. According to their formula, children under nine who were two years 
behind in mental development were ‘probably’ deficient, and those aged 
over nine whose development was three years behind were ‘definitely’ 
deficient. These tests functioned as a guide to ensure the admission of 
the correct children to special schools, making sure that those who could 
progress in an ordinary school, nor those that would not advance in any 
educational setting did not enter. There was initially a slow take up in 
England, but the attempt to create an unhealthy mind, as a classification 
based in science, is an important one.
In Birmingham, the tests were not taken up and the School Board 
adopted the approach of providing special classes, rather than schools 
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for suitable children. As early as December 1900, all of these had been 
certified by the Board of Education under the Elementary Education 
(Defective and Epileptic Children) Act, 1899.23 To get a sense of 
demand on these special classes, the School Board of the city, in 1903, 
commissioned school attendance officers to conduct an analysis of the 
number of defective children receiving an education. The method of 
counting was, somewhat, imperfect considering that attendance officers 
only had contact with children already known to them but the results, in 
Table 4.1, reveal the range of issues that were dealt with in special classes 
at the time.24
It is immediately evident that children with supposed unhealthy 
minds numbered fewer than those with physical impairments. However, 
this was a rudimentary counting exercise that did not take into 
account the ‘invisibility’ of mental health issues and the fears that par-
ents might have in disclosing them to authorities, especially if it might 
bring them closer to requiring medical relief from the much maligned 
poor law. Furthermore, there is a lack of nuance in the classification sys-
tem with no insight into how many of those counted as ‘weak intellect, 
Table 4.1 The prevalence of ‘defective’ children in Birmingham schools, 1903
Source Wolfson Centre for Archival Research, Birmingham Education Committee, Special Schools 
Committee of the School Board Minutes, 10 February 1898–17 March 1903, SB/B11/1/1/1, p. 214





Over 14 years Total
Cripples 24 33 146 0 203




3 19 25 2 47
Defective sight 1 4 55 0 60
Epileptics 11 4 39 0 52




2 39 61 0 102
Various 
diseases
0 0 10 0 10
Total 41 98 352 2 493
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feeble-minded, and imbecile’ would have benefited from education, a 
key factor in filtering children into the classes. These numbers therefore 
need to be handled with a healthy degree of cynicism, but are neverthe-
less useful in providing some context into how the Birmingham School 
Board approached the issue of mental disability and special education.
The proactive approach of Birmingham authorities in attempting to 
provide educational provision for those that were described as defective 
was not mirrored in all areas and the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 in 
an attempt to impose some kind of uniformity, defined four classes of 
the mentally defective population. These were idiots, imbeciles, feeble- 
minded and the morally defective; the latter category was appropriated 
to include single unmarried mothers, demonstrating the fluid nature 
of definition and the moralistic concerns of authorities. Yet as Wynter 
has observed, the definitions of mental impairment fluctuated when 
deployed at the local level.25 With local authorities, under the auspices 
of the newly formed Board of Control, given responsibility for the super-
vision and protection of defectives, both inside and outside of institu-
tions it is important to assess how local ideas about mental capabilities 
formulated in practice.26 This is possible for Birmingham thanks to a 
definitional exercise that took place two years prior to this seminal leg-
islation. The Medical Superintendent of the Birmingham School Board, 
the Superintendent of Special Schools and the Chairman of the Special 
Schools Sub-Committee decided that clear classifications of mental defi-
ciency in relation to the children already attending special classes in the 
city was required, in order to better understand the level of demand 
in Birmingham. This exercise created the local boundaries found in 
Table 4.2.
Unsurprisingly, children in Class V were the least ubiquitous in 
Birmingham’s special schools while those in Class IV, those potentially 
requiring care into adulthood, were the most common. The description 
of each class was shaped around social and economic factors, rather than 
medical concerns. For instance, any child counted in Classes I through 
IV was only included because their families were judged not to have 
the means to assist them when they reached the age of 16, thus exclud-
ing them from Class V. In addition, Classes II and III were primar-
ily linked to social efficiency and economic potential, whereas I and IV 
were concerned with the expense that might be incurred to the public 
purse. This echoes the findings of the Royal Commission on the Care 
and Control of the Feeble-Minded whose report in 1908 informed the 
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Mental Deficiency Act. Ellen Pinsent, the only female Commissioner 
and a key personality in driving the direction of educational provision in 
Birmingham, stated in 1909:
There are numbers of mentally-defective persons whose training is neglected, 
over whom no sufficient control is exercised, and whose wayward and 
 irresponsible lives are productive of crime and misery, of much injury and 
 mischief to themselves and to others, and of much continuous expenditure.27
The report also reinforced two stereotypes about the feeble-minded: the 
first, being that the condition replicated itself from one generation to the 
next and the second, that the feeble-minded were more likely to engage 
in vice and criminality. The managers of the Sandwell Hall School readily 
bought into these tropes. Their initial prospectus stated: ‘The history of 
the lives of mentally-defective people shows that if at liberty they mate-
rially increase the numbers of paupers, criminals, inebriates, and prosti-
tutes, while the children to whom they too often give birth cannot fail 
to sink into the dependent class’.28 It was argued that the children of 
these parents fell into two categories: the first were the criminal, vicious 
and immoral and the second were those living in ‘bad homes’. For those 
in the latter category, the issue was not in the physical structure of the 
home, although many children lived in far from ideal abodes, but rather 
the occupants, with parents depicted as ‘vicious’, neglectful and ‘cruel’.29 
Due to these circumstances, it was considered that mentally impaired 
children had ‘no chance of becoming good citizens’ without some kind 
of guidance in the form of education.30
Table 4.2 Classification of the special school population in the Birmingham 
area, 1911
Source Wolfson Centre for Archival Research, Special School Minute Book 1, BCC1/BH/5/1/1/1, 
p. 395
Class I Cases urgently in need of further care and control; suitable for Residential 
Schools for the mentally defective
Class II Cases that have a chance of becoming self-supporting
Class III Cases that may become temporary wage-earners but that will need further 
care and control on the break-up of their homes
Class IV Cases that will need further care and control in an institution at 16 or when 
they leave the Day Schools
Class V Cases where parents will be in a position to look after them when they 
leave—well to do parents
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sandweLL haLL sChooL
The buildings used for the Sandwell Hall School, an Institution for the 
Care of Mentally Defective Children, belonged to the Earl of Dartmouth 
and from 1897 to 1905 the Lunacy Commissioners of Birmingham 
used them to house 200 lunatic patients on the site.31 These were 
mainly ‘quiet and dependable’ convalescent patients from the Winson 
Green Asylum and they demonstrate the site’s utility as a medical space, 
rather than an educational one immediately prior to its conversion. It 
was located in 30 acres and ‘the land included in the holding is suffi-
cient for exercise purposes and for the cultivation of vegetables for use 
in the Institution’.32 The school was founded in 1908 and opened its 
doors to children the following year, with space for 80 boys and 70 
girls. The Staff were resident and included a matron and teachers, with 
a Medical Officer visiting frequently. Unlike the Sandlebridge School 
in Cheshire, it did not intend to offer permanent care of the individu-
als that attended, although this element of provision was included in the 
original documentation.
Sandwell Hall School’s guiding principles closely reflected the findings 
of the Royal Commission; the building itself had strong links with con-
fining lunatic patients and the idea for it came from Rev. Harold Nelson 
Burden a colleague on the Royal Commission on the Feeble-Minded of 
the school’s Honorary Secretary, Mrs. Ellen Pinsent. Upon his death in 
1930, Burden was acclaimed as a ‘pioneer in the research of problems 
connected with mental deficiency’ and had worked in British India and 
East London before founding the National Institutions for Persons 
Requiring Care and Control.33 The school was also managed and super-
vised by a Committee of Visitors made up of influential members of the 
local community. It included: G. H. Kenrick as Chairman—also Chair 
of the Birmingham Education Committee; David Davis Chairman of 
the Birmingham Asylums Committee; H. J. Sayer and A. J. Norton 
both former Chairmen of the Birmingham Board of Guardians; William 
Brown the Chair of the Aston Board of Guardians; Joseph Walter the 
Chairman of the King’s Norton Board of Guardians; four members of 
the Birmingham Education Committee; and Dr. Violet Hill who was 
a member of the Special Schools After-Care Committee. Nominally, 
this organisation managed Sandwell Hall but from the outset, Burden 
made it clear that the school was ‘financially under my own control and 
direction’.34 The appointment of the Council was effective in tying the 
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school to prominent figures across the city who had vested interests in 
providing suitable instruction to children and Pinsent was the key to 
ensuring that the new educational endeavour gained traction. She had 
served on the Royal Commission on the Feeble-Minded (1904–1908), 
was a Commissioner on the Board of Control from 1921 to 1932, but 
most significantly was elected to the Birmingham School Board’s Special 
Schools Committee on 19 June 1900 and chaired it from 1901.35 Less 
than a year later the School Board founded, upon her suggestion, an 
After-Care Sub-Committee to monitor individuals who were no longer 
under the supervision of special schools,36 thus demonstrating her influ-
ence in directing special educational policy across the city.37 Additionally, 
her influence and expertise in the management of mental deficiency were 
far-reaching, as attested to by Margaret MacDowall who wrote a trea-
tise on the training of mentally defective children in 1919. In her intro-
duction, she noted that following the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, she 
retired to focus on the education of ‘only a few children’ as she ‘could 
not work under the inspection of those who possibly might be unsym-
pathetic’.38 However, following an inspection from Pinsent in July 1916 
MacDowall was reinvigorated into her work and accredits the inspiration 
for writing her volume to Pinsent. Subsequently, Pinsent’s influence in 
the field is not to be underestimated.
As might be expected, the fate of Sandwell Hall, and the children 
associated with it, was closely intertwined with the figures of Burden and 
Pinsent and the experience of this institution reveals much about atti-
tudes towards unhealthy young minds at this time. The promotional 
material for the school heralded the social role that it would fulfil and 
stated that ‘children of feeble mental capacity are peculiarly liable to 
fall into sexual vices’.39 It went on to note that those subject to violent 
tendencies ‘are brought under control if the children are removed from 
home surroundings’.40 These tropes about mentally deficient children 
held social weight and subsequently mainstream schools were deemed 
unsuitable because ‘defective’ children were considered to ‘be incura-
ble truants, and receive no benefit from instruction in Day Schools, on 
account of the irregularity of their attendance’.41 As we have seen in 
Birmingham, the School Board was particularly aware of the presence of 
children requiring special education and attempted to provide appropri-
ate education for them.
The management of the school adopted an approach that meant 
those taken would not become accustomed to a lifestyle that they were 
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considered unlikely to maintain upon on the termination of their time at 
the school. They stated, in correspondence to the Board of Education, 
‘In view of the fact that they are never likely to have a high wage-earning 
capacity, the Managers are of the opinion that the provision made should 
be on economical lines’.42 Such a statement was about making sure 
that the children under care knew their position in society but also may 
have prevented some applications from parents who could have viewed 
Sandwell Hall as a desirable alternative to workhouse accommodation.43
There was also an economic concern for local authorities who had to 
find extra money to fund residential education for children who could 
not attend ‘ordinary’ day schools. The Sandwell Hall council was told 
that ‘the Local Education Authority (LEA) will only send children to it 
if the amount for each child does not exceed £27.10’.44 In this instance, 
the LEA was in a position where it could dictate price, this concentrated 
the minds of managers who had to balance financial pressures that were 
associated with the residential nature of their educational offer. In an 
attempt to relieve economic concerns, Pinsent wrote to the Board of 
Education suggesting that they employed a head teacher with the sal-
ary of £40 per year with board and lodging. The proposed salary was 
significantly below those of class teachers working in day special schools 
in Birmingham. The LEA recommended that an ‘uncertificated Assistant 
Mistress’ should earn the salary of between £70 and £80 per annum, 
a substantial discrepancy with the head teacher salary at Sandwell Hall 
even with board and lodging taken into account.45
The Board of Education met with Burden and Pinsent to discuss the 
matter further. During this meeting, Pinsent stated that they had advertised 
for the post of Headmistress on the proposed terms but ‘only one answered 
and she was quite impossible’.46 To widen the net it was suggested ‘that the 
rule may be relaxed and that they may be at liberty to appoint an uncer-
tified teacher to the post’.47 Here we see the quality of instruction was 
directly balanced against the financial health of the school, even though 
Mr. Tabor of the Board of Education reported that ‘they [Pinsent and 
Burden] are certain that they will then be able to obtain a really compe-
tent person’.48 The paradoxical nature of this statement did not seem to 
worry Burden or Pinsent as they attempted to get more by paying less. 
Pinsent used some of the professional capital that she had accrued serving 
on the Royal Commission and found an ally in Dr. Eichholz, the Board of 
Education’s Inspector of Special Schools. Who commented that ‘there is 
much force in Mrs. Pinsent’s arguments. They are going to take the worst 
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cases who will never repay in their careers a large educational outlay’.49 
Eichholz argued in favour of the proposal to appoint an uncertified teacher 
because he believed that LEAs would never agree to pay fees equivalent to 
those found in mainstream schools. However, support was not universal 
with Tabor commenting ‘I should have thought that the additional cost of 
a certified teacher would be very small, and hardly appreciable in so large 
a general expenditure’50; and George Newman, the Chief Medical Officer, 
stating ‘the Regulations [for Defective and Epileptic Schools] of 11th July 
1904 are absolutely binding, the Board being given no discretionary power, 
we must, I fear, tell Mrs. Pinsent that we cannot waive the requirements of 
paragraph 6(a)’.51
Before the Board of Education had reached a decision, Pinsent 
attempted to raise the stakes and wrote a letter to Dr. Eichholz inform-
ing him that she had decided to appoint Frances Dipper as the school’s 
first Headmistress. Dipper was aged 28 and Pinsent provided a glow-
ing reference of her professional qualities. Listing her experience work-
ing in both an elementary school and special school in Birmingham, at 
the latter she had ‘distinguished herself by the control she has gained 
over some of the most difficult among the scholars’.52 This appoint-
ment forced the Board to make a decision on recognising an uncerti-
fied teacher. Pinsent though sought to mitigate this issue and informed 
the Board that Dipper ‘was not able to go to college or to read for her 
certificate, owing to home claims, her mother being a widow and rely-
ing on her for help both pecuniary and domestic’.53 Dipper was depicted 
as exemplary and respectable and she fulfilled the expected gender roles 
of Edwardian women. Commenting on Pinsent’s reputation the Board 
agreed to approve Miss Dipper as Headmistress subject to approval from 
the Inspector, the sympathetic Dr. Eichholz.
With Dipper in place as Headmistress, the cost per child was set at 
£24 per annum, inclusive of clothing expenses. Furthermore, word 
of the school had also spread and the LEAs of Worcester, Rochford 
Hundred, Hereford, Berkshire and Chester had agreed to send children 
to the school, as had the Poor Law Guardians of Aston, Leicester and 
Wolverhampton. The Board of Education and the Local Government 
Board conducted inspection of the school’s standards, with the Board of 
Control taking over some of these duties from 1914.
Sandwell Hall was one strand of provision for mentally defective 
children in Birmingham and operated in conjunction with the day spe-
cial schools that were managed by the Birmingham School Board and 
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after 1902 the LEA. When Dr. Eichholz inspected the Bristol Street 
Special School in 1908, he noted that ‘the following children William 
B., William L., Joseph D., Annie R., and Jas B. are in capable of receiv-
ing benefit from day school instruction, and should not continue on the 
roll of this school. They are fit cases for permanent care’.54 This report 
sparked a reaction from the Special Schools Sub-Committee to the wider 
school population in Birmingham and they stated on 13 May 1908 that 
‘there are at least 40 cases of the above description in the special schools 
under this Committee’s control, needing permanent care and suitable for 
a boarding school’.55 To deal with such a problem it was decided that ‘in 
view of the fact that Sandwell Hall will probably be filled during the next 
three months’ the Committee should make contact with Rev. Burden 
and reserve the necessary spaces.56 This, of course, was mutually ben-
eficial to parties and Ellen Pinsent with her oversight of Sandwell Hall 
and special education ensured that Birmingham was in prime position to 
filter appropriate children towards the school. By examining the expe-
riences of some of these ‘appropriate’ children, it is possible to glean a 
better understanding of Sandwell Hall, ideas of healthy minds, and those 
who were responsible for education.
On 23 April 1909, there were 20 children admitted to the school, its 
largest intake since opening.57 This was followed by a steady flow of chil-
dren, such as Alice T. and Albert B. who both entered on 21 May 1909 
with the fees covered by public funds and Rebecca S. who was admit-
ted 1 June 1909 with her parents contributing 1/per week. Rebecca S. 
demonstrates that although there had been a move towards compulsory 
state-funded education, for children living with learning difficulties the 
normal funding streams did not always apply and parental contributions 
were sought. In another case, Douglas H. aged 9 had been truanting 
from the George West Day School for Mentally Defective Children 
in the city. In October 1909, his father appeared before the Appeals 
Committee of the LEA to account for his absence from school. It was 
recorded that ‘the lad appeared to be beyond his father’s control and 
declined to go with the Guide provided by the Committee’. Due to the 
difficulty of the boy’s behaviour, it was decided that he was unsuitable 
for a day school and arrangements were made for him to be admitted 
to Sandwell Hall.58 In this instance, the only details that are presented 
about the child in question are their challenging behaviour, again pro-
viding an insight into the range of needs that were accommodated at 
Sandwell Hall.
86  S. J. TAYLOR
With the complexities associated with the needs of children, it is 
worth remembering that Sandwell Hall was not simply a dumping 
ground for those who were unable to function in society but rather, it 
was expected to maintain and provide a suitable standard of education 
for its pupils.59 Therefore, when Dr. Eichholz inspected the prem-
ises in 1910, he found that four children, John W. (aged 14), Lily T. 
(14), Mary K. (12) and Annie R. (12), all previously removed from 
the Bristol Street School, were deemed to be ‘uneducable’ and should 
be removed from the roll. Despite their unsuitability, the Birmingham 
Special Schools Sub-Committee noted that ‘in the event of these chil-
dren leaving the institution arrangement be made where possible for 
them to be admitted to Day Schools in the City’.60 This suggests that in 
this instance at least, the school space was used to control and supervise 
these children instead of being part of a concerted attempt to improve 
their educational and intellectual achievements. In a notable aside, John 
W.’s parents were chased for an outstanding contribution of 3/for his 
time in Sandwell Hall. Prosecution was discussed but it is uncertain if 
this action ever came to fruition.
It is evident from the classifications of children admitted to the school 
that there were tensions between central legislation and local practice. 
These tensions also manifested in the governance of the school and on 
the 13 October 1909 the Special School Sub-Committee at Birmingham 
was informed via its Chairman, Ellen Pinsent, of the resignation of 
the Sandwell Hall Council. It was resolved that Rev. Burden would be 
asked to furnish details of the new methods and conditions for govern-
ing the school and to provide ‘full information’ as to the new manage-
ment committee.61 Furthermore, Councillor Kenrick, previously the 
Chairman of the Sandwell Hall Council, and Councillor Jephcott, were 
appointed as LEA visitors for the school with responsibility for making 
sure it met local standards. This occurrence was a schism in the opera-
tion of the school. Only a month earlier, on 15 September 1909, a let-
ter was submitted to the Special Schools Sub-Committee (chaired by 
Pinsent) from the Honorary Secretary of Sandwell Hall (also Pinsent), 
with regard to the opening of a new school at Stoke Park near Bristol, by 
the National Institutions for Persons Requiring Care and Control with 
Rev. Burden as the Warden. Rather than noting the impending implo-
sion of Sandwell Hall, the committee decided to speak to the relevant 
Poor Law Guardians of the city with a view to admitting Amy T. and 
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Frank K. who had both been deemed too ‘low grade’ for education at 
Sandwell Hall.62 Therefore, it appears that space to accommodate such 
children was at premium and the committee were willing to overlook the 
mismanagement of the school in order to find spaces for Birmingham 
children. Those children that were unsuitable for Sandwell Hall should 
have been maintained in an Idiot or Imbecile Asylum but space inside 
them was at a premium and private institutions required a nomination.63
Following the resignation of the council, and subsequent inadequate 
communication from Rev. Warden regarding the future direction of the 
school, it was resolved at the December meeting of the Special Schools 
Sub-Committee ‘that no more children be sent to [Sandwell] Hall…
until the Board of Education signify their approval of the new condi-
tions under which the institution will be managed’.64 It was not until 
April 1910 that such reassurance was given, even though it was accompa-
nied, when it did arrive, by the caveat that approval was only a temporary 
measure for twelve months while they awaited a more secure plan for the 
management of the school. We thus see that the education of children 
considered to have unhealthy minds was at the whim of personal disputes 
and political decisions on both the local and national stage.
In 1911, a local examination of all children in Birmingham’s special 
schools was carried out using the classification system discussed above in 
Table 4.2. The purpose was to identify the number of children requiring 
residential care and the likelihood of the special school population to be 
in some way self-supporting in adult life. Included in the survey were 
837 children with the results displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Birmingham Special School survey, 1911
Source Wolfson Centre for Archival Research, Special School Minute Book 1, BCC1/BH/5/1/1/1, p. 394
Boys Girls Total Percentage
Class I—Residential schools 58 65 123 14.7
Class II—Chance of being self supporting 135 72 207 24.7
Class III—Temporary wage earners 141 74 215 25.7
Class IV—Further control post-16 152 128 280 33.5
Class V—Well to do families 8 4 12 1.4
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Alongside the broad classification, a more nuanced medical assess-
ment of mentally defective children was also conducted. This found 
that there were 48 children in Birmingham suffering from epilepsy, but 
not mental deficiency and a further 23 in the extended city area. There 
were 9 children with combined epilepsy and mental deficiency, with 11 
in the wider city area; and 111 mentally defective children without epi-
lepsy and 52 in the wider city area.65 Significantly, these counting exer-
cises were designed not to ascertain the amount of room in Sandwell 
Hall that the Birmingham LEA required but rather as part of a plan to 
include mentally defectives in the Board’s Monyhull Epileptic Colony, 
thus circumventing the reliance on Sandwell Hall. The Special Schools 
Sub-Committee concluded that the numbers had most likely been 
underestimated due to some parents not wanting to commit their chil-
dren to specialist education until legislation compelled them to do so. 
Nevertheless they noted that ‘during the next few years the Guardians 
would require places for 130 children and the Education Committee 
about 260 children, provision would be made for careful classification 
of the children, as the colony is to consist of detached homes’.66 These 
comments signalled a shift in approach to directing children requir-
ing residential care to the Monyhull Colony. The impact on Sandwell 
Hall was the loss of its most prolific contributor of children and subse-
quently a substantial reduction in revenue. In a further blow to Sandwell 
Hall, Ellen Pinsent and David Davies, formerly on the Council at the 
school, took up new roles on a committee to oversee the management of 
Monyhull, signalling a further distancing of the LEA from school.67
The financial consequences of the rift between the two parties were 
most starkly evidenced in the payments made by the LEA to the school. 
In October 1909, the Birmingham LEA paid the sum of £219 6s 8d for 
the maintenance of children present at Sandwell Hall. Three years later, 
in October 1912, the payment had reduced to £48 4s 10d for nine girls 
who the LEA had struggled to find alternative places for.68 The school 
struggled on until 1921 but it was blighted by financial concerns and 
inability, in a time of expanding numbers of the mentally deficient, to 
fill its spaces. This was compounded by the reluctance of Rev. Burden to 
commit more of his own resources to the school and frequent requests 
from him to the Board of Education for an advance in grant payments 
that central government paid to special schools for each eligible pupil 
that was present. In 1921, the situation at the school had deteriorated 
to such an extent that the Board of Education refused to recertify the 
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school citing ‘serious irregularities’.69 Burden attempted to appeal, stat-
ing ‘the defects in the school, such as they are, are wholly traceable to 
the lack of funds due to the exceedingly small amount paid for mainte-
nance’.70 The Board did not reconsider and the Sandwell Hall School 
subsequently closed in December 1921, with its buildings demolished 
seven years later.
ConCLusions
The experience of the Sandwell Hall School reveals that efforts at car-
ing for and managing the healthy minds of children at the beginning 
of the twentieth century were centred on the intellectual and moral 
health of the child. Operating in a compulsory and state education sys-
tem it was inevitable that ideas of mental deficiency were influenced by 
national and local inputs. Sandwell Hall grew out of wider concerns, 
its founders meeting as they worked on the Royal Commission on the 
Feeble-Minded together, work that they both considered essential to the 
national interest. The focus of Burden and Pinsent was on attempting to 
ameliorate the mental conditions of children and the school was founded 
on a belief that education would materially benefit the individual, both 
immediately and in their later life. However, in practice, interventions 
were symbolic of power struggles that existed about how best to man-
age this specific population of children in order to educate them into a 
socially efficient, ‘healthy’ and independent-minded members of the 
population. In the end, the Sandwell Hall School descended into farce 
and economic ruin, with the interests of its pupils and their ‘unhealthy’ 
minds apparently secondary to personal ambitions.
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Healthy Minds and Intellectual Disability
Jan Walmsley
introduCtion
This chapter concerns itself with the concept of a healthy mind as applied 
to people with intellectual or learning disabilities. It traces its roots 
back to the early part of the twentieth century, particularly the perva-
sive belief in eugenics, and uses historical practice and experience as a 
prism to consider the situation in the present. The principal argument 
is that people with intellectual or learning disabilities, by definition, do 
not have minds that can be regarded as ‘healthy’. This is an important, 
if not controversial, starting point. If people with learning disabilities in 
the twenty-first century are to gain equal status as fellow citizens, as was 
promised in the Valuing People White Paper (England and Wales 2001), 
Same as You (Scotland 2000), and the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of People with Disabilities to which the UK was a signa-
tory in 2007 there needs to be a change that goes beyond stirring pol-
icy statements, a pious belief that things will get better, or even ‘more 
resources’.1 This chapter addresses two major questions; firstly, how 
far were people with intellectual disabilities regarded as having healthy 
minds during the twentieth century? And, secondly, what relevance does 
this have to people with learning or intellectual disabilities in the present? 
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This chapter will focus on a number of issues, including Western phi-
losophy, eugenic theory, changing labels, psychotherapy and control of 
reproduction, in order to find answers to these questions.
LabeLs—Language and its signifiCanCe
A brief discussion of language, especially the changing nature of labels 
applied to people currently known as having ‘learning’ or ‘intellectual’ dis-
abilities, is essential to frame the analysis of the chapter. Alfred Tredgold, 
a highly influential doctor and member of the 1908 Radnor Commission, 
used the term ‘amentia’ (absence of mind) in early editions of his book 
Mental Deficiency which was the key textbook in medicine and nurs-
ing until the late twentieth century.2 If the mind is associated with rea-
son, perception, judgement, intellect and understanding, what does it 
mean not to have a mind, or to have a mind that is impaired? The early 
twentieth-century term ‘feeble-minded’ was officially adopted in legis-
lation passed in 1913 in England and Wales and was widely used in the 
USA, Canada and the rest of the English-speaking world3 although Steven 
Taylor observes in Chapter 4 of this volume that definitions could fluctu-
ate according to space and place. The very use of the word ‘feeble’ means 
that these could not be considered healthy minds. ‘Feeble-minded’ was 
used as a social and medical category until the second half of the twentieth 
century, as the legislation which perpetuated it, the Mental Deficiency Act, 
1913, was not repealed until 1959. Indeed, ‘feeble-minded’ lingered on in 
common speech beyond that time. A parent in an interview used it with 
the author in 1991 to describe another parent who had two children with 
learning disabilities.4 The word ‘ineducable’ was introduced into official 
language in 1944, to label those deemed incapable of benefitting from an 
education also suggests that medically and legally a mind was considered 
less than healthy if it was incapable of education. These children were only 
admitted to the education system in 1970.
The Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 subdivided the term ‘defectives’, 
into the following classifications: ‘idiots’, ‘imbeciles’, ‘feeble minded’ 
and ‘moral defectives’. These were replaced in the Mental Health 
Act, 1959, by the terminology ‘sub-normal’, which was then itself 
replaced by ‘mental handicap’, ‘learning disabilities’, and now the term 
‘intellectual disabilities’ appears to be gaining favour. Alongside these 
legal and medical classifications, have been less formal designations like 
‘backward’, applied to children until well into the late twentieth century, 
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and also terms which started life as having a medical significance, like 
‘mongol’ and ‘cretin’ but which quickly degenerated into terms of abuse. 
In the final quarter of the twentieth century, there was a shift towards 
the language of disability/disabled. This realignment, from association 
with madness and mental affliction to association with people who are 
physically impaired has been significant—for example, it opened the way 
for the influence of the social model of disability to learning disability.5 
The shift has, in some respects, left people marooned between the two 
and neglected by both.6 Paradoxically, the medical specialty most closely 
associated with learning/intellectual disability remains psychiatry, despite 
the official dropping of the ‘mental’ label. The connection with ‘learn-
ing’ remains in ‘learning disabled’ and its user preferred variant ‘learning 
difficulties’. In the internationally used variant ‘intellectual disabilities’, 
the problem remains in the mind, specifically with the intellect.
Valerie Sinason, leading psychotherapist, is of the view that the 
ever-changing labels, and the bitter conversations accompanying debates 
about the proper language to use, are no coincidence. They are a means 
to hide deep discomfort about ‘learning disability’ as a toxic identity, 
the ultimate outgroup.7 In a world where intellect, reason and judge-
ment are paramount marks of esteem, to be labelled as lacking these, 
is indeed stigmatising. Despite the shift to apparently less stigmatising 
language—intellectual disability is preferable to ‘feeble-minded’ or 
‘idiot’ to the modern ear—the abbreviation ID for ‘intellectual disabil-
ity’ is widely used in academic papers. It seems somewhat disrespectful, 
distancing and dehumanising to abbreviate what is supposed to be a 
respectful modern term, but it is a common practice.
the eugeniC infLuenCe and LegaCy
The spectre of eugenics cannot be separated from terms such as defec-
tive, idiot, imbecile and feeble-minded. It would have come as a sur-
prise to campaigners and legislators of the early twentieth century to find 
the idea of healthy minds applied to what were then generically called 
‘mental defectives’. The minds of these people were, according to the 
official Radnor Report (1908), so diseased as to be ‘a terrible danger 
to the race’ (a phrase attributed to Winston Churchill).8 At the turn of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Binet’s IQ tests were deployed 
to show that most convicts and prostitutes were illiterate and therefore 
feeble-minded.9 These tests provided quasi-scientific truths that these 
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people were the cause of many of the ills with which society grappled—
illegitimacy, drunkenness, promiscuity and fecklessness to name but a 
few. So hideous was this often hidden danger—the feeble-minded could 
often pass as normal—that they needed to be sought out, ascertained and 
detained in segregated institutions.10 There was a belief that feeble-mind-
edness was hereditary and unless the breeding of the feeble-minded was 
curtailed, the ‘healthy’ stock would, it was believed, be overwhelmed by 
larger numbers of defectives. US Scientist H. H. Goddard affirmed that 
feeble-minded people were ‘multiplying at twice the rate of the general 
population’,11 thus producing ‘more feeble-minded children with which 
to clog the wheels of human progress’.12 He too cited quasi-scientific 
research to back up these claims. Goddard met a young woman whom 
he called Deborah Kallikak in an institution and later looked into her 
family tree. Her great-grandfather had been Martin Kallikak. According 
to Goddard, the Kallikak family was divided into two strains—one 
‘good’ and one ‘bad’—both of which originated from Martin Kallikak, 
Sr. The ‘Normal N’ and ‘Feeble Minded F’ were deduced by what these 
ancestors achieved in their lives. When Martin Kallikak, Sr. was a young 
soldier, he had a liaison with an ‘unnamed, feeble-minded tavern girl’. 
This relationship resulted in the birth of an illegitimate son, Martin 
Kallikak, Jr. It was argued that the ‘bad’ strain of the Kallikak family 
descended from this line. Later Martin Kallikak, Sr., married a Quaker 
woman from a ‘good’ family. The ‘good’ line descended from this mar-
riage. Goddard’s genealogical research purported to show that the union 
with the feeble-minded tavern girl resulted in generations of ‘mental 
defectives’ who were plagued by illegitimacy, prostitution, alcoholism, 
epilepsy and lechery. His investigation into the other Kallikak branch 
revealed the opposite: Goddard believed that the striking schism sepa-
rating the two branches of the family was due entirely to the different 
genetic input from the women.13
In the UK, the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 was introduced in direct 
response to the moral panic associated with these eugenic beliefs. This 
legislation made it possible to segregate ‘defectives’ in institutions, with 
men and women kept strictly apart to prevent ‘breeding’.14 Other meas-
ures to restrict childbearing, associated with negative eugenics, included 
prohibition of marriage, which was widely canvassed in England dur-
ing the 1920s, legalised sterilisation, and other forms of birth control.15 
None of these were formally adopted in any of the British Isles, but steri-
lisation was widely practised.16
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The heyday of segregation as the preferred way to manage mental 
defectives, and to prevent their breeding, was the first three-quarters of 
the twentieth century. In the Western world at least, following scandals 
and journalistic exposes, buildings based on the idea of segregation in 
large remote ‘colonies’ fell out of fashion.17 However, these buildings 
and institutions continue to be the dominant form of provision, other 
than family-based care, in much of the rest of the world.
In the countries of the west, which had been amongst the earliest to 
adopt a ‘colony’ solution, a combination of factors came together to 
bring that era to an end. Segregation was an expensive way to prevent the 
‘unfit’ from having children once the employment of ‘high grade’ patients 
became unacceptable during the 1950s. At a time of high employment 
and rising wages, it became ever more difficult to recruit staff to work 
in remote institutions often run on quasi-military lines.18 Academic cri-
tiques, such as that of Goffman19 and parent-run organisations like the 
National Association of Parents of Backward Children (England), and the 
National Association for Retarded Children (USA) also exerted pressure 
on politicians to move cautiously away from institutional solutions.20 The 
last large state-run institutions to open in the UK were in the early 1970s 
at Princess Marina Hospital in Northampton, and Lea Castle Hospital in 
Kidderminster: the last one to officially close was Orchard Hill, on the 
outskirts of London in 2010. However, the demise of the institutional 
solution did not signal a true reappraisal of people with learning disabil-
ities, rather it proved that technology opened the way for new forms of 
reproductive control, negating the need for physical segregation.
steriLisation and ContraCePtion
Control of reproduction was the driving force behind segregationist 
policies. The arrival of more effective contraception meant that physical 
segregation became less necessary. Sterilisation also offered an alterna-
tive to achieving the pre-eminent eugenic aim of preventing procreation 
and child-rearing by people with feeble-minds. In numerous countries, 
including many states of the USA, Canada, Sweden and Iceland, invol-
untary sterilisation was practised lawfully during much of the twentieth 
century.21 In Sweden, Iceland and the USA, it was a condition of release 
from the institution.22 Oral history accounts provide a greater degree of 
insight, such as this recollection from Ragnheiður, a former inmate of an 
Icelandic institution:
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It is so strange. When I moved to the group home I had to undergo  
sterilization. I didn’t agree but I had to agree because otherwise I would 
not be allowed to move from the institution.23
Sociologist Robert Edgerton, writing in the 1960s, noted that 44 of 
the 48 ex-patients he interviewed about life outside had been subject to 
‘eugenic sterilisation’ before their release from the Pacific State Colony, 
California.24 The letter sent from the Colony seeking parental permis-
sion emphasised that it would enable parole and visits outside, and unless 
there were strong objections, the patient was sterilised. Edgerton records 
that a few respondents, all single men, approved of the operation, giving 
them greater freedom. However, most regretted it, and several saw it as 
a ‘permanent source of doubt about their mental state’.25 One woman 
speculated a connection with an unhealthy mind in her musing to the 
researcher on the subject:
I still don’t know why they did that surgery to me. The sterilization wasn’t 
for punishment, was it? Was it because there was something wrong with 
my mind?26
Edgerton noted that the most significant cause of concern was the 
difficulty it posed for hiding a discredited past, to tell or not to tell 
potential partners—or in the terms of this volume, to conceal the diag-
nosis of not having an acceptably healthy mind. The resulting scar was 
regularly explained as the result of an appendectomy. Edgerton notes the 
irony that this was how the hospital explained the operation, saying to 
patients that it was to remove an appendix, a subterfuge that was also 
recorded in England, Canada and Iceland.27
Famously, in the four countries of the UK involuntary sterilisation 
was never legalised after the failure of the Brock Committee to persuade 
Parliament to legislate in the 1930s.28 Nevertheless, this did not mean it 
did not occur as shown by Tilley et al. via oral histories, and by Stansfield 
et al. who scrutinised court records of the later twentieth century.29 
Sterilisation was widely canvassed in the mid- and later twentieth cen-
tury. A survey undertaken in England in the 1990s found that over half 
of 274 responding family members would or had considered sterilisation 
for their child.30 Roy et al.’s study found that family members consider-
ing sterilisation had not explored alternative contraception.31 In 2011, 
the author interviewed two elderly parents of a woman born in 1950 
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who recounted how they had obtained sterilisation for their daughter in 
1970 by requesting it from the GP.32 Their fear was, not that she would 
have sex, which she apparently much enjoyed, but that it would result 
in a child that she would be unable to adequately care for. Ladd-Taylor 
argues that it was child-rearing that was the focus, not childbearing:
Sterilization policy was as much about preventing child rearing by the 
so-called feeble minded as it was about preventing child bearing.33
The most recent study on the subject of sterilisation in England and 
Wales was a detailed review of 73 applications which went before the 
Official Solicitor between 1988 and 1999.34 Seventy of these cases were 
women, three were men, and 37% were minors. The average age of the 
women was 21.4 years. The court approved thirty-one sterilisations; six 
procedures went ahead without the need for court approval because it 
was deemed ‘therapeutic’. Thus, roughly half the cases that were consid-
ered were deemed suitable for sterilisation.
There is little evidence about sterilisation practices after this period, 
despite the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, in England 
and Wales, which arguably provided a new framework for decision-making 
in relation to reproductive rights. However, evidence about recent prac-
tice from other countries shows that sterilisation remains widespread. A 
Belgian study of 397 women aged 18–46 found that 22% had been ster-
ilised.35 A Dutch study involving 397 women aged 15–59 of whom 112 
were using contraception, found that 25 had been sterilised, 20 of these 
prior to 2000.36 Intellectually disabled people may be sterilised, without 
their consent, under New Zealand law, and court authorisation is not 
always necessary.37 Concern about people with intellectual or learning 
disabilities reproducing continues in twenty-first-century thinking and 
practice. It is estimated that between 40 and 60% of children born to par-
ents with intellectual disabilities in Western countries are removed from 
their care.38
The drive to prevent people with ‘unhealthy’ minds from having 
children has not ended, but it is much less visible and in the UK ster-
ilisation appears to no longer be widely practised. The literature indi-
cates that in the early twenty-first century, women’s capacity to conceive 
and bear children is, in the main, controlled through social and contra-
ceptive care interventions rather than surgical sterilisation.39 While the 
law in England and Wales has changed to make sterilisation without 
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legal sanction virtually impossible, ‘newgenic’ social practices continue 
to restrict the sexual and reproductive freedoms of learning disabled 
women. Tilley et al. comment:
Whilst medical technologies may have changed, essential questions about 
intellectually disabled women’s rights to participate in decisions about 
their own reproductive futures remain.40
McCarthy and Ledger et al. argue that continuing use of long-acting 
patches to prevent pregnancy is a form of reproductive control which 
does not require legal sanction.41 Two small-scale studies indicated that 
many women with intellectual disabilities are prescribed long-acting 
contraception without requesting it, frequently when they are not in 
relationships.42
This discussion of reproductive control concludes with an explora-
tion of policy changes. Policy statements of the twenty-first century are 
bold, optimistic and unambiguous, for instance England’s Valuing People 
Now explicitly stated, ‘people with learning disabilities have the choice to 
have relationships, become parents and continue to be parents and are 
supported to do so’.43 Yet the gap between rhetoric and reality is yawn-
ing. Prevention of childbearing and child-rearing continues to inform 
practice, under a cloak of changing policy. The drive to privilege repro-
duction of ‘healthy minds’, untainted by intellectual disability, has not 
gone away.
norMaLisation and soCiaL roLe VaLorisation
Normalisation and social role valorisation are perhaps the most explicit 
acknowledgement in theory that it matters to hide the unhealthy mind. 
The question of how to address what appeared to be the low valuation 
of people with intellectual disabilities became a preoccupation of the 
late twentieth century. Drawing on sociologist Goffman’s argument 
that to overcome stigma, it was essential to ‘pass’ as normal, to conceal 
the discrediting attributes, normalisation and social role valorisation, 
came to dominate learning disability policy and practice from the 1970s 
onwards.44 Normalisation was defined by Dane Bank Mikkelson as let-
ting the mentally handicapped (sic) obtain an existence as close to nor-
mal as possible.45 These ideas from the Nordic countries were recast by, 
the American theorist, Wolf Wolfensberger as social role valorisation:
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The utilization of means which are as culturally normative as possible in 
order to establish and / or maintain personal behaviours which are as  
culturally normative as possible.46
To achieve this, a positive image of people with learning disabilities was 
vital as it would assist in people being accepted in mainstream society. 
Social role valorisation emphasised the importance of people with learn-
ing disabilities taking on ‘valued social roles’—if people with learning 
disabilities occupied valued roles such as worker—or researcher—then 
fuller integration into society would become possible. Wolfensberger also 
advocated association with ‘valued’, i.e. non-disabled people. It was, I 
would suggest, a way of concealing their stigma of an ‘unhealthy’ mind, 
as the route to wider acceptance.
eradiCation
The final example of the ‘low’ value which has historically been attributed to 
people with learning disabilities is their potential for eradication. This prac-
tice was associated with the Nazis in the mid-twentieth century when they 
murdered people that they labelled Unnütze Esser or, in English, ‘useless 
eaters’.47 It was, until quite recently, believed that this had discredited eugen-
ics, and that the eradication of people with learning disabilities is no longer 
countenanced.48 Wolf Wolfensberger, mentioned above as the architect of 
social role valorisation, disagreed. His view was that ‘deathmaking’ is one 
of the functions of learning disability services. He cited case studies which 
demonstrated how medical services fail disabled people, primarily because to 
some their lives are still perceived to have low quality and value.49 He wrote:
handicapped people are given massive doses of psychoactive drugs so that 
they die from drug effects – even though the death certificate will list only 
the complications such as cardiac arrest, pneumonia.50
Within his work, he also targeted abortion. He drew parallels between 
Nazi Germany’s extermination practices and contemporary practice of 
aborting disabled foetuses.51
I think that the liberalisation of abortion is one of the expressions of the 
lowering of human life and I do believe we will soon see legalised eutha-
nasia. We will see it applied to the aged and the retarded first …. We will 
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have to see that you can’t have this part way; that once you break through 
a qualitative barrier of defining human life and its value, then there’s no 
stopping.52
Some recent events suggest that Wolfensberger’s views cannot be lightly 
dismissed. The poor health care offered to people with learning disabil-
ities revealed in Mencap’s Death by Indifference campaign and the find-
ings of the University of Bristol’s Confidential Enquiry into Premature 
Death (CIPOLD) can both be considered to be evidence of this.53 
Moreover, the failure to investigate unexpected and premature deaths to 
which the Mazars Report drew attention, reinforced by the Care Quality 
Commission’s findings in 2016, is further evidence to point to the low 
value which, in some contexts, continues to be accorded to the lives of 
people with learning disabilities.54
Wolfensberger’s starting point for arguing that we are on a slippery 
slope to discarding lives perceived by others to be of ‘low value’ was the 
widespread practice of aborting foetuses identified as disabled through 
prenatal testing.55 Recent medical ‘advances’ open up the real possibility 
that Down’s Syndrome will be eradicated entirely by early detection in 
utero, followed by abortion, discussed in Sally Phillips’s TV Programme 
A World Without Down Syndrome first broadcast in 2016.56 Genetics 
offers the potential to identify more traits than Down’s Syndrome in 
utero which as long ago as 1977 Reilly cited as having the potential for 
negative eugenics.57 If the gene for autism can be located, for exam-
ple, it opens the way for this also to be detected and eradicated before 
birth. Barnbaum uses absence of theory of mind to argue that parents 
have a moral obligation not to bring autistic individuals into the world, 
although she argues that once born, a different approach needs to pre-
vail.58 It is difficult to escape the view that the emphasis on ‘healthy 
minds’ in modern discourse continues to influence policy and practice in 
relation to the abortion of disabled foetuses.
Despite this discussion, the question remains why, despite modern 
policies and stirring words, do people with learning disabilities continue, 
in certain contexts, to have such low social value and how might this 
be rectified? This returns us right back to the idea of ‘healthy minds’ as 
a concept. In 2008, before things got as bad as they were at the time 
of writing (see, for example, the UN’s condemnation of UK’s fail-
ure to uphold the CPRD 2016),59 Kelley Johnson and I pondered the 
question—why, after 3 decades of social inclusion policies, a good life 
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for people with learning disabilities seemed so elusive.60 We looked at 
Western philosophy for answers. We found that ‘reason’ was pre-eminent 
in the qualities philosophers valued for a rounded life. Overwhelmingly, 
male philosophers have outlawed emotions and passion as disturb-
ing to the equilibrium sought through the exercise of reason. Of par-
ticular significance was the view associated with the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment which equated human history with progress related 
to man’s reason, increasing knowledge and understanding of the nat-
ural world, and the means to control it. Certainly, the implications of 
not being seen to possess reason run deep. John Rawls argued that as 
rational human beings we develop a social contract resting on two princi-
ples. The first is the freedom to pursue the life we want to lead providing 
it does not harm others. The second is that economic and social ine-
quality is unavoidable, but the institutions of society should protect the 
less well off.61 Like many preceding philosophers—John Locke amongst 
them—Rawls assumed that a social contract existed between individuals 
who are equal to one another in their freedom to suggest how society 
should be organised, based on their reasoning and ability to participate. 
People with learning disabilities are those whose interests must be pro-
tected in a Rawlsian sense, rather than being active citizens who par-
ticipate in formulating a just and fair society. There is a fundamental 
inequality here, built into the social contract.
Notoriously, twentieth-century thinker Peter Singer placed reason at 
the core of what makes us human and used this to exclude many peo-
ple with learning disabilities from the status of human being.62 This 
extolling of reason, we argued then, is at the core of the exclusion of 
people with learning disabilities. Subsequently, another advocate for 
people with learning disabilities, Chris Goodey argued that since the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment, if not before, people now called 
learning disabled have been the ultimate outgroup.63 He traces this 
to the pre-eminence of intellectual ability in modern claims to spe-
cies membership; he stated that ‘intellectual ability or intelligence is 
in modern societies the foremost claim to status’.64 This, he argued, 
is used to justify classifying people with learning disabilities as an out-
group, suggesting that ‘classifying a human group by intellectual criteria 
is today’s prevailing symptom of inclusion phobia’.65 He further devel-
ops the argument to say that ‘intellectual disability is vital to the domi-
nant in-group because of its relationship to that quality which that group 
attributes to itself ’.66 In other words, we need people with learning 
106  J. WALMSLEY
disabilities to prove our intellectual ability—there is no point in having 
it—if everyone has it. Unless this idea changes, he argues, no amount of 
bold pronouncements will produce change. Taken together, these two 
attempts at understanding the persistent othering of people with intel-
lectual disabilities alluded to in this chapter are depressing. However, 
unless these conclusions are faced up to and challenged for what they 
are, change will only be superficial, and only for the few who can—as 
numerous self-advocates assert—do things other people can do.
ConCLusions
This chapter has argued that some of the impulses that drove the move-
ment to privilege and protect ‘healthy minds’, by segregating people 
with intellectual disabilities to prevent their ‘breeding’, have not van-
ished, as some would argue. Rather the desire to prevent childbearing 
and child-rearing remains, but thanks to technology, the means of pre-
vention are far less obvious; they are well hidden under rhetorical flour-
ishes proclaiming rights. Efforts to change this state of affairs, such as 
normalisation/social role valorisation, rely, not on challenging the fun-
damental undervaluing of people with intellectual disabilities, but on 
persuading people to ‘pass’ as normal, and persuading others to sup-
port such passing by offering and talking up ‘valued social roles’. My 
challenge to readers is to recognise that until the overinflated value 
attributed to intellect and reason changes, until we re-evaluate what con-
stitutes a ‘healthy mind’, such undervaluing will continue.
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Sheltered Employment and Mental Health 
in Britain: Remploy c.1945–1981
Andy Holroyde
introduCtion
The history of mental health provision is now firmly established as 
a major area of research. The traditional focus on the asylum has also 
now been complemented with examinations of what went on outside its 
walls,  and the focus on the history of the institution, likewise, has been 
complemented by attempts to give voice to its service users.1 Though 
research has tended to remain focused on the Victorian heyday of the 
asylum, studies which examine developments in mental health provision 
over the twentieth century have also appeared.2 The process of deinsti-
tutionalisation which occurred after the Second World War has attracted 
attention from both historians and social policy analysts.3 Such consid-
erations have focused on the key legislation passed in the period, par-
ticularly the Mental Health Act, 1959, and have presented an overall 
narrative of the move from residential institutions to community care, 
with a general conclusion that factors such as financial stringencies pre-
vented the fulfilment of the objectives espoused by policymakers in this 
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process.4 As John Welshman noted, however, the roles of the various 
institutions which together formed this community of care in the post-
war period, such as hostels, special schools and occupation centres, have 
remained largely neglected by historians.5 Welshman himself began to 
remedy this with a preliminary exploration of the hostel system in the 
post-war period.6 In the conclusion to this piece, Welshman called for 
further work examining the system of community care.7 Responding 
to this call, this chapter seeks to provide a similar preliminary explora-
tion of a further component of community care in the form of sheltered 
employment, chiefly that provided by Remploy.
The importance of employment to mental well-being and in the reha-
bilitation process of mental hospital patients has been noted by histo-
rians and social policy analysts. Employment within such institutional 
care for those with mental health conditions or learning disabilities has 
also been examined as part of the treatment provided. Historians have 
recognised the potential for such employment to be a positive experi-
ence for patients, providing, for example, a potential means to progress 
through the rehabilitation process, gain increasing independence and 
offer a source of friendship and informal care.8 That employment could 
have a ‘darker side as an instrument of punishment, imposed redemption 
and atonement, exploitation and a means of control’ has also been rec-
ognised.9 The provision of employment for patients once they had left 
such institutions was a key part of the transition to community living. 
Sheltered employment was an important aspect of this for those unable 
to secure work in open employment and represented something of a 
halfway house between the residential institution and the community in 
the promotion of ‘healthy minds’ for the mentally-ill.10
Remploy itself has received only scant attention from historians with 
limited references to its role in post-war disability employment pro-
vision. There were a range of voluntary organisations providing shel-
tered employment before the outbreak of the Second World War. Some 
schemes provided training or limited employment in residential  settings 
such as St. Dunstan’s, which was established in 1915 and did much to 
aid blind ex-servicemen, and the Star and Garter Home for Disabled 
Soldiers and Sailors, opened in 1916.11 More ambitious schemes 
involved whole sheltered communities of disabled ex-servicemen, 
such as the Enham Village Centre settlement, which combined a rural 
environment with training and some employment.12 The majority of 
schemes involved work in workshops or factories, the largest of which 
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were the Lord Robert’s Memorial Workshops. Established following 
the Boer War, they expanded during the First World War and at the 
end of 1919 employed over 600 men in several workshops around the 
country.13 Though likely preferable to unemployment, such workshops 
could be less than ideal for workers and were run on very slight budg-
ets owing to their reliance on continued public generosity.14 Following 
the First World War, the British government did provide such charitable 
organisations with some limited financial support under the Ministry of 
Labour’s ‘Scheme of Grants’.15 During the interwar period, the Ministry 
paid these grants to ‘thirty separate enterprises’, which Deborah Cohen 
suggested probably employed around 2000 workers, ‘only a fraction of 
those who according to the government’s figures needed work’.16 At the 
close of the Second World War, there remained a number of voluntary 
providers of sheltered employment still in operation, though such provi-
sion was noted by the Ministry as being ‘meagre and inadequate’.17
Remploy was established by the British government as part of the 
provision of the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944. The aim 
of the company was to provide sheltered employment on a national 
scale for those ‘severely disabled people’ who were considered una-
ble to gain work in the open employment market. In a similar fashion 
to the nationalised industries, Remploy was run by a Board of Directors 
selected by the Ministry of Labour, who handled the day-to-day busi-
ness of the company, while overall policy was directed by the Ministry. 
The company was intended to be as financially self-supporting as pos-
sible with any losses funded by the Treasury. A period of rapid expan-
sion following the opening of the first Remploy factory in Bridgend in 
1946 resulted in Remploy employing over 6000 disabled people across 
91 factories by 1953.18 The number of employees steadily grew over the 
subsequent decades with Remploy remaining the dominant provider of 
sheltered employment in the post-war period. This began to change in 
the 1980s, in response to the fundamental changes to the welfare state 
which occurred and the increasing desire to promote the inclusion of 
disabled people in open or ‘mainstream’ employment. Remploy facto-
ries began to be closed down and replaced by Remploy ‘branches’ on 
the high street which focused on providing employment services to sup-
port those with disabilities or health conditions into mainstream employ-
ment. Remploy’s transition from sheltered employment to employment 
services provider was finally completed with the closure of the remain-
ing Remploy factories in 2013. Further change occurred when, in April 
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2015, Remploy left government ownership. Continuing to provide spe-
cialist employment services, Remploy is, at the time of writing, owned by 
Maximus, an international provider of health and employment services, 
and Remploy employees themselves who hold a twenty per cent stake in 
the company.19
Though it was not the only form of sheltered employment available, 
with both voluntary organisations and Local Authorities also providing 
such services, Remploy was the majority provider. Owing to this and its 
place as the central government provider of sheltered employment, the 
company has, in contrast to the range of other organisations, left a signif-
icant imprint in the archives. This chapter will draw upon the wealth of 
material relating to the company located in the National Archives, as well 
as some archival material retained by the company itself. Remploy was 
initially called ‘The Disabled Persons Employment Corporation’, with 
its factories referred to as ‘British Factories’. The name Remploy was in 
use from 1946 and officially adopted in 1949, though reference to the 
‘Corporation’ continued for some years after this. In the interests of clar-
ity, the term ‘Remploy’ will be used here. In terms of terminology in this 
chapter, the use of terms such as ‘disability’, ‘disabled people’, ‘severely 
disabled people’, ‘Section I and II disabled people’, ‘mentally disabled 
people’ and ‘physically disabled people’ solely reflects the specific historic 
bureaucratic categories applied to people during the period examined 
here and are not intended to reflect lived experience or personal/group 
identity. The term ‘mentally disabled’ is used frequently as a historic 
term which refers to a specific bureaucratic category which covered all 
forms of mental illness or learning disability and meant that a person was 
eligible for work in one of Remploy’s factories. This chapter also includes 
occasional instances of use of what is now considered derogatory lan-
guage in direct quotation from primary sources. This is done purely in 
the interests of historical accuracy in order to reflect the nomenclature of 
the period and is not intended to condone any current use of such terms.
This chapter will explore the role played by Remploy as the largest 
provider of sheltered employment in the provision of community care 
in the post-war period. The composition of Remploy’s workforce has 
yet to be examined in detail and has thus largely been taken for granted 
by academics across disciplines as being simply ‘disabled people’ or 
‘severely disabled’ people.20 The popular viewpoint meanwhile, espoused 
by Remploy itself and regularly featured in media reports on the com-
pany, has suggested that Remploy was created to cater for those injured 
6 SHELTERED EMPLOYMENT AND MENTAL HEALTH IN BRITAIN …  117
as a result of the Second World War.21 There is a general assumption, 
therefore, that in the immediate post-war period Remploy catered solely 
for so-called physically disabled people. Yet by the mid-1980s, 40% of 
Remploy’s employees were those with ‘some form of mental or nervous 
handicap’.22 This move from so-called physical to non-physical or ‘men-
tal’ disability in the company’s employees is understood by Remploy 
itself to be a key feature in the development of the company, yet there is 
no understanding of how this occurred beyond the assumption that the 
1959 Mental Health Act instigated the change.23 This development has 
similarly remained unexplored in considerations of Remploy and disabil-
ity employment provision among academics. This chapter will therefore 
attempt to clarify the position of Remploy in the employment provision 
for mentally disabled people and to add this to our understanding of the 
development of sheltered employment in the post-war period. To do 
so it will consider first the impact of the 1959 Mental Health Act upon 
Remploy, to determine if this did indeed mark a turning point in the 
company as has been assumed. It will then consider the place of mentally 
disabled people within Remploy and whether the company adapted to 
reflect an increasing number of such employees.
the iMPaCt of the 1959 MentaL heaLth  
aCt—a turning Point?
The central legislative impetus for the move from institutional to com-
munity care for the mentally-ill was the Mental Health Act, 1959. 
One change instigated by the Act was that the former mental hospital 
patients became able to register as disabled in line with the Disabled 
Persons (Employment) Act and thereby become eligible for a place in a 
Remploy factory.24 Though it has been suggested by historians that the 
legal changes imposed by the 1959 Act were not matched by practical 
application at the local level, the case of sheltered employment in this 
assessment has not been examined until now.25 As noted, there has been 
an assumption that in the immediate post-war period, Remploy catered 
solely for the physically disabled until the 1959 Act resulted in the 
introduction of mentally disabled people. It is apparent, however, that 
Remploy had always included people designated as ‘disabled’ because of 
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disability’. To understand this, it is first neces-
sary to understand the process by which disabled people became eligible 
for a place in a Remploy factory.
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Entry to Remploy involved a specific process which all potential 
workers had to follow. The first step to entering a Remploy factory was 
registering as a disabled person on the Disabled Persons’ Employment 
Register.26 This was the voluntary mechanism established by the 
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944, for gaining access to any of 
its provisions, including Remploy. The registration process involved a 
person fulfilling a number of criteria and certain exclusions applied. First, 
a person had to be considered disabled in accordance with the definition 
of the Act, which stated that:
‘Disabled person’- means a person who, on account of injury, disease or 
congenital deformity, is substantially handicapped in obtaining or keeping 
employment, or in undertaking work on his own account, of a kind which 
apart from that injury, disease or deformity would be suited to his age, 
experience and qualifications.27
Beyond this general definition, the Act further stipulated that a person’s 
disability must be likely to last for six months or more; that the person 
must be at least 14 years old; that they be resident in Great Britain; and 
that they be willing to undertake the training or employment offered.28 
Those disqualified from registration included prisoners, full-time hospital 
patients and those deemed to be of ‘bad character’.29 Mentally disabled 
people were therefore always included in the broad definition of disabil-
ity contained in the Act. There were, however, some further exclusions 
which applied to disabled people who were subject to treatment under 
the Lunacy and Mental Treatments Acts.30 The scope of such exclusions 
was given further consideration by the Ministry of Labour in 1945, fol-
lowing calls from the Board of Control and the London County Council 
for clarity regarding whether those ‘mental defectives’ receiving treat-
ment, particularly in the case of those living outside institutions, were 
eligible for registration or not.31 Following a process of consultation 
between the Board of Control, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Labour, it was finally agreed that registration was possible for those 
under treatment or supervision under the Mental Deficiency Act, pro-
vided such persons were considered likely to be able to gain and keep 
employment.32 Exclusion from registration continued to apply to those 
who were resident in mental hospitals or institutions unless they were 
individually authorised to be absent on licence.33
Having registered upon the Disabled Persons’ Employment Register, 
a disabled person was then assessed and designated as being either 
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‘Section I’ or ‘Section II’. Section I disabled people were those con-
sidered able to secure work in open employment and represented the 
majority of those registered. The Section II designation applied to those 
considered too ‘severely disabled’ to access open employment, and 
thereby as requiring sheltered employment provision. Those designated 
as Section II were therefore eligible for a place in Remploy, and it was 
from this pool of disabled people that Remploy could recruit its factory 
workers. Eligibility was therefore determined on the basis of the impact 
of a person’s disability upon their employment prospects, and as such, 
mentally disabled people were able to register and become eligible for 
Remploy. The inclusion of such cases in Remploy was always expected, as 
the Ministry of Labour made clear when considering the issue of placing 
those with ‘psychiatric disorders’ in employment in 1945.34
At no time in its existence did Remploy employ all Section II, and 
therefore theoretically eligible, disabled people, but rather selected a 
limited number of employees from this pool of potential recruits. As 
Remploy began to expand in the late 1940s, it is apparent that Remploy 
did indeed include those with mental disabilities within its disabled 
workforce. Unfortunately, there is no breakdown of what was termed 
the ‘disability mix’ within the company extant for the early period of 
Remploy’s operation. Some localised examples do attest to the inclu-
sion of mentally disabled people in the workforce, with the Halifax 
Remploy factory including an individual with ‘low mentality’ among its 
employees in 1948, and with the Barking Remploy factory noting that 
it had a dozen employees suffering ‘Neurosis’ among its workers.35 
Furthermore, a guide for Remploy factory managers published and dis-
tributed by the company in 1949 made reference to those with ‘mental 
disabilities’ as one category of disabled employee factory managers were 
dealing with.36
A full company breakdown of its disabled employees comes from 
December 1954, by which time Remploy had completed its initial fac-
tory expansion, with 91 factories in operation employing some 6433 
disabled people.37 Of these disabled employees, some 530 were classi-
fied as having a ‘mental disability’ in terms of neurosis, psychoneurosis 
or ‘nervous or mental disorders’.38 Remploy was therefore employing 
a significant number of people, a little over 8% of its workforce, with 
mental disabilities five years prior to the passing of the 1959 Act. It is 
apparent therefore that the 1959 Act did not introduce mentally disabled 
people into Remploy and that the assumption that the company catered 
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exclusively for the physically disabled in the immediate post-war period 
does not reflect the reality.
The question then is what impact the 1959 Act did have upon 
Remploy. During discussion of the Act in the House of Commons, anx-
iety was expressed by the Labour MP Edward Mallalieu, when querying 
what was to become of those deinstitutionalised in terms of employment 
and whether there would be specialist sheltered employment for such 
cases ‘on the Remploy model’.39 In the House of Lords, the following 
year, it was suggested that Remploy should take a central role in provid-
ing sheltered employment for those deinstitutionalised.40 Remploy was 
not something that required setting-up, it was already in the community 
and was already employing people considered ‘severely disabled’ due to 
mental illness or disability. One might be forgiven, therefore, for assum-
ing that they would be greatly utilised as part of the move to community 
care following the 1959 Act. Remploy later described how it had taken a 
‘fair share of this burden’ in terms of the policy of deinstitutionalisation, 
so that by 1964 ‘10% or our total disabled employees were suffering from 
mental disabilities’.41 However, when compared with the 8% of such cases 
a decade earlier, it is apparent that the Act did not lead to an immediate 
sea change in terms of recruitment policy and a sudden influx of such 
cases within Remploy, with an increase of only 2% over 10 years. Indeed, 
by December 1959, the figure was already approaching 9%.42
With Remploy already including a significant proportion of workers 
with mental disabilities, it appears that the focus for the company fol-
lowing the passing of the Act was on a cautious consideration of how 
the company might cater for the newly eligible former mental hos-
pital patients who may have had more ‘severe’ mental health condi-
tions than the company had yet been asked to accommodate. As the 
Executive Director of Remploy noted, it had previously been the policy 
in Remploy that ‘serious mental cases were not employed’.43 The initial 
response to the 1959 Act was therefore the undertaking of an experi-
ment in employing ‘serious mental cases’ in the form of mental hospi-
tal patients suffering from schizophrenia. The experiment was conducted 
in 1960 in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour and the Medical 
Research Council.44 This involved the employment of a small number 
of such ‘serious’ cases across a group of factories.45 Thus, by April 1960, 
there were three such persons employed in the Croydon Remploy fac-
tory and one in the Barking factory, with two more awaiting employ-
ment in the Park Royal factory and Southampton factory, respectively.46 
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The following month saw the extension of the experiment with a fur-
ther small intake at the Bermondsey factory and the inclusion of two for-
mer patients from the Long Grove Hospital at the Radcliffe factory.47 
At the meeting of the Remploy Board of Directors in which the exper-
iment was discussed, one member expressed her surprise ‘that we were 
employing schizophrenic patients in our factories’.48 It was explained 
by the Executive Director that this was part of a limited experiment and 
that the ‘persons recruited by Remploy were very carefully selected’.49 
This selection appears to have included advice from medical experts, as 
well as a series of interviews and discussions with several management 
levels within Remploy, with careful consideration of each case.50 The 
Managing Director noted that those employed were ‘doing very well’.51 
Similarly, the Executive Director was able to claim that those recruited 
‘had proved to be very good workers’.52 The representative of the 
Ministry of Labour at the meeting further explained that the Minister 
himself had received a special report on the progress of the experiment 
thus far and was ‘very pleased and heartened with the action taken’.53 
Indeed, the experiment was referenced in the House of Commons in 
July 1961 with Mr William Morgan, the Conservative MP for Denbigh 
noting:
Remploy factories do not remain static in their attitude to employment. 
I was gratified to learn from a recent report that the Remploy factories 
have, by arrangement with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour, 
taken in a small number of patients suffering from the effects of schiz-
ophrenia. This effort to give mentally disordered persons a place in the 
working life of the community deserves every sympathy and encour-
agement. The rehabilitation of these particularly unfortunate disa-
bled persons is a challenging experiment, and it must be a satisfaction 
to us all that the results, according to the report, have so far been very 
encouraging.54
Such ‘experimentation’ in using employment to make ‘sick’ minds 
‘healthy’ was not limited to Remploy, with sheltered employment 
run by Local Authorities and voluntary institutions also responding to 
the change in eligibility for registration brought on by the 1959 Act. 
In 1960, for example, the City of Leeds introduced a sheltered works 
programme in its parks department, while the following year the 
Industrial Therapy Organisation in Bristol launched an ‘experimental 
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scheme’ providing ‘special supervision’ to a group of ex-mental hospital 
patients in open industry.55 In addition to this, the Industrial Therapy 
Organisation established a car-wash scheme which ‘was operated entirely 
by mental patients, many of whom had been in psychiatric hospitals for a 
number of years’.56 In a report on the scheme by the National Advisory 
Council on the Employment of the Disabled (NACED), established by 
the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act to oversee the progress of its 
provision, the car wash was ‘running at a profit and well patronised by 
the Bristol public’ with the suggestion that this had contributed to a pos-
itive change ‘in the attitudes of the public towards the mentally disor-
dered’.57 As with Remploy, it was noted that for all such schemes ‘the 
workers involved were specially selected patients’.58
The Mental Health Act did not, therefore, lead to a sea change in 
who was recruited by Remploy and did not instigate a sudden influx 
of former mental hospital patients into the company. Its impact in the 
immediate term was rather a limited experiment with carefully selected 
cases of those newly eligible for Remploy. The Act does appear, how-
ever, to have supported an existing longer-term trend of increasing 
numbers of mentally disabled people registering upon the Disabled 
Persons Employment Register and thereby increasing the proportion 
of such cases within Remploy’s recruitment pool. In 1963, people with 
‘mental illness or mental handicap’ represented 14% of the Section II 
register; by 1973, this had increased to 20% and by 1978 had reached 
25%.59 This increase was similarly reflected in the proportion of those 
with mental disabilities employed by Remploy. By 1974, the propor-
tion of employees with mental disabilities in Remploy had increased to 
17%, making it the largest disability ‘grouping’ in the company, and by 
1978 had increased again to 20%.60 This trend was well recognised by 
both Remploy and the government. During a debate in the House of 
Commons on the employment of disabled people in 1972, it was noted 
that ‘mental and nervous conditions are of growing significance’.61 
In its investigation of sheltered employment the following year, the 
Department of Employment, previously the Ministry of Labour, sug-
gested this trend was a result of both ‘modern techniques of care and 
attention’ by which ‘mentally handicapped or mentally ill people are 
enjoying a longer and full life’ as well as ‘present mental health poli-
cies…aimed at minimising in-patient treatment’.62 The result was that 
‘more and more mentally handicapped and mentally ill people are 
becoming available for sheltered employment’.63
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A significant change clearly occurred in Remploy’s disability mix over 
the period considered in this chapter, with a steady increase in the num-
ber of mentally disabled people as a proportion of both those employed 
by Remploy and in terms of those eligible to apply for a place with the 
company.64 The Mental Health Act, 1959, and the policy of deinstitu-
tionalisation are therefore best understood as contributors to a longer-
term trend in terms of eligibility for sheltered employment, which 
Remploy steadily increasingly drew upon.
MentaL disabiLity within reMPLoy
With Remploy employing an increasing number of mentally disabled 
people over the course of the period examined in this chapter, it is 
important to consider the impact such a change had upon the company. 
This chapter will now consider the place of those with mental disabilities 
in Remploy and whether the company adapted to reflect the changes in 
who it was employing.
As previously noted, Remploy did not simply employ all those eligi-
ble under the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, designated as being 
Section II. Rather, the company selected those it wished from the avail-
able Section II pool of candidates. From the beginning, the Remploy 
Board of Directors were clear that they felt that the primary purpose 
of Remploy was to provide ‘genuine employment’ and establish a via-
ble long-term business for its severely disabled employees. There was 
to be no place for either charity or simple occupational therapy.65 The 
‘treatment’ or ‘rehabilitation’ provided by Remploy was in terms of the 
understood benefits of worthwhile employment for the individual. The 
aim of the company was ‘to provide productive and worthwhile work’ 
in an environment which resembled a ‘normal’ industrial operation as 
closely as possible.66 The 1956 report of the Committee of Inquiry on 
the Rehabilitation, Training and Resettlement of Disabled Persons (Piercy 
Report), established to review the progress of the provisions of the 
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, emphasised the importance of 
productivity and the concept of genuine employment in distinguishing 
sheltered employment provision from purely occupational welfare.67 The 
report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency (Percy Commission) the following year endorsed the 
application of this principle ‘with regard to mentally handicapped or dis-
abled patients’.68 Sheltered employment provision such as Remploy was 
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therefore to provide employment for those capable of undertaking work 
with a degree of productivity. The chief aspect considered in recruitment 
to Remploy was not therefore a person’s disability per se, but rather the 
potential productivity of the applicant. In short, Remploy factory man-
agers were primarily concerned with recruiting the most productive 
workers from the available Section II pool of candidates, regardless of 
the person’s particular disability. As such, those with mental disabilities 
were considered for work in a Remploy factory by this same measure, 
with only those capable of undertaking the factory work required being 
recruited and retained by the company.
In following this principle, Remploy employed workers with a wide 
range of disabilities. The records for the company reveal that consider-
ation was regularly given to potential issues involved in the employment 
of people with different disabilities. In terms of mentally disabled people 
specifically, there were regular questions raised about the benefits of inte-
gration. The notion that mentally disabled people should be segregated 
within sheltered employment had been raised from the very beginning 
of Remploy, with consideration about the placing of ‘psycho-neurotics’ 
in 1945.69 There was broad agreement within the Ministry of Labour at 
that time that in such cases ‘segregation is undesirable’.70 Such a policy 
was subsequently adopted by Remploy, with the only case of segregation 
along the lines of disability being the establishment of a number of ded-
icated Tuberculosis (TB) factories owing to the danger of infection. As 
such, in the case of Remploy, mentally disabled people both before and 
after the passing of the 1959 Mental Health Act were not segregated.
In the wider field of sheltered employment, things were not as clear-
cut. Unlike Remploy, sheltered employment provided by voluntary 
organisations could often be limited to particular groups of disabled 
people. This reflected the various purposes and ‘causes’ to which these 
organisations were devoted. In the most obvious example, sheltered 
employment in TB sanatoria was, of course, available only for those with 
TB. Similarly, those sheltered workshops run by the British Legion pro-
vided only for the ex-servicemen which the charity was established to 
support, while the workshop run by the Ayrshire Society for the Deaf, 
as its name suggests, provided sheltered employment only for the deaf.71 
In the case of mental illness, in 1945 only one organisation explicitly 
focused on this group, Thermega Limited, which provided employment 
for 36 disabled men suffering from ‘Neurosis, psychosis and associated 
diseases’.72 By 1965, a Ministry of Labour list of ‘approved independent 
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charitable sheltered employment providers’ included several which 
were explicitly devoted to mentally disabled people. This included the 
Industrial Therapy Organisation which employed 68 ‘mainly mentally 
handicapped men and women’ and the Camphill Village Trust, which 
employed 183 ‘mentally handicapped men and women’ across three 
sites.73 In terms of Local Authorities too, the NACED noted in 1965 
that several Authorities had followed Leeds in providing sheltered 
employment programmes specifically aimed at mentally disabled people.74
The policy view remained, however, that integration was generally 
preferable wherever possible. This view was endorsed by the Secretary 
of State for Employment and Productivity in 1968, when he expressed 
his belief that ‘sheltered workshops should cater as Remploy does, for 
both the mentally and physically handicapped’.75 This was reiterated 
under the following government in 1971, with the Under-Secretary of 
State for Employment replying to a query regarding the possibility of 
providing sheltered employment exclusively for the ‘mentally handi-
capped’, that ‘sheltered work is generally best provided in workshops 
catering for all kinds of severely disabled people’.76 The Department of 
Employment’s detailed examination of the sheltered employment field 
in 1973 argued too that it was desirable that such provision avoided 
‘arrangements whereby people are segregated into particular categories 
of disability’ and made ‘integrated arrangements as far as it is possible to 
do so’.77 The Department recognised, however, ‘that broad policy con-
tains certain areas of difficulty and uncertainty, especially in the fields of 
mental handicap and mental illness; and there may sometimes be good 
reason for separate measures for particular disabilities in certain circum-
stances’.78 Such a case occurred in 1976, with a proposal, at the request 
from the Department of Employment, for Remploy to open a factory 
entirely for some 90 mentally-ill patients in Surrey.79 This was not, how-
ever, due to any belief that this was inherently preferable; rather, it was 
owing to practicalities and location.80 The issue being that there were 
100 such cases in hospitals in the Epsom area all deemed to be ‘suitable 
for sheltered employment’.81 Rather than ‘dispersing them around the 
country, with all the problems that would be involved in finding work 
and accommodation’, the better option was believed to be to ‘open a 
factory, solely for them in the immediate location’.82 This project was 
not to come to fruition and it remained the case that mentally disabled 
people remained integrated into Remploy as policy. Arguably, this pol-
icy of integration may have had a positive effect on the minds of those 
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suffering from mental illnesses, by offering them regular employment 
and the opportunity to assimilate into a broader community.
One consequence of this policy of integration was that mentally dis-
abled people would have to essentially ‘fit-in’ with the normal ‘flow’ of 
a Remploy factory in the same way as any other disabled employee. The 
question is therefore whether the increasing proportion of employees with 
mental disabilities resulted in any changes to the way Remploy operated. 
In 1964, Remploy’s personnel director spoke at an international confer-
ence on social psychiatry in London on the topic of ‘practical problems 
on the employment of the mentally handicapped’.83 Such discussions were 
not unique to considerations of mental disability, with regular reflections 
from the company on employment ‘issues’ relating to a range of disabil-
ities within the company occurring throughout the period. However, the 
increasing number of mentally disabled employees within Remploy does 
seem to have led to greater consideration of the implications raised, with a 
belief that this offered particular challenges for factory management.
In 1974, responding to concerns expressed by a group of factory man-
agers, it was decided by Remploy to undertake ‘teach-ins’ across the com-
pany, with factory managers and doctors invited for group discussion and 
instruction in order ‘to increase our skill in handling mentally disabled 
people’.84 At a meeting of the Remploy Board of Directors discussing the 
‘teach-ins’, the Managing Director ‘stressed the importance of these, with 
the increasing numbers of mentally disabled in Remploy, and the need 
for even experienced factory managers to have more guidance’.85 It was 
explained that the key point raised during the teach-ins ‘which has already 
come across very forcibly (and which has been raised before many times 
by works managers) is the need to improve the ratio of supervisory staff 
to disabled employees, especially where mentally disabled people are con-
cerned’.86 This question of additional supervision appears to have been 
the main conclusion from the sessions, with no commitment to take fur-
ther action.87 The only hint of any notion of instigating systemic change 
in the way Remploy operated was a remark by one Board member that 
having attended one of these teach-ins, ‘he had become very much aware 
that the Company might have to change some points of its basic policy of 
employment if mental illness were to be catered for’.88
There was, therefore, to be no meaningful consideration of fun-
damental change to Remploy until the early 1980s with two internal 
reports examining the issue. The first of these was a wide-ranging report 
considering the fundamental purpose of Remploy and its ‘criteria of 
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success’.89 As part of its findings, the report noted that since its establish-
ment, the key development in terms of Remploy’s recruitment pool was 
the significant change ‘from physical to mental disability’.90 It then ech-
oed the conclusions from the ‘teach-ins’, claiming that there remained a 
‘generally held view’ in the company that an ‘increase in the numbers of 
supervisory staff to disabled employees’ was necessary in order ‘to main-
tain an acceptable level of productivity and efficiency’.91 The recommen-
dation of the report was that ‘a limit should be placed on the numbers 
of mentally disabled; if this cannot be controlled serious consideration 
would have to be given to establishing separate units within Remploy for 
the employment of the mentally disabled’.92 As a result of this report, a 
working party was formed to fully examine the issue of the so-called disa-
bility mix in Remploy. The report explained:
The chief aspect of disability mix on which Remploy Managers have fairly 
firm opinions is that of mental disability. Maintaining an acceptable balance 
between employees with mental and nervous disabilities and those with 
physical handicaps is regarded as a major problem and managers are keenly 
interested therefore in trends in disability mix.93
The report noted the expectation that the trend of an increase in the 
‘proportion of mentally disabled’ would continue.94 Ultimately, however, 
it rejected the idea of establishing any limit or set quota, highlighting 
that there was already a ‘smaller proportion of mentally handicapped 
people’ working in Remploy than were on the Disabled Persons 
Register.95 The report further argued that while there were concerns 
expressed by some factory managers, there were many examples where 
there were no issues with integration within factories.96 The report con-
cluded that it was ultimately up to factory managers to deal with any 
issues which arose on a case-by-case basis. The solutions proposed were 
focused on supporting this with better training for managers.97 This was 
not to be the end of the issue, with the report suggesting further con-
sideration would be needed regarding how the company should readjust 
to reflect the increasing proportion of mentally disabled employees.98 
Such considerations were to wait until later in the decade when changes 
in the welfare state, manufacturing industry and perceptions of shel-
tered employment itself were to lead to more fundamental changes to 
Remploy. While concerns were frequently expressed, therefore, and the 
issue of changes to Remploy examined carefully, action in the period 
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considered in this chapter was limited to the offer of more support for 
factory management to manage their employees effectively.
ConCLusions
Contrary to both the popular and scholarly understanding of Remploy, 
this chapter has illustrated that the inclusion of mentally disabled peo-
ple within the company’s disabled workforce was not a sudden result 
of the 1959 Mental Health Act but was a feature of the company from 
its very beginning. It was always expected that Remploy would employ 
those considered ‘severely disabled’ in line with the Disabled Persons 
(Employment) Act, 1944 owing to mental illness or disability and it is 
apparent that they did so. The promotion of ‘healthy minds’ through 
productive work in Remploy was thus available to mentally disabled peo-
ple. The immediate impact of the 1959 Act was the limited inclusion of 
some of the more ‘serious’ cases of mental hospital patients the company 
might be expected to employ, with similar experiments undertaken by 
other organisations. The most significant effect of the Act was in support-
ing an existing trend in increasing numbers of mentally disabled people 
entering Remploy’s recruitment pool. While this change in the compa-
ny’s ‘disability mix’ did provoke some concern among factory manage-
ment, there was to be no serious consideration of whether it justified a 
fundamental rethink of how Remploy operated until the early 1980s. As 
such, mentally disabled people in Remploy were recruited and employed 
in the factories on the same basis as all disabled workers. Individual pro-
ductivity and how well a person could ‘fit-in’ with the operations of the 
given factory would determine their access to Remploy. In offering such 
conclusions, the nature of this chapter as a preliminary examination bears 
repeating. Further research into the place of sheltered employment within 
the process of deinstitutionalisation and into the experiences of men-
tally disabled people across the range of sheltered employment providers 
would contribute enormously to our understanding of how employment 
was considered to aid in the promotion of ‘healthy minds’.
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Autism in the Twentieth Century: 
An Evolution of a Controversial Condition
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introduCtion
Clinically, autism spectrum disorder (henceforth, autism) has been 
described as a lifelong neurodevelopmental condition characterised by 
impairments in social interaction, communication, and rigidity in think-
ing. Additionally, autistic individuals are typically characterised as having 
executive functioning difficulties (i.e. self-regulation skills), sensory pro-
cessing problems (i.e. the brain processing information from the senses), 
difficulties with sleep and food, limited theory of mind (i.e. the ability 
to see things from the point of view of others), and the possibility of 
various co-morbid mental health conditions.1 Despite such descriptions, 
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autism, as we now know it, is a relatively new condition. In less than a 
century, a whirlwind of ideas, movements, and positions have littered the 
autism literature, with a critical polemic threaded through the narratives 
of various autistic individuals, political advocates, writers, and academic 
scholars. Indeed, autism is a by-product of many (even conflicting) disci-
plinary knowledges, institutional discourses, and histories.2
The twentieth century was a significant and powerful century for 
autism, and for some, it has been classified and understood as a ‘twentieth- 
century disorder’.3 Not only were there clinical advances in terms of it 
being recognised, labelled, and identified and appearing in the classifi-
cation systems for mental illness, but there was also the rise of pharma-
cology for treatment and the increased role of psychiatry for identifying 
and managing autism. Importantly, the twentieth century also saw a rise 
of critical rhetoric, challenges, political ideologies, and a range of move-
ments, such as anti-psychiatry, critical psychiatry, neurodiversity, con-
sumerism, and social models of disability. All these movements and 
perspectives made visible a struggle to invent, reconfigure, and reinvent 
the meaning of autism, with some challenging the position of autism as 
a mental health difficulty, that is, a psychiatric disability. Indeed, even in 
the historical present, the classification of autism as a mental health condi-
tion is controversial and contested. Later in the twentieth century, autism 
became redefined as a spectrum, which served to acknowledge the great 
heterogeneity within the meaning of autism and developed more refined 
ideas around the so-called impairments associated with it.
In this chapter, we overview some of the historical changes and, in 
doing so, highlight some challenges of labels and language that shroud 
those who are named autistic and/or take up this identity label. We also 
note the shifts in thinking that have challenged the psychiatric and psy-
chological framing of autism. The residue of the twentieth-century ten-
sions that is the genetic revolution, the diagnostic medicalisation, and 
the empowerment of neurodiversity has spilled over into the  twenty-first 
century, leaving us with an array of critical discourses and challenges 
around what many now describe as a spectrum condition. That is, we 
are left with a patchwork of different perspectives and ideas regarding 
what constitutes autism, the language of autism, how autism should be 
researched, and the most appropriate healthcare pathways and other 
service provisions for those diagnosed. This chapter explores how this 
fractured view of one ‘mental health difficulty’ came to be. In so doing, 
we thread through our own position, that of social constructionism, 
not denying the reality of the autistic community, but acknowledging 
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differences in views and the importance of language and meaning. 
Indeed, we recognise that for some autism is celebrated, treated as dif-
ference, and tensions of medical notions and impairments are proposed, 
and yet for others, autism is seen as disabling, the diagnosis is stressful, 
and treatments are actively sought. The range of perspectives that grew 
from the twentieth century are considered throughout. We do  however 
insert a caveat here and note that the history of autism is vast and spans 
multiple disciplines and fields, and thus what follows can only ever 
 represent a snapshot of history and inevitably misses out some of the 
developments that occurred throughout that century and some scholarly 
contributions. The chapter is only ever intended as a summary.
earLy history of autisM
Importantly, the concept of autism did not specifically exist prior to the 
1940s, although the notion was introduced by Bleuler in his work on 
schizophrenia in 1911. However, it was the work of two pioneering 
practitioners that identified some of the core characteristics that distin-
guished it as a discrete concept. First, the work of Leo Kanner, follow-
ing his seminal child psychiatry text in 1935, introduced the world to 
the condition, autism.4 Kanner was an Austrian psychiatrist who wrote 
a paper describing the behaviour he had observed in eleven children. 
He conceptualised these characteristics as a need for sameness, alone-
ness, and obsessions. It was common at this time for children with these 
types of behaviours to be classified as schizophrenic, so Kanner’s work 
was important for distinguishing between the two groups. However, it 
should be noted here that the credit given to Kanner has created some 
tension and criticism.5 Second, was the work of Hans Asperger who 
was writing in parallel with Kanner and wrote about the characteris-
tics of children in similar ways.6 Asperger was a German paediatrician 
who observed the behaviour of four boys who he argued were showing 
challenges in forming friendships, displayed a general lack of empathy 
towards others, had clumsy movements, and had difficulties with com-
munication. While this work became considerably influential, it did not 
reach the mainstream literature until after he died. It was Asperger who 
noted that children with this syndrome could flourish, and in some cases 
show signs of genius, and expressed the insight that autism may exist on 
a continuum.7 It was this notion that resurfaced, as British psychiatrist 
Lorna Wing introduced the notion of a spectrum.8
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Kanner and Asperger laid a foundation therefore for understanding 
the behaviours of these children, and Kanner particularly argued that no 
single factor could explain it. However, the influence of psychoanalysis 
was strong during this time, and therefore, there was also a powerful 
promotion of the idea that there were psychodynamic causes.9 This dom-
ination of psychoanalytic theory at this time formed the basis of a culture 
that blamed mothers for their child’s psychological problems.10 A hugely 
influential theory in the 1960s, long since discredited, was that autism 
was associated with a certain style of parenting, with a cold and unavail-
able mother leading the child to shut down emotionally.11 Bettelheim 
referred to this as the ‘refrigerator mother’12 and resulted in many moth-
ers feeling to blame for their child’s condition. This has been argued to 
be particularly problematic, given that evidence suggests that Bettelheim 
faked his medical credentials.13
Nonetheless, there is some persistence of mother-blaming even 
today,14 despite the neurodevelopmental positioning of autism15 and 
despite the extensive criticism.16 Historically it has always been women 
who have carried this parental burden, as they were argued to fail to con-
form to the idealised view of motherhood.17 There was a shift in think-
ing as psychoanalytic views lost some favour, and science took over as 
the predominant explanatory framework, and yet the blaming rhetoric 
underwent a subtle shift as mothers were not blamed via their parenting 
skills and style, but via their genes. The genetic and medical revolution in 
psychiatry positioned the aetiology of autism and other mental illnesses 
as having a biological origin.18 This is something we return to shortly.
ContextuaLising ChiLdren
An important advancement during the first half of the twentieth century 
that has important implications for the development of an  understanding 
of autism was the view of children and childhood in relation to the role 
of psychiatry and psychology. As Steve Taylor observes in Chapter 4, a 
significant period of history for child mental health was the introduction 
of a universal education system. In Europe and North America in the 
late nineteenth century, there was a new formalisation of public and pri-
vate education.19 Karim reported that it was this formalisation of educa-
tion that provided a platform for adults to recognise physical and mental 
health conditions in the young, which subsequently in the twentieth cen-
tury led to the creation of sub-disciplines such as educational psychology, 
7 AUTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN EVOLUTION …  141
social care, and developmental psychology. The increase in the social 
surveillance of children with the advent of compulsory education indeed 
engendered the necessary social conditions for the creation of autism.20 
Further, developmental psychology was especially influential and is gen-
erally credited as beginning with the work of Wilhelm Preyer in 1882 
and G. Stanley Hall through his introduction of the first American 
Journal of Child Psychology in 1891.21 Notably, such work at the time, 
into the early twentieth century was heavily influenced by the notion of 
the ‘normal’ child, underpinned by psychoanalytic ideas of childhood, 
which was strengthened by the specialised work of Anna Freud, Melanie 
Klein, and Jacques Lacan, amongst others.
The field of psychiatry also recognised the relevance and importance of 
treating children separately from adults, and it was in 1935 that the first 
child psychiatry textbook was produced by Leo Kanner. This was in paral-
lel with the US work by Douglas Thom who developed the Boston Habit 
Clinic designed to help parents manage their child’s everyday difficulties. 
This was considered necessary as following the Second World War there 
was recognition that children too needed help with their mental health.22 
Child psychiatry therefore became a separate sub-discipline of medicine, 
and one that recognised that specialist attention that was developmentally 
appropriate was needed, with the foundation of the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry happening in 1953.23 By the 1960s and 
1970s, therefore, specific treatments designed for children had been devel-
oped within psychiatry and psychology.24 Furthermore, during this period, 
family therapy emerged and gained popularity as it viewed the child as part 
of a complex social system.25 However, it was the focus on pharmacolog-
ical treatments for children that raised controversy in the later part of the 
twentieth century and continues today.26 Thus, by the late twentieth cen-
tury, child mental health was treated as distinctive and separate by a range 
of health services, including psychiatry, nursing, psychology, and education. 
Such services for children relied on childhood being constructed as a series 
of stages, with a separate focus on adolescence.
diagnosing autisM: the introduCtion  
of standardised ManuaLs
A crucial historical moment in conceptualising autism was the development 
of standardised manuals. We present an overview of the main diagnostic 
manual, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
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to demonstrate some of the key shifts in thinking about autism. While we 
recognise that there was some influence of the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD), this system was much broader and contained physical 
illness, whereas the DSM was designed specifically for mental illness. The 
DSM was designed so that those working in the field of mental health were 
able to classify the full range of mental health conditions based on stand-
ardised criteria for diagnosis.27 In other words, the DSM defined what does 
and does not constitute an illness and by default implies what constitutes 
normality and therefore a ‘healthy mind’.28
The development of the DSM and the role of psychiatry have to some 
extent influenced how ‘normal’ is viewed, and the American Psychiatric 
Association decided to unify the diagnostic processes with the creation 
of DSM-I. Notably, however this single manual was not published until 
1952.29 This first edition represented an important paradigmatic change 
about the conceptualisation of mental illness and was a milestone in the 
creation of diagnostic categories. This first version contrasted two core 
groups of conditions, those caused by organic brain dysfunction and 
those with aetiology in environmental circumstances.30 The second ver-
sion, DSM-II, was developed quite quickly because of concerns about 
inconsistencies in the first. This version had 193 diagnostic categories, 
was heavily influenced by psychoanalysis, and launched in 1968.31 This 
version of the DSM transformed psychiatry from a field that was con-
cerned with pathology, to one that was more concerned with the bound-
aries of normality.32 During this time, the rise of psychopharmacology 
was influencing more biological and neurological explanations of men-
tal illness. Consequently, the diagnostic criteria were proposed as ways to 
ensure that standardisation could be achieved.33
The notion of standardisation underpinned new changes to the 
 system, and in the resulting DSM-III, there were substantial changes 
from DSM-II. DSM-III contained criteria which identified categories 
but moved to a multi-axial system for diagnoses,34 and while the  revision 
began in 1974, it was not published until 1980.35 This version held 
nearly 500 pages and 265 categories.36 The USA was especially influen-
tial here with its insurance health system, as they demanded more pre-
cise diagnostics and were more reluctant to fund long-term therapies 
like psychotherapy.37 What is especially relevant to our discussion in this 
chapter is that it was the advent of DSM-III in 1980 that recognised 
autism as a distinct conceptual category, almost 40 years after its incep-
tion by Kanner.38
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It was this point in the twentieth century, with the inclusion of autism 
on the DSM-III that the work of Kanner and Asperger were revived by 
two British professionals who coined the notion of autistic spectrum dis-
order39 and the triad of impairments became part of common clinical 
discourse.40 This triad consisted of three core characteristics of autism;
1.  Impairments in social interaction
2.  Impairments in communication
3.  Restrictive repetitive patterns of behaviour.
This was later reconfigured in the twenty-first century as a dyad of 
impairments and reconstructed as autism spectrum disorder, but the 
notion of the spectrum has been maintained.
A quick succession of revisions occurred after this with DSM-III-R, 
to DSM-IV, and DSM-IV-R which each reflected a round of changes. 
Again, relevant to our discussion, is that DSM-IV saw the inclusion of 
Asperger’s Syndrome and this was viewed as distinct to autism.41 Those 
with Asperger’s Syndrome were seen as having normal or higher levels of 
intellectual ability, and those with the diagnosis often argue that this is 
fundamental to their identity.42
dsM 5: autisM in the twenty-first Century
DSM-5 is the first of the manuals in the twenty-first century and reflects 
the modern revision from DSM-IV-R. Notably, this version was repre-
sented with numbers rather than Roman numerals. This new version, 
DSM-5, has created a great deal of controversy and was created during 
a period of critical thinking around mental illness more generally. The 
development of DSM-5 began at the end of the twentieth century and 
unlike its predecessors was subject to public scrutiny because of the rise 
of the internet.43 By 2010, the first draft was posted online and returned 
over 8000 comments, with 2000 further comments in 2011 on the 
 revision.44 By this point, the DSM had grown to 947 pages and 541 
diagnostic categories.45
This new version of DSM had some important changes for autism. 
While the notion of the spectrum was maintained, other changes 
were more controversial. For example, this version saw the removal of 
Asperger’s Syndrome as a distinct classification. Indeed, Asperger’s 
Syndrome had a short shelf-life in terms of official diagnosis, as it was 
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not formally recognised until the 1990s and was then removed in 2013, 
being subsumed under the general category of autism spectrum disorder. 
The rationale for its removal was to reflect the shift from a categorical 
system to a dimensional one.46 This however has caused great unrest in 
the autistic community,47 as new interest groups have emerged claim-
ing that classifications are a blueprint for their identity and not just an 
 arbitrary means for classifying conditions.48
The criteria for diagnosing autism also shifted, as there was a move 
away from a triad of impairments, to a dyad of impairments, as we noted 
earlier. Thus, there were now just two domains of difficulties—social 
communication and restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviour.49 
However, Wing et al. argued that there were relevant clinical reasons 
why social interaction and communication were treated separately on 
the triad, and therefore, collapsing them into one domain was viewed as 
inappropriate.50
The shifts in diagnosis and classification from the original version 
in 1952 to the latest version in 2013 have shaped and impacted on 
the meaning of autism and the language used to describe it. Autism is 
a condition that has invoked a great deal of debate and controversy in 
terms of the language and labels used and adopted and this has not been 
straightforward. As Kenny et al. noted,
Tensions surrounding the language of autism are attributable, in part, to 
the very different ways that autism touches people’s lives; some experi-
ence it personally, others through their children and others still might only 
encounter autism in some aspect of their lives – at school, at work, in the 
community or through friends and family.51
The terms used and the language adopted around autism have changed 
over time, with a range of different conceptualisations of the condition, 
including, autism, autistic spectrum disorder, autism spectrum disorder, 
autism spectrum condition, Asperger’s syndrome, pervasive developmen-
tal disorder, and high functioning autism.52 The different labels used 
are loaded with category rich inferences, and these can have different 
 meanings for different individuals and their families.
The tensions and debates within public and academic communities 
regarding the most appropriate ways to conceptualise autism has been 
a consequence of growing disquiet about the role of psychiatry and the 
influence of medicine, as well as the rise of critical perspective.53 During 
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the twentieth century, there was a shift towards person-first language 
when describing individuals diagnosed with autism, so that the person 
came first, and the disability came after, that is, person with autism.54 
Over time however, this position has changed and further controversy 
about descriptive language has been proposed. Disability-first language is 
now more generally accepted to be the most appropriate way of describ-
ing autism, that is, an autistic person. This is because disability-first lan-
guage adheres to the principle of putting a positive pronoun in front of 
the noun and thus removes the suggestion that autism is intrinsically 
negative.55 This is especially important for the autism community who 
often view their autism as an accepted and instrumental part of their 
identity.56 A good example of this was offered by Hagan who argued 
that society would not describe someone who was creative as ‘a person 
with creativity’, they would be a creative person and as such treats the 
creativity as part of who they are.57 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, research 
has shown that diagnosed individuals tend to favour the concept of 
‘autistic person’, but interestingly professionals still favour ‘person 
with autism’.58
the genetiC reVoLution
An important contribution to the rise of science and medicine was 
advances in the study of genetics. Psychiatry and medicine advocated 
organic causes of mental illness, and geneticists began to seek ways to 
isolate the gene(s) responsible for autism. This notion of aetiology had 
important implications for how we view autism and for the position of 
autistic people in society. The geneticisation of deviance worked to pro-
vide accounts for behaviour that failed to conform to social norms and 
thus provided new ways of thinking about stigma.59 In other words, 
those with diagnosed conditions were now constructed as less blame-
worthy for their condition where it had a biological origin rather than a 
psychosocial one.60
Such a turn to science has had consequences for research and 
funding. The field of autism research became reenergised by  genetics 
studies. This generally increased pace in the late-1990s, when a link 
between two chromosomes, 15q and 7q, were identified as connected 
to autism.61 Consequently, large funding streams have been provided 
to further the credibility of genetic explanations, so that the  aetiology 
may be uncovered, and medical treatments created that target the core 
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symptoms. However, it is arguably concerning that this energy has 
resulted in a dominance of genetics in the study of autism at the expense 
of other kinds of necessary and needed research. Statistics from the UK 
have shown that autism research is now preoccupied with biomedical 
issues, as 56% of studies have explored brain, biology, and condition, 
and a further 15% on aetiology, and only 18% on interventions, 5% on 
services, and 5% on diagnosis.62 The picture is similar in the USA, which 
spends 18 times the amount of the UK, but again biologically grounded 
work receives significantly greater income than other areas.63
The inappropriateness of this lack of balance in research funding 
streams has been positioned from a range of different views. For exam-
ple, some have argued that autism is an incredibly complex and heter-
ogeneous condition, and it is unlikely that scientists will be able to 
isolate a single autism gene.64 Arguably more concerning is the risk or 
threat perceived by the autistic community in terms of the potential for 
genetic testing, which may put mothers under pressure to terminate their 
pregnancy.65 Waltz noted that for autism this is especially concerning as 
the spectrum is broad and it is likely that multiple genes are connected, 
and this termination potential may threaten the lives of autistic people 
who could be functional in society. Some scholars have extended this 
argument further by claiming that the genetic focus in autism research 
reflects a new wave of eugenics.66
The diversion of research resources to genetics research is also prob-
lematic for those already diagnosed as autistic. Critics and autistic 
advocates have argued that by prioritising genetics research, necessary 
finances have been diverted away from those who need support now.67 
Arguably, there is a need for more research which focuses on the agen-
das that matter to autistic people and their families.68 In our own work, 
we found that genetics research and the notion of a cure for autism  
was a low priority for autistic people and their families, and what they 
really wanted was more work to help them manage difficult behav-
iour, challenging sleep patterns, coping with adversity, and improving 
quality of life.69 The research base that has an impact on the lives of 
autistic people and their families is insufficient, and medical and genetic  
evidence is inconclusive or contested.70 It seems therefore that the pri-
orities of medical researchers and funding councils are at odds with 
autistic self-advocates and families.71 In practice, this means there is a 
gap between our knowledge and practice, and we need to advance our 
research to meet the needs of those who would benefit from it most, by 
focusing on issues that affect people’s daily lives.72 Specifically, we argue 
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that there is a need for much more qualitative research that promotes the 
need to listen to the voices of autistic people and their families and allows 
for an exploration and focus on their views, opinions, and experiences.
the ChaLLenge of anti and CritiCaL PsyChiatry
The dominance of genetics and medicine in the field of autism has 
caused tensions for scholars and advocates throughout the twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first. As the different versions of the DSM 
evolved and changed, and the dominance of genetics and pharmacol-
ogy grew, there was a notable shift in thinking about psychiatry as a 
discipline, the conceptualisation of mental illness (and more specifically 
tensions in classifying autism that way), and the ways in which  diagnosed 
individuals ought to be treated and embedded in society. By the 
mid-twentieth century, there was a great deal of tension regarding the 
turn to science and medicine for answers regarding mental illness, and 
questions were raised about the credibility of categorising illness purely 
in biological ways and treatment with medications. Notably,  movements 
during this latter half of the century were the anti-psychiatry and the 
critical psychiatry movement, which gained momentum as new and 
different critical arguments emerged.
It was during the 1960s that the international anti-psychiatry move-
ment was recognised as such, as was a term coined by David Cooper.73 
This movement was noted to be motivated by anger and the perceived 
arbitrariness of diagnosis.74 Those advocating anti-psychiatry called for 
a paradigm shift in terms of understanding mental illness and argued 
that patients were being marginalised.75 Fundamentally those taking this 
position opposed the use of medication, which was the main form of 
treatment in the field. Furthermore, they opposed the power of psychi-
atrists and considered the practices to be coercive (see, e.g., Foucault).76  
The mid-twentieth century therefore saw three critical periods of anti- 
psychiatry, as noted by Furnham:
1.  The early 1950s, where there was a conflict between psychiatrists 
adopting psychoanalytic perspectives and those new ideas around 
biology.
2.  The 1960s saw a range of influential figures, such as Szasz, 
Basaglia, Foucault, Laing, and Cooper, from within and outside of 
psychiatry.
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3.  In the 1970s and 1980s, American and European sociology 
joined the debate, particularly in relation to labelling ideas and 
stigma, and popular media began to spotlight the practices of the 
profession.77
It was thus during the 1980s that anti-psychiatry began to lose its 
momentum, as psychiatrists began responding to the critique, changing 
their practices, and working in a more biopsychosocial way. This biopsy-
chosocial perspective of formulating and working with mental illness 
began to address some of those concerns about treatment of the men-
tally ill.78 Thus, anti-psychiatry as a movement failed to establish itself 
as a mainstream ideology embraced by mental health professionals.79 A 
further paradigmatic shift occurred therefore in the 1990s, with a softer 
critique of psychiatry emerging under a new guise of critical psychiatry.80 
The notion of critical psychiatry was coined by David Ingleby through 
the collection of essays into a monologue.81 This recognised the change 
from focusing on the institution to the community but retained recogni-
tion of the difficulties of psychiatry and the political issues surrounding 
the field. This movement began to gain some acceptance, even amongst 
those practicing psychiatry.82
The focus for critical psychiatry was that psychiatry was a powerful 
field, and this should be moderated by the voices of service users as cen-
tral to decisions made.83 This movement thus proposed two core issues 
with psychiatry. First, they argued that there are challenges to the scien-
tific basis of psychiatric classification, and second, they noted moral prob-
lems that are a consequence of diagnosis.84 The reliance on science and 
the turn to genetics were viewed as fundamentally problematic, as the 
biological basis of mental illness was argued to be overstated as the evi-
dence fails to offer sufficient support for this thesis.85
One of the core concerns in the rising movements that had  varying 
degrees of opposition to psychiatry, particularly from those concerned 
with autism, was that mental illness, and in this case autism, was being 
over-medicalised and thus ignoring the ecological and systemic frame-
works around an individual. The significantly progressive number of 
diagnostic categories with each version of the DSM was argued to 
be increasingly medicalising behaviour of individuals, reducing social 
expectations of normal behaviour.86 Such an increase of conceptualis-
ations of abnormality created by diagnostic manuals is a cause for concern, 
particularly in the context of autism, and the medicalisation of autism 
has been especially contested.
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The concept of medicalisation refers to the process of human experi-
ence being reduced to medical terms and definitions.87 It is this medical 
vocabulary that validates professionals’ determination of what consti-
tutes sickness, and who qualifies as being categorised as psychiatrically 
disabled.88 For the critical psychiatrists, psychiatry is a discipline that 
medicalises the mind as a way of legitimising the requirement of medi-
cine to manage conditions89 and this perpetuates an illusion that med-
icine provides a theoretically viable view of disability, which in turn, is 
tied to the notion of recovery and the restoration of the healthy mind.90 
In other words, this perspective constructs the person’s illness as disposi-
tional, and those who are unable to be ‘fixed’ by medicine are inappro-
priately labelled as deficient in some way.91 Such a goal of normalisation 
denies agency to those with disabilities92 and risks judgements of laziness, 
weakness or belligerence.93 By the end of the twentieth century, health-
care was seen as consumer-driven and patient-centred, and these changes 
increased the tension between rising medicalisation and increased 
resistance to it.94 Furthermore, the DSM-5 was argued to rely more 
heavily on medicalisation than any of its predecessors,95 because of low-
ered thresholds, which separate individuals from the optimal society.96
For autism, these arguments are especially pertinent. The autism diag-
nostic process lacks definitive measures, and while there are tools to facil-
itate the process, the decision relies mostly on the subjective judgement 
of professionals applying the criteria, and thus, the power of medicine to 
define, diagnose, and treat autism has come under criticism.97 There is 
therefore an extensive literature that expresses dissatisfaction with the 
medicalisation of autism as failing to adequately meet the needs of the 
autistic community.98 This has been further hindered by the medicalised 
notions of deficit and cure, as medicalisation has encouraged the search 
for a cure.99 Through this, autism has been constructed as a biological 
fact100 and the social and cultural aspects inherent to the language of 
autism have been given less attention.101 Consequently, autistic people 
and their families are frequently renegotiating what constitutes normal 
behaviour and such deviations from the norm are called to account.102
The ambition to ‘fix’ disability is central to medicalised practices, 
and for many autistic people, this provides a perspective that they are 
‘broken’ in some way.103 Such ideas are co-constructed by the  mental 
health profession and taken directly from medical, psychological, 
neurological, and developmental positions of autism as grounded in the 
criteria created through DSM-5.104 Importantly, autistic individuals do 
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not use the same knowledge spheres or frames of reference as profession-
als, and their relationships with services can be stressful and in some cases 
conflicting.105
It may seem that medicalisation as a concept is negative; yet, notably 
medicalisation is not inherently problematic. The view of medicalisation as 
being viewed as good or bad rests on the implicit definitions of health and 
illness and a critical perspective regarding the effectiveness of medicine to 
address the well-being of the individual.106 Indeed, the founders of med-
icalisation theory, such as Peter Conrad, described medicalisation as value 
neutral.107 Furthermore, it must be recognised that medicalisation does 
serve some function for patients and families. It provides a basis to legit-
imise concerns that may otherwise be dismissed, and although there are 
risks that society takes on psychiatric concepts as identity terms, access to 
support largely relies on medics to confirm the nature of the problems.108 
Thus, the medical hegemonic position on autism underpins a legislative 
requirement to access services, as without an official diagnosis and label 
families are not entitled to help.109 The flip side to this, however, is that 
parents may fear that if they fail to follow medical advice they will be mor-
ally implicated in any later negative experience.110
Despite the value neutral nature of medicalisation, it has brought with 
it a very particular orientation to mental health; that is, one focused on 
‘fixing’ the presumably ‘broken’ individual. In contrast to this, more 
social constructionist understandings afford nuanced and layered under-
standings of difference and disability. More particular to autism, there 
is a need to shift away from a focus on the medicalisation to language, 
with its overreliance on medical explanations regarding autism.111  
Such an overreliance might lead to the mismeasurement of the  autistic 
experience.112 Indeed, this shift has implications for whether autism 
might be viewed as a natural identity or a dilemma.113 This focus on 
 language and the social construction of disability and normal identity 
were encapsulated by a related movement, that of neurodiversity.
neurodiVersity: eMPowering autisM
The language that we use has the power to reflect and shape people’s 
 perceptions of autism.114
A core focus of the neurodiversity movement is on the language we use 
around autism. This movement rejects medicalised negative concepts 
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such as ‘disorder’, ‘deficit’, and ‘impairment’ and instead reconstitutes 
autism as a way of being.115 The neurodiversity movement therefore 
directly challenged framing autism in a medicalised way. The notion of 
neurodiversity can be traced to Australian sociologist Judy Singer and 
journalist Harvey Blume, and it became popular with civil rights groups 
in the late-1990s.116 The popularity of neurodiversity as a movement 
arose mostly online in response to what was argued to be a marginalisa-
tion of autistic people.117 Thus, this movement sought to establish a cul-
ture where autistic people could have pride in their autistic identity and 
provide mutual support in self-advocacy.118
An underpinning principle of neurodiversity was the foundational idea 
of a ‘differently wired brain’.119 This movement has been instrumental 
in advocating strength-based discourses for autism,120 but also for other 
brain-related conditions.121 For autism, neurodiversity has two main 
claims as outlined by Jaarsma and Welin:
1.  That autism is simply a natural variation in humans, and being neu-
ro-diverse or neurotypical, reflect different ways of being human.
2.  That neurodiversity connects to human rights, political issues, and 
non-discrimination of autistic people.122
This movement therefore became associated with the struggle for 
civil rights for those individuals diagnosed with neurodevelopmental 
conditions123 and as such became a counter-argument for the deficit 
model to prevent discrimination.124 This is important, as society tends 
to be organised around neurotypical values and by contrast autism is 
positioned as a deficit.125
As will be seen in Chapter 8, an important aspect of neurodiversity 
is that the autistic community were instrumental in its promotion and 
development. Indeed, there are many autistic self-advocates who have 
celebrated autism as part of their identity and see their autism as a natu-
ral variation.126 Some of these people have expressed fears that the seek-
ing of a ‘cure’ may result in the eradication of autism.127 It was argued 
therefore that by constructing autism as synonymous with impairments, 
it raises questions about what it means to be human, and those failing to 
conform to the dominant ideology are positioned as impaired.128
We would note here that not all those in the autistic community 
advocate a neuro-diverse position, and it is important to have some bal-
ance in these arguments. Some neurodiversity movement advocates have 
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acknowledged that some aspects of autism can cause distress and their 
amelioration or control is sometimes useful, and they do not oppose all 
forms of intervention and treatment.129 Notably, some parents of children 
with autism do actively pursue treatments for their child and may even seek 
a cure for the condition.130 Parents of course should have the right to seek 
early intervention for their offspring and have the freedom to work in ways 
they see as best for their child.131 For those promoting neurodiversity, there 
is a position of promoting well-being and adaptive functioning to support 
autistic people.132 The balance therefore is to support the notion for treat-
ment, support, and services to overcome some of the potentially disabling 
effects of the condition, while steering away from medicalisation, negative 
language of deficiency, and damaging stereotypes that reify difference.133 
Neurodiversity as a movement and the construct of an autistic disability do 
not have to be incongruent, as individuals may have areas of strength and 
celebrate their identity, while still having some difficulties.134
A central underpinning concern that has arisen from medicalisation 
and from neurodiversity therefore is the way in which autism is classi-
fied. While medicalisation advocates the appropriateness of autism as a 
mental health condition, as reified through its presence on the DSM, 
neurodiversity tempers this position, critically questioning the ‘deficit’ 
associated with such constructions. Ultimately, therefore, questions have 
been raised as to whether autism should be viewed by medicine, and by 
society more widely, as a psychiatric disability. The rise of the neurodi-
versity movement in the latter part of the twentieth century had a signif-
icant impact on the way we view autism and contributed greatly to this 
debate. The construction of autism as a psychiatric category, as a mental 
health condition, and as a disability is therefore dependent upon differ-
ent points of view, different theoretical frameworks, subscription to dif-
ferent disability models, and personal experiences and viewpoints.
In our own work, we attempt to strike a balance between recognising 
the real distress of some families and the severity of symptoms for some 
children, against the critical and imperative challenges to the notion of 
deficit and the importance of empowering autistic people. It is important 
to be aware that for some families the diagnosis of autism is stressful, and 
the condition can have some disabling effects on the autistic person and 
their families.135 For others, a more positive view of autism is necessary 
and the language surrounding the autistic identity is crucial in challeng-
ing deficit, stigma, and unacceptable stereotyping. Arguably, we should 
not see dysfunction, but we should see difference.136
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This is a helpful perspective that has been recognised in research 
with autistic people and those who live or work with them. In our own 
research on this issue, we considered how the notion of a disability might 
be understood discursively in relation to autism.137 Using focus groups 
with a range of stakeholders, including autistic adults, parents of autistic 
children, mental health practitioners, researchers, and service managers, 
we found that the notion of a disability is fluid, contestable, and socially 
constructed. For example, an autistic adult in the focus groups argued 
that autism is not a disability:
I’m a great believer that ↑autism138 itself actually isn’t a disability in any 
way at a::ll (.) in fact there are many areas where I would argue that my 
autism >is a s↑trength.139
However, a mother of an autistic daughter, actively disagreed, noting 
that autism is a disability:
I kinda disagree< because (0.6) wouldn’t you say that (0.4) <some of 
th::e> the like from the <triage> of autism (0.2) >the symptoms< (.) ↑a::re a 
symptom of the condition which is autism…….So it is a disability.140
There was little agreement amongst participants as to whether autism 
constitutes a psychiatric disability as discussions permeated the bound-
aries of normality versus abnormality, disability versus ability, and med-
icalisation versus neurodiversity. While there was some acceptance that, 
clinically, categorisation and diagnosis were essential for support and ser-
vice provision, and that some autistic people encountered more severe 
levels of difficulty than others, there was also an advocacy that autism 
was a fundamental characteristic of personhood and should not be char-
acterised in limiting ways.
drawing ConCLusions: our PersonaL View of autisM 
in the twentieth Century
Our focus has predominantly been the evolution of autism throughout 
the twentieth century, exploring the various paradigmatic shifts that 
occurred and polar arguments that developed to influence our thinking 
around autism. However, these influences, research ideas, medical ide-
ologies, genetic revolution, critical discourses, movements, and personal 
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advocacies have all influenced our understanding of autism today. We 
now have a fractured view of a heterogeneous condition with a spectrum 
of characteristics, and of autistic people being different and reflecting a 
multitude of identities, views, opinions, and experiences. The twenty-first 
century is now plagued by the notion of an autism epidemic, and med-
icalised questions about where such an influx of autistic individuals has 
come from. This means that parents are thrown into a ‘minefield of con-
flicting information’.141 Indeed, the volume of information is a confus-
ing and time-consuming area for parents.142 Yet, in some ways, this has 
been positioned as hope for parents, as ‘the first decade of the new cen-
tury was a time of hope for many families, as parents told me they felt 
optimistic that science was on the verge of finally unravelling the mystery 
of their children’s condition’.143
Such ‘hope’ and challenges related to autism are important as the 
‘epidemic’ of the twenty-first century has become part of the medical 
rhetoric. There are few epidemiological studies of autism, but it is gen-
erally agreed that the prevalence currently stands at approximately 1% of 
the population.144 Similarly, in childhood, a total prevalence of 116.1 per 
10,000 was presented.145 Baird et al. argued that the rates of autism are 
now much greater than was previously seen, and yet the reasons for such 
an increase in incidence are unclear.146 The consequences of this growth 
have meant that services are having to rapidly expand to meet the greater 
demands.147 Such an increase has however been controversial, as some 
have argued that it reflects an exaggeration of the existence of the condi-
tion, and others claiming it reflects the broader criteria.148 It is therefore 
arguably not a new scientific discovery, but a shifting cultural and social 
practice regarding the social construction as to what counts as normal.149
We conclude our chapter by presenting our perspective on this 
 controversial issue and in so doing recognise the validity in different 
perspectives. In a personal and professional sense, we acknowledge our 
own experiences of autism. The lead author (O’Reilly) is an academic 
psychologist who has a brother diagnosed with autism, currently living 
in an institution due to the severity of his condition and the expanse 
of personal need. Furthermore, in addition to the academic position, 
O’Reilly also works as a research consultant for a Child and Adolescent 
Mental Health Service and therefore works alongside a multi-disciplinary 
team of mental health practitioners. The second author (Lester) is a for-
mer autism teacher in the USA, has a niece diagnosed with autism, and 
is now an academic working in educational autism research. The third 
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author (Kiyimba) is an academic and chartered clinical psychologist, who 
specialises in trauma, and has worked professionally both with clients 
with autism, and as a clinical supervisor of mental health professionals 
working with autism, as well as supervising professionals who are autistic 
themselves. In outlining this personal position, we reflexively acknowl-
edge that no text can ever be produced without influence and some 
imposition of the values and experiences of the writer, and our views and 
motivations are inspired and underpinned by our personal circumstances.
Thus, in our work on autism, we favour social constructionism as a 
guiding theoretical position, recognising the importance of language, 
and taking a child-centred and family-centred approach to research. We 
see the value of balancing the perspectives of psychiatrists,  psychologists, 
other mental health professionals, autistic people, autistic advocates, 
families, and other stakeholders. The focus, for us, should be on mean-
ing-making, that is, on the language used in different contexts and 
the impact that this has. In taking this social constructionist position, 
we do not deny the reality of autistic people or their families. This was 
eloquently expressed in a recent text by Thomas et al.:
This is not to deny the reality of mental health issues within people’s lives, 
but rather to acknowledge that if we are to comprehend the ubiquity and 
impact of mental distress within a contemporary UK context, then we 
need to recognise the ways that particular types of scientific knowledge 
and particular narratives of distress have been invested with meaning and 
authority, and as such, have the potential to become tools for use in the 
pursuit of broader political agendas.150
The twentieth century saw many changes in the scientific and medical 
community understanding of autism. What we understand about autism 
is ‘constantly in flux’.151 Autism as a condition has created much inter-
est, amongst researchers, scientists, the public, and the media, and this is 
likely due to the multiplicity of meanings.152 We have argued that autism 
is a social construct. In so doing, we have recognised that for some 
autistic people, their autism is celebrated, but for other families it is dis-
tressing, and they struggle to cope with what they frame as adversity.153 
We have woven a narrative that is congruent with the autonomy of 
those with lived experiences, have favoured a person-centred position, 
and explored alternative ways of thinking about the pervasive medical-
ised discourses that have constructed autism as a psychiatric disability. 
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We have recognised that there are economic, institutional, and social 
consequences of adopting different social constructions of autism.154 
Through our exploration of the different arguments, we have shown 
how the dominant ideas of the impaired autistic person have become 
reified through medical rhetoric and the genetic revolution. We argued 
that psychiatry and other mental health professions have an important 
place for autism but acknowledge that the embracing of biopsychosocial 
framings of autism within those fields is important. We also noted that 
social constructionism provides a way for easing some of the tensions and 
a focus on language sets autism centre stage and challenges narrow inter-
pretations of normality. The neurodiversity movement will be considered 
in greater depth by Erika Dyck and Ginny Russell in Chapter 8.
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Challenging Psychiatric Classification: 
Healthy Autistic Diversity 
the Neurodiversity Movement
Erika Dyck and Ginny Russell
introduCtion
Beginning after the Second World War, amid the momentum of civil 
rights, feminism and gay and lesbian rights movements, patients’ rights 
groups began campaigning for their place in the human rights discourse. 
Disability rights activists engaged in aggressive campaigns for better 
access to services, while psychiatric patients and their families began 
lobbying for anti-stigma campaigns, alongside demands for adequate 
housing, basic health services, voting rights, and access to safe employ-
ment. The concept of ‘mad pride’ emerged in the 1960s and, like other 
pride movements, challenged the notion that madness, or gayness, 
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or femaleness, was a disease to be treated rather than an identity to be 
celebrated.1 At its heart, mad pride campaigns took aim at psychiatry 
for codifying mental health into a system of deficits and disorders that 
required medical interventions to fix, rather than look to political action 
as a mechanism for producing a culture of acceptance. The late twenti-
eth century has been a time of expansion in both the utilisation of the 
diagnostic label of autism and the reach of the ‘neurodiversity’ concept, 
and we situate the work of this group in the context of previous patient 
movements.
Embracing ‘madness’ as a preferred term over ones such as men-
tal disease, defect, disability, or illness reconnected an experience with 
an identity that was not necessarily the product of a medical encoun-
ter. Intellectuals in the 1960s began critiquing modern social values, in 
part, by analysing the history psychiatry and how it had evolved into a 
form of policing behaviour. They held psychiatry accountable for passing 
judgement on human value and in harnessing their practice to a political 
system that equated human worth with productivity.2 Classifications sys-
tems, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), they argued, merely institutionalised a practice of pathologising 
undesirable or unproductive people.
Famously, French philosopher, Michel Foucault in his first book Folie 
de la Raison (1961), translated into English under the title, Madness and 
Civilization (1965), trenchantly critiqued the rise of psychiatry and how 
it psychiatrised and attempted to control normal behaviour.3 Madness, for 
Foucault, not only existed as a state that predated the rise of psychiatry as 
a discipline, but was also reminiscent of a point in time when mad peo-
ple had a small degree of autonomy and when madness itself was part of 
one’s character, not an affliction, label, or burden. Foucault lamented the 
rise of a modern world where psychiatrists wielded significant and, in his 
view, illegitimate power to determine what was and what was not accept-
able behaviour. In a society where free will was leached away by mod-
ern aspirations of productivity, capital accumulation, and moral authority, 
Foucault critiqued how this world order created opportunities for individ-
uals to police normalcy and to discipline members of society. His influen-
tial work on this topic ricocheted through the intellectual community and 
contributed to the rise of anti-psychiatry during the 1960s.
Some contemporary critics, including Thomas Szasz, a psychia-
trist ultimately based in California, pronounced that ‘mental illness 
was a myth’, which had no basis in scientific or medical reasoning.4  
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The evolution of an ‘anti-psychiatry’ perspective, which sometimes cross- 
fertilised with post-modernism, provided fodder for critiques of psychia-
try and its institutions. Another 1960s critical scholar, Erving Goffman, 
focused his doctoral work specifically on the way in which the institution 
itself produced abnormal behaviours, due to the disciplined existence 
within its walls, the rhythms of institutional life, and the reinforced labels 
that one was forced to adopt while ‘playing a role’ or meeting the expec-
tations of a psychiatric diagnosis.5 Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing added 
further grist to the mill by provocatively suggesting that madness offered 
insights into higher orders of consciousness; in other words, madness 
stimulated creativity, intelligence and allowed an individual to see past 
certainties held in check by the majority of society—the so-called sane.6
These academic critiques provided some of the intellectual, philosoph-
ical, and linguistic foundations for a more widespread social movement, 
which was populated by individuals who had consumed and survived 
mental health services (henceforth referred to as consumer/survivor 
movements). The timing was important. In the 1960s, governments 
throughout North America and Europe began closing, downsizing, 
and repurposing large psychiatric hospitals. Thousands of patients were 
moved into communities, unleashing a new host of challenges as former 
patients carried stigmatising labels, behaviours, and habits with them into 
communities that were often unwelcoming.7 This major transition in 
mental health service provision—from asylum-based care to an undiffer-
entiated matrix of health, welfare, education, and labour support—also 
gave rise to new forms of activism, as former patients and their families 
repositioned themselves in civil society.
Mad pride, the disability rights movement, the recovery movement, 
and other consumer/survivor movements emerged alongside these 
intellectual critiques of psychiatry and provided a poignant example of 
people denouncing psychiatric labelling and instead turning psychiat-
ric experiences into sources of insight, authority, and expertise. The 
rise of consumer/survivor movements that ensued can be considered 
as a form of ‘biosociality’ a term coined more recently by Rabinow to 
describe common health identities linked by social networks.8 What the 
new movements seem to share is a repudiation of ‘victim’ status and a 
push towards greater equality with those who are considered experts, 
clinicians, researchers, or professionals who become involved after diag-
nosis. They demanded a greater involvement in determining research pri-
orities and policy decisions.9 Thanks in part to these groups, the power 
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and credibility of their first-person voice—the voice of affected individu-
als—are increasingly acknowledged nowadays in health policy and clinical 
guidelines.
The 1960s patients’ rights movements that relied on anti-psychiatry 
critiques have evolved considerably and have splintered and developed 
different approaches under the umbrella of social health activism. Today, 
one area of resistance to psychiatric labelling channelled by patients 
themselves is from those who have been diagnosed with neurodevel-
opmental conditions of childhood such as attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, dyslexia, Tourette’s syndrome, and in particular autism. 
A politically mobilised group of adults with autism spectrum disorder 
(here referred to as ASD or simply autism), and sometimes their rela-
tives, pioneered the neurodiversity movement (NDM). The NDM voice 
rejects society’s disablement of difference while advocating a neurologi-
cal/medical model for autistic behaviour. In this chapter, we examine the 
position of the NDM, with reference to other mental health consumer/
survivor/patient movements and their challenges to psychiatric classifica-
tion in the past.
the neurodiVersity MoVeMent
I am autistic. I’ve always been autistic, and I always will be autistic. Autism 
is part of who I am, just as my sense of humor and my emotions are part of 
me. I like who I am, even my autistic part.10
‘Neurodiversity’ is a concept that implies that neurological difference is 
best understood as an inherent and valuable part of the range of human 
variation, rather than a pathological form of difference. The NDM 
met and mobilised in the late twentieth century through utilising 
websites such as Aspies for Freedom, The Autist, Autcom, Angelfire, 
Wrongplanet, and Neurodiversity.com, most of which are based in the 
USA or Europe. Numerous online chat rooms, blogs, and fora are spring-
ing up where autistic adults discuss common interests and make friends 
across international and geographical boundaries. The rise of the internet  
in the late twentieth century enabled mobilisation and creation of online 
communities in geographically dispersed areas, occupying virtual social 
spaces that are constructed and normative in their effects.11 Many autistic 
people started ‘coming out’ with pride, asserting minority cultural status, 
adopting similar strategies to the earlier gay rights movement. Many of 
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the arguments of the NDM relate to the autism diagnosis as a category or 
label. NDM voices taken from open access neurodiversity and autism sites 
are quoted here to illustrate their position.
The theory of labelling has a long history and activists and practition-
ers alike have struggled to come to terms with whether psychiatric labels 
help to reduce stigma and encourage research and treatment, or whether 
they merely reinforce a particular negative characterisation of behaviour 
that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The neurodiversity movement in 
this respect is not unlike other survivor, consumer, or disability rights 
campaigns that both resist labels and rely on labels to forge a sense of 
community. Even amongst the most radical anti-psychiatry groups, the 
relationship with medical language has produced a common touchstone 
for identifying community and fostering a more positive image of iden-
tity. For example, Canada’s earliest expression of organised mad pride 
emerged in the 1960s from a consortium of people who had been insti-
tutionalised for psychiatric disorders in Vancouver. As they discussed 
the appropriate name for their community-based group, they settled on 
Mad Patients’ Association (MPA). The name blended philosophies of the 
de- or anti-medicalised term ‘madness’ with the explicit term ‘patient’, 
conveying a relationship with medicine. This self-conscious choice of 
names thus embraced the ethos of the survivors, or the radical edge of 
anti-psychiatric views—those who survived in spite of psychiatric inter-
ventions, and the consumer model—those who have relied on psychiatric 
services, from the perspective of an autonomous client or user.
autisM as a diagnostiC Category
Kanner and Asperger first described ‘insistence on sameness’ and ‘autis-
tic aloneness’ over 70 years ago.12 As was explained by O’Reilly, Lester, 
and Kiyimba in Chapter 7, according to today’s DSM-5, autism diag-
nosis is given where there is (1) impairment in behaviours within the 
social/communication domain and (2) sensory issues and/or repetitive 
behaviours. Autism as a phenotype thus creates a category of persons 
who share social/communication impairment and repetitive behaviours, 
although the evidence that these symptoms are co-inherited is fairly 
weak.13 Essentially, the diagnosis depends on a deficit-based description 
of a person, creating a ‘spoiled identity’ in Goffman’s terms. Since the 
first epidemiological prevalence estimates were conducted in the 1970s 
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the autism diagnosis has seen an exponential rise, changing from a diag-
nosis given to an estimated one in two thousand to one in forty children. 
This rise is partly due to increased awareness and partly due to chang-
ing boundaries of diagnostic criteria, with intellectually able individu-
als included in the category of Asperger’s disorder in the 1990s. Such 
changes, coupled with the advent of the internet, meant that for the first 
time, many twentieth-century children were identified with autism, and 
as they grew up, many had the means, the motivation, and the intellec-
tual resources to challenge a purely medical understanding of ASD. In 
the 1990s, Martijn Dekker of the Netherlands founded Independent 
Living on the Autistic Spectrum (InLv), an e-mail list for autistic people. 
First run by hand on dial-up, InLv was the first fully autistic-run, self-
hosted online autism community. The effect was to promote discussion 
of how autism could be a benefit as well as create challenges, fostering 
in its subscribers a ‘healthy autistic’ identity. The community became the 
forerunner to the NDM.
Autism is not currently identified by neurological markers as none are 
reliable enough to create diagnostic tests, although ASDs are classified as 
‘neurodevelopmental disorders’ in the DSM. Despite the NDM’s focus 
on the ‘neuro’, it is behavioural inventories that are used to diagnose 
ASD, not brain scans, and these use a dimensional scale of impairment 
with a cut-off rather than a dichotomous distinction. In the diagnostic 
process, the point at which individual differences in behaviour constitute 
autism is based on clinical decisions which may depend on resources that 
diagnosis will trigger, the meaning of diagnosis to the patient or clini-
cians’ own ideas about signs and signifiers of autism. This, a somewhat 
arbitrary cut-off is used on the autism spectrum to define autism as a 
diagnosed disorder. This process is heavily influenced by culture, con-
text, and values.14 Chloe Silverman argues that the concept of autism as 
a diagnostic category has been established in the DSM and International 
Classification of Disease (ICD) and stabilised through the work of insti-
tutions such as schools, gene banks, professional associations, charities, 
government committees, parent networks, and those with vested inter-
est in treatments.15 The DSM and ICD systems are tools for classi-
fication of disorder that are themselves shaped by moral and historical 
values.16 These aspects underscore the shifting nature of autism diagnosis 
and remind us that the idea of ASD as a fixed underlying biological/
neurological entity (the purely medical model) requires qualification. 
Moreover, part of the pushback on these categories is coming from peo-
ple who have been placed in them.
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The Position of the NDM
The NDM has articulated a number of central features or core values, all of 
which stem from a denial of pathologisation and a critique of labelling as 
a harmful action against diversity. Each of these tenets is discussed below:
Opposing Elimination and Cure
Opposition to Cure of autism was frequently expressed as a rationale for 
online activity of NDM members:
We are deeply concerned with the perception of autism as a disorder and 
the attempts to cure and prevent autism. In addition we are concerned 
about attempts to help autistic people that actually harm them. The purpose 
of this website is to educate the public about the anti-cure perspective.17
Michelle Dawson, a Canadian academic diagnosed with autism, has ques-
tioned the ethics of treatments such as applied behaviour analysis (ABA) 
and appeared as an expert witness in the 2004 legal case where parents of 
autistic children filed to get medical insurance to cover the cost of treat-
ment, claiming it was a medical necessity. Her position was that ABA’s 
techniques of aversion, which persistently expose children with ASD to 
stimuli that cause distress and subsequently discourage unwanted behav-
iours such as hand-flapping, are tantamount to cruelty. Dawson considers 
these unwanted behaviours to be coping mechanisms in stressful situations:
Where ABA needs scrutiny is when its power is used to remove odd behav-
iours which may be useful and necessary to the autistic (such as rocking, 
flapping, and analytical, rather than social or ‘imaginative’ play); and when 
typical, expected behaviours which may be stressful, painful, or useless to 
the autistic (such as pointing, joint attention, appropriate gaze, and eye 
contact) are imposed.18
Others within the movement have criticised therapies, which attempt 
to remove autistic behaviours, claiming for example that the repetitive 
behaviours are valid attempts to communicate.19
Neurotypical people pity autistics. I pity neurotypicals. I pity anyone who 
cannot feel the way that flapping your hands just so amplifies everything 
you feel and thrusts it up into the air. … A boy pacing by himself, flapping 
and humming and laughing. …A shake of the fingers in front of the eyes, 
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a monologue, an echolaliated phrase. All of these things autistic people are 
supposed to be ashamed of and stop doing? They are how we communi-
cate our joy.20
In their opposition to ‘elimination’ and invoking the term ‘genocide’, the 
NDM has drawn on and shares a stance with the earlier ‘survivor’ move-
ment. Similarly, people who were sexually sterilised under the eugenics 
programme in Alberta, Canada, have worked closely with community 
advocates and scholars to produce a ‘survivor’-based website that exam-
ines the history of eugenics from their perspectives.21 Survivors reject 
psychiatry outright, likening psychiatric treatment to a form of slav-
ery and an outright abuse of power. Anthropologist Gabriella Coleman 
has suggested that some people have embraced that language of sur-
vival—much akin to the language of the NDM—strategically to under-
score their resilience after decades, even centuries, of oppression.22 The 
resulting movement, Coleman contends, ‘mobilizes the cultural ideal of 
freedom and self-determination, along with the law of human rights and 
informed consent, to undermine the moral, scientific, and legal claims 
furthered by the pharmaceutical companies and other authoritative psy-
chiatric institutions’.23 Survivors represent the most radical voices within 
mad culture, connecting their survival, self-consciously, to a form of resil-
ience. This terminology intentionally invites connotations of genocide by 
linking identity with a social group, such as a race or ethnicity.24
Use of Neurocentric/Medical Models
The NDM seems to have its roots in the social model of disability, which 
separates physical and biological impairment from the disabling attitudes 
and practices of society.25
People with autistic spectrum disorders are not victims of autism, they are 
victims of society. They do not suffer from their developmental differences, 
they suffer from prejudice, ignorance, lack of understanding, exploitation, 
verbal abuse - all this and more from that sector of society which considers 
itself socially able.26
The NDM has also sprung from the twentieth-century trend dubbed 
‘neurocentrism’ by Satel and Lilienfeld who define neurocentrism as ‘the 
view that human experience and behavior can be best explained from 
the predominant or even exclusive perspective of the brain’, which they 
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argue, has increasingly been adopted in parallel with the rise of neurosci-
ence throughout the last half of the last century and into this.27 Applying 
neurological explanations to one’s mind has further been described by 
Rose as the ‘neurochemical self ’.28 Neurocentrism is therefore a descrip-
tion of the extent to which neuroscientific theories, practices, tech-
nologies, and therapies are influencing how we view ourselves (those 
identities and characteristics ascribed to self and views of others). The 
term ‘neurodiversity’ implies the movement predominantly understand 
their differences in terms of innate neurology, the brain and/or wiring, 
perhaps underpinned with genetic causes. Language has been devel-
oped describing people as either ‘neurotypical’ (NT, not on the autism 
spectrum) or ‘neurodivergent’, i.e. people like themselves (non-NT). 
‘Neurotypical’ is a term now widely adopted in academic neuroscience. 
The NDM, then, uses the language of brain wiring or neurology to 
explain the nature of their differences. The differences in how the brain 
communicates then result in behavioural differences. One NDM advo-
cate explained it this way:
Another common sign that someone is an NT? Touching. NTs enjoy all 
sorts of physical contact and often use touch to greet friends, family and 
even casual acquaintances… NTs are simply wired differently.29
As the autism phenotype is well-established, research coalesces around 
it. Neuroscientific research charts uniformities and abnormalities in the 
brain that make it possible to distinguish an autistic brain from a normal 
brain. Neuroscience seeks tangible, discrete differences between autistic 
and non-autistic brains while epidemiology tells us ASD is a spectrum 
condition extending into the sub-clinical range. In this way, neuroscience 
researchers tend to dichotomise brain structure for what is essentially a 
dimensional condition. By looking at differences between dichotomised 
autistic/non-autistic phenotypes (as opposed to a dimensional spectrum 
of traits in the whole population), medical neuroscience models tend to 
homogenise autistic brains.30 This is analogous to the dichotomisation of 
difference between ‘neurotypical’ and ‘neurodivergent’ persons identified 
by the NDM; it refers to an essential difference in brain structure and/
or functioning. Thus, the NDM adopts a position that both challenges 
and shores up medicalisation: while questioning autism and other neu-
rodevelopmental conditions as diagnosable ‘disorders’, it utilises a model 
derived from neuroscientific research.
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The rise of neurocentrism is transdisciplinary in its reach. Historian 
Daniel Smail has developed this idea as an overarching ontology that, if 
applied carefully, has the potential to disrupt our commonly held beliefs 
about diversity and difference over time. He proposes a ‘neuro-histor-
ical’ approach that locates the beginning of history at a moment when 
humans approach a state of consciousness; he defines this moment in 
neuro-biological terms as the evolutionary stage that separates humans 
from animals. Pinpointing this moment, he argues, requires careful col-
laboration with scientists to sift through new kinds of evidence—biolog-
ical and neurochemical evidence—to re-interpret the origins of history. 
Part of Smail’s justification for a turn to neuro-history is that it offers a 
deeper, richer account of humanity by acknowledging human bio[neu-
ro]-diversity. He recommends shifting the historians’ gaze away from 
political structures, social arrangements, or even cultural expressions and 
looking instead to neuro-history.31 This conceptualisation of neurodiver-
sity is not unlike some of R. D. Laing’s suggestions in the 1960s that 
schizophrenia could be productively understood as an alternative form of 
consciousness. Rather than view psychotic symptoms as deficits or abnor-
mal characteristics, Laing considered that delusions, paranoid ideation, 
and other kinds of behaviour might produce a form of intelligible insight 
into human interactions.32
Objections to Diagnosis as a Category of Disorder
Diagnosis of autism is recommended by health guidelines as an essen-
tial way to access treatments.33 However, many autistic adults in the 
NDM feel that both experts and families misinterpret or take no notice 
of them.34 Autism, they argue, should not be considered as pathological, 
i.e. in terms of a medical condition, but in terms of the normal varia-
tion of the human population; thus, many in their ranks oppose medical 
description in terms of diagnosis of an ASD.
The autistic community firmly believes that autism is not a disorder but a 
natural human variation. We are deeply concerned with the perception of 
autism as a disorder.35
A core argument is that the extreme end of the autism spectrum (i.e. 
reaching diagnostic thresholds) is required for the existence of a healthy 
gene pool in the human population. Without these people, the range of 
natural human variation is reduced, and the strengths that autism brings, 
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such as ability to focus and systemising skills, will be lost. Such variation 
in the gene pool is desirable for evolutionary reasons, the NDM contest.
It may be that autistic people are essentially different from “normal” peo-
ple, and it is precisely those differences that make them invaluable to the 
ongoing evolution of the human race.36
This argument matches some of the historical anti-psychiatry arguments, 
particularly those of Laing, who suggested that people with psychotic 
disorders had a lot to offer society due to the gift of insight that they 
had into situations that non-psychotic people could not even appreciate. 
Within the neurodiversity movement, a similar sentiment circulates, sug-
gesting that some autistic people also have particular areas of strength 
or talent formerly known in the medical literature as ‘islets of ability’.37 
Members of the NDM point out that all these aspects of autism will be 
lost if people like them are ‘cured’ or aborted as babies.
Many of the traits I identify with most strongly are those labelled autistic, 
such as the ability to hyperfocus, a strong attention to detail, the ability 
to enjoy my own company for long periods, not being controlled by the 
social collective, etc.38
There are several historical precedents where conditions have been 
de-medicalised in the past, through activism of politically mobilised 
social movements. The classic example of de-medicalisation in the twen-
tieth century is homosexuality, which was listed as a disorder in the 
second edition of the DSM, becoming a treatable medical condition 
rather than a behaviour that had previously been seen as morally wrong. 
Hormone treatments and castrations were used to ‘cure’ homosexuality 
and in some cases admission to mental institutions.39 While people were 
unsuccessfully ‘treated’ or punished for homosexual behaviour in the 
past, medicine now recognises it as a dimension of a normal and healthy 
life, thanks to sustained pressure from gay activists who mobilised around 
the diagnosis in the mid-century period.40
Parallels to the NDM objection to ASD as a devastating childhood 
disorder can be seen in the transgender movement’s attempts to demed-
icalise gender identity disorder (GID) of childhood in the late twenti-
eth century. Bryant and Burke describe in depth the opposition of the 
transgender movement (TGM) to this diagnostic category which first 
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appeared in DSM-III in 1980.41 The main objections to GID diagno-
sis were that sex-stereotyped behaviour was used to define children as 
healthy or pathological, which reinforced the binary model of gender. 
The TGM objected that GIDs could result in stigmatisation of trans-
gender individuals that gender variance was no longer described as 
a range of valid ways to be, but rather had been redefined as a serious 
form of illness. The movement drew attention to treatments that were 
designed to intervene and ‘cure’ individuals of their problem. A techni-
cal objection was that existing research and clinical evidence were based 
overwhelmingly on study and treatment of boys, an argument that has 
parallels with discussions about gender and autism.42 Overall, the TGM 
raised similar objections to those of the NDM today.
Like the NDM, the TGM were vocal protesters and mobilised 
around the diagnostic category. After a concerted writing campaign to 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA, authors of DSM) in 1977, 
concerns and correspondence led to modifications in DSM-IV, where a 
less behavioural-based medical definition of GIDs was adopted. GIDs in 
DSM-IV were also subject to sustained activist objection. By the mid-
1990s, several political US-based transgender groups, including Gender 
Pac, National Centre for Lesbian Rights, and National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, issued stinging statements critiquing GID. In 1996, activ-
ists repeatedly picketed the APA and formed the ‘National Coalition 
for GID Reform’, and finally in 2013, GID was dropped in the DSM-5 
revised diagnostic criteria. The condition was replaced with a new cate-
gory ‘Gender Dysphoria’ which only pathologises the discontent experi-
enced as a result of gender identity issues. Some in TGM accept the new 
DSM-5 definition does go some way to demedicalise GIDs and helps to 
resolve some of their issues. Fraser, Karasic, Meyer, and Wylie, for exam-
ple, argue that changes to DSM were a direct consequence of activism 
and have led to a more acceptable diagnosis/ label and a reframing of 
the condition as they see it.43 One parallel NDM argument is that the 
term ‘disorder’ implies a pathological state, with negative and stigmatis-
ing connotations. Autism researchers have therefore called for the term 
‘autism spectrum disorder’ to be replaced by ‘autism spectrum con-
dition’, reminiscent of the replacement of the term ‘retardation’ with 
‘learning disabilities’ in the 1970s.44 This replacement of terms and 
continual refinement of diagnostic criteria is an important feature of the 
history of psychiatric disorders. However, as Jan Walmsley explained 
in Chapter 5, replacing terms does not always alter stigma indefinitely. 
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The new term may become stigmatised as its connotation may become 
the same as the old term. Even replacing autism with ‘neurodivergent’ is 
simply replacing one label with another.
Embracing Labels: Being or Having?
The NDM see autism as an integral part of their identity that they are 
disinclined to change. The autistic activist Jim Sinclair presented a talk 
called ‘Don’t Mourn for Us’ at the 1993 International Conference on 
Autism in Canada, addressed primarily to parents. It drew interest 
through its challenge to the then-dominant ‘autism as tragedy’ narrative, 
describing autism as inseparable from the person, rather than a separate 
disease entity, and as a valid way of being. Following this influential paper 
and in contrast to the requirements in medical journals, the NDM often 
prefer first-person language ‘autistic person’ to ‘person with autism’ as 
the latter implies the autism can be divorced from the individual.
Autism is not something that I have, it is something that I am. Autism is 
not a cage, with us as the prisoners.45
Many parents, by contrast, prefer the more medical term ‘person with 
autism’. Kit Weintraub, a parent who is a board member of Families for 
Early Autism Treatment, states:
My children are not autistic, they ‘have autism’…. Autism, according to 
the vast majority of medical experts today, causes severely abnormal devel-
opment, and without appropriate treatment it can condemn those affected 
to a life of isolation and dependency. “Autistics” is a rather new political-
ly-correct term that I find troubling; it is a label that attempts to define 
people with autism as members of an elite group of human beings who 
differ from the rest of us only in terms of their unique talents and their 
superior way of experiencing the world.46
However, some autistic people have argued against this viewpoint. 
Michelle Dawson retorted that ‘person with autism’ was equivalent to 
describing herself as a ‘person with femaleness’.
Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it colors every experience, every 
sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of 
existence. It is not possible to separate the autism from the person.47
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Examining some of the online sources suggests that that parents, teach-
ers, and even siblings are indeed present within the NDM community, 
but their relationship to the movement is different. Unlike the bold 
statements about being autistic, not having autism—parents fill a differ-
ent role in their relationship to children who are considered autistic. This 
triangulating effect may force us to return to a different set of histori-
cal trends. That of familiar arguments about pre-natal screening, moth-
er-blaming, food additives, and other environmental factors that cast the 
net over a much wider set of influences for contributing—whether posi-
tively or negatively—to the neurodiversity identity. American philosopher 
and psychiatrist Carl Elliot has described this cascading effect in terms 
of contagion or that of being ‘sick by association’ or courtesy stigma 
idea.48 The resulting labelling of entire families or perhaps groups creates 
another layer of complexity as we examine the process of identity build-
ing and forms of activism that are created to challenge or embrace these 
labels.
For the NDM, although opposed to the notion that they suffer 
from ‘disorder’, the label of ‘autism’ has become both an identity and 
a rallying cry. Increasingly activism occurs online, and occasionally this 
becomes a physical meeting. In 1995, Autreat was founded. This is an 
annual conference that accommodates autistic difficulties, e.g. partic-
ipants wear colour-coded badges indicating whether or not they may 
be approached for conversation. Autreat endeavours to create an ideal 
NDM environment that eliminates disablement through tolerance and 
adaptation and challenges the status of autism as a psychiatric disorder.
diVerse PersPeCtiVes within soCiaL heaLth  
and surViVor MoVeMents
As the scholarship on this topic has illustrated, the approaches taken by 
social health and survivor movements are varied, complex, and change 
over time. The language of survival versus consumption provides one 
broad set of generalisations for understanding the political stances within 
this multifaceted set of movements. Even within organised campaigns, 
however, there is significant granularity that can range from libertarian to 
socialist perspectives regarding how people should be cared for, accepted, 
and tolerated in modern society. Within debates over the medicalisa-
tion and treatment of addiction, for example, scholars and practitioners 
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continue to disagree on whether the twelve-step model of recovery 
developed in the twentieth century offers a sufficiently de-medicalised 
approach, or whether it should be used at all. Some have suggested that 
individuals need a menu of treatment options that might change over 
time, which superficially may appear as though they subscribe to differ-
ent models of addiction altogether.49 The fluidity, however, is important 
in these rights-based campaigns as individuals develop different relation-
ships with practitioners, services, and gaps in the mental health system.
Similarly, the position of the autistic community vis a vis diagnosis of 
autism is not homogenous. While some activists argue that the diagno-
sis of autism spectrum ‘disorder’ implies a pathological state, with neg-
ative and stigmatising connotations, many other adults describe their 
relief and understanding once a diagnosis is given; a label that makes 
sense of a lifetime of struggle. High profile cases have included Susan 
Boyle who described her relief at getting an Asperger’s diagnosis, which 
for her, provided an explanation of her difficulties, and deflected attribu-
tions of responsibility for previous aberrant behaviour.50 Thus, the diag-
nosis can have a positive effect, whereas undiagnosed, a person may have 
been blamed as lazy or socially tactless: diagnosis may lead to attribution 
of behavioural difficulties to biomedical causes, which improves others’ 
reactions.51
Autism is highly heterogeneous, and individuals may range from 
severely intellectually impaired and/or non-verbal to ‘high functioning’ 
and articulate. Detractors of the NDM argue the online self-advocates 
represent only the high-functioning extreme. Indeed it may be the 
medicalisation of less severe autism behaviours that has ironically given 
impetus to the NDM, as less severely impaired individuals have rallied 
under the autism banner, where previously they may not have been 
diagnosed. Francisco Ortega, describes the movement as a form of 
aggressive identity politics who appropriate the right to speak on behalf 
of every autistic person.52 It is certainly true that not all adults diag-
nosed with autism see their condition as a positive part of themselves, 
and some are pro-cure.53
The possibility that I could be very autistic for the rest of my life always 
upsets me. Therefore, when people talk about a cure I actually love to hear 
it. To be realistic, I know I will never be cured. The cause of my autism is a 
genetic anomaly and can’t be changed.54
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Whether or not total de-medicalisation of autism is a desirable out-
come, there are powerful forces at work that oppose this. The fact that 
autism is such a well-recognised phenotype with invested research, clin-
ical and commercial worlds reliant on its existence as a medical category 
adds to the entrenchment of the category. Cooper describes this process 
and argues this makes major de-medicalisation by DSM unlikely.55 This 
uncomfortable relationship with medical terminology, treatment, and a 
simultaneous rejection of a disordered identity is a familiar tenet of many 
of the social health movements and illustrates some of the inherent ten-
sions within these campaigns.
ConCLusions
The NDM movement is an example of the kind of authentic expression 
that attempts to take mental health and disability conditions out from 
clinician’s control. It both uses and challenges the medicalisation of brain 
and behaviour in a way that offers a coherent and consistent critique of 
psychiatry while allowing for diversity within its members. Broderick and 
Ne’eman argue that the bulk of the support for framing autism within a 
disorder model, where it is viewed as a ‘disease’ external to the person 
comes from within the non‐autistic ‘NT’ community, whereas the bulk 
of the support for framing autism within a neurodiversity model comes 
from within the NDM and autistic community.56 They argue that NDM 
provides a counter‐narrative that can play a vital role in the resistance to 
ideological hegemony (which they view as the medical model of autism 
diagnosis). They position the NDM are essentially activists in the process 
of de-medicalisation of autism.
However, we have found that instead of providing a homogenous 
oppositional set of ideas, the NDM have struggled to define their rela-
tionship with psychiatric categories much like other consumer campaigns 
that adopt aspects of the medical model, while rejecting wholesale psy-
chiatric classification. Far from being a standardised voice, the NDM is 
also typical of other social health movement in the complex identity pol-
itics that co-mingle with the psychiatric labels, those of gender, age, sex-
uality, race, class amongst others, which continue to condition individual 
experiences.
The early phase of mad pride movement in the 1960s relied on a 
more homogenous notion of madness to anchor its resistance from insti-
tutionalisation and opposition to psychiatry borrowing strategies from 
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the left, namely collective action, and from the right, especially elements 
of libertarianism. As the movement evolves, however, as with other social 
movements, identity politics have grown more complicated. The NDM 
provides an illustrative example of how some of those struggles have 
played out in a particular manifestation of experiences, ones brought 
together through a degree of commonality. Digital media technology, 
used very effectively by the NDM, also demonstrates a new layer in 
the discourse on consumer networks as unlike the 1960s where people 
needed to physically gather to generate a common set of political goals, 
and the internet allows for virtual meeting spaces and virtual identities.57 
It helps to complicate boundaries of citizenship and identity and offers, 
perhaps, a new model for consumer-survivor activism for the twenty-first 
century.
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The National Schizophrenia Fellowship: 




In 1970, the newly formed Schizophrenia Action Committee claimed 
that ‘Schizophrenia is one of the greatest crippling scourges of man-
kind.’1 The pamphlet was a call to arms, seeking members to join and 
bolster this new organisation. It called for those with personal experience 
and first-hand knowledge of the condition to make themselves known 
and come together with like-minded people, to help and be helped in 
return. Schizophrenia is still in the ‘unmentionable classes’ of stigmatised 
illnesses, the pamphlet argued, highlighting that ‘to drag the horrible 
problem into the full light of day and publicity was the only way of deal-
ing with it.’2 Explaining that the community care programme and new 
drugs meant that more schizophrenic persons were being pushed out 
of closing mental hospitals and back into the homes of the often unpre-
pared and ill-equipped, good-will of families and caregivers, the article 
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concluded; ‘If you agree that a new voluntary society is required, will 
you help?’3
The path to community care and evaluating the effectiveness of com-
munity care services has been widely documented by historians over the 
past few decades.4 Within this history, the role of individual patients and 
their families has also received much attention.5 Alex Mold has identi-
fied that historically there has been ‘a culture of paternalism’ within the 
medical profession, which advocated patients taking a largely passive 
role in their relationship with their doctors.6 However, as Ali Haggett 
explains, ‘during the 1960s, this situation began to change, heralded by 
the growth of post-war social surveys and the emergence of early patient 
advocacy groups, which demonstrated that patients wanted more infor-
mation about health and disease.’7 This emergence of early patient advo-
cacy groups corresponds with the work of Dyck and Russell in Chapter 8  
of this volume. Following on from their work however, this chapter sug-
gests that it was not only the patients, but the families who wanted more 
information in the 1960s. As such, this chapter aims to recount the nar-
rative of a collection of families who came together to form a pressure 
group to support each other in their quest to provide better care to their 
loved ones who had being diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Historically, the role of the families themselves in trying to understand 
their relatives’ mental health condition has been well documented.8 
Historians have revealed how families were instrumental in all aspects of 
institutional life, from committal, to corresponding with loved ones and 
superintendents during treatment, to reclaiming their loved ones from 
the grasp of the asylum when they were in a better social or financial 
position to cope with their illnesses.9 Nicole Baur has identified that 
patients’ families could very often be extremely vocal in the recovery 
process for their loved ones suggesting that in the 1930s, ‘many patients 
and relatives welcomed the new treatments, as they often provided 
the only glimpse of hope for a cure.’10 By the 1960s, this relationship 
between families and medical authorities remained in friction, and fam-
ilies complained of having to deal with the ‘obfuscating fog of hospital 
vagueness and evasiveness.’11 One contemporary article, published in 
1972, argued that ‘relatives seldom have the chance to share what little 
they have learnt with professional workers. Still less of course, are they 
in the position to make themselves heard by central policy makers and 
social services. They are unorganised [and] shy of publicity.’12
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Charitable bodies were not new to the mental health sector in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The Mental After-Care Association, 
established in 1879, as ‘The After-Care Association for Poor and 
Friendless Female Convalescents on Leaving Asylums for the Insane,’ 
was the first association to assist those recovering from mental disorder.13  
Moreover, the National Association for Mental Health [N.A.M.H] had 
been in existence since 1946, merging from a variety of pre-existing 
charities: the Central Association for Mental Welfare (founded 1913), 
the National Council for Mental Hygiene (established 1922) and the 
Child Guidance Council (formed 1927).14 However, the evidence sug-
gests that some families and caregivers felt unsupported by such a large 
and impersonal umbrella organisations.15 Letters identified that some 
family members wanted more personal support groups to aid them with 
their individual problems and illnesses.16 From the backdrop of these 
frustrations, a number of charities, pressure groups and support groups 
sprang up in the 1970s. The N.A.M.H itself was rebranded to become 
MIND in 1972, to overcome a public perception that it was becoming 
old-fashioned.17
Using the National Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF) as a case study, 
this chapter will identify how different stakeholder groups, including 
families and caregivers, attempted to respond to government policies 
and the perceived shortfalls in state provision for mental health care in 
the late twentieth century. The origins of the NSF lay as a fellowship 
for those who knew, looked after, or cared for relatives, family members 
or friends suffering from schizophrenia. In his work, Peter Barham has 
described the early days of the NSF as an organisation which ‘maintained 
an intransigently patronising attitude towards its constituents.’18 Despite 
this assessment, this chapter will show that this opinion may have been 
created because this organisation was substantially more than just a char-
ity for those who were suffering from schizophrenia. Instead, it was a 
support group, a network where the ‘healthy’ non-schizophrenic relative, 
friend or caregiver could access the support that they needed, not neces-
sarily to care for their loved one or charge, but also to care for their own 
mental health needs.
This chapter will look at the beginning of the movement for a care 
regime and support network in the UK from the perspective of one of 
the very founding members of the organisation, E.A., using oral his-
tory to bring the narrative to life. Interspersed with the oral history, this 
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chapter will also look at surviving documents from the NSF archives, 
looking at papers, council minutes and publications of the NSF itself. 
This chapter will show how the National Schizophrenia Fellowship 
helped to support relatives struggling with stigma and acted as a barrier 
to this stigma, thus providing strategies of coping for the ‘healthy mind’ 
of the non-schizophrenic caregiver. One of the arguments that are cen-
tral to this chapter is that stigma manifested itself in a variety of ways. 
Many of the relatives and friends of those suffering from schizophrenia 
felt the stigma themselves, and certainly, their loved ones felt it keenly.19 
My interviewee, E.A., although proud and fiercely independent, asked 
to be anonymised in this chapter. The reason that was stated for desiring 
such anonymity is that although her brother passed away many years ago, 
he never wanted E.A. to talk about his ‘episodes’ or his times in hos-
pital, a request that she dutifully promised. In the interview, she states, 
‘And so that’s my anxiety now that I might let P.A. down by telling any-
body.’20 To preserve her promise to her brother and therefore to pre-
serve his anonymity, E.A. herself must remain anonymous in this chapter. 
Those who may be able to identify her are asked to respect her wishes 
and preserve her (and therefore her brother’s) anonymity.21
In 2002, the National Schizophrenia Fellowship underwent a rebrand to 
encompass a broader diversity of mental illnesses, renaming itself ‘Rethink’ 
in the process. Although as a charity, it is still registered under the name 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship, ‘Rethink’ became known as Rethink 
Mental Illness in 2011, officially trading under this name. Throughout 
the interview, E.A. uses the term ‘Rethink’ to refer, anachronistically, to 
the National Schizophrenia Fellowship. Whilst I have preserved her use 
of the name ‘Rethink’ when quoting from her interview, I have tried to 
preserve the appropriate historically accurate name in the text.
on our own, with the MediCaL authorities
Like many people with schizophrenia, P.A. was in his early twenties when 
his symptoms first started to manifest themselves. P.A. lived with his 
mother and sister, in London in the mid-1960s. His father had died in 
the war when P.A. was just a small boy. P.A. himself had served briefly 
in the army and had a good service; however, by the end of his service, 
his problems started to become apparent. After coming out of the army, 
P.A. suffered a couple of suicidal attacks. In the early 1960s, before 
receiving diagnosis or treatment, his psychotic symptoms really started 
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to become problematic. E.A.’s narrative identifies the struggle to receive 
a diagnosis and the attitudes her family experienced by both the commu-
nity and medical professionals at the time.
Although, as will become clear, E.A. was evidently upset about the 
reaction from her neighbours, relatives and lay community more gen-
erally, the interview identifies that she felt extremely supported by the 
medical professionals. Within the interview, she praises the ‘dear old met-
ropolitan police,’22 the doctors and the mental hospital that her brother 
was sent to and has special praise for the community psychiatric nurses 
[CPNs] who cared for her brother on numerous occasions through-
out his illness. Nevertheless, at the outset of her brother’s illness, E.A. 
identifies how receiving a diagnosis by any medical professional proved 
challenging. E.A. recounts how at the beginning of the illness, in the 
early 1960s, when P.A. had just started to become ‘very psychotic’ every 
attempt to achieve a diagnosis was hindered:
But every time this GP made an appointment for P.A., P.A. said that there 
was nothing wrong. We told P.A. that he had to let the doctor look at him, 
but every time the GP came, he said there’s nothing wrong, there’s noth-
ing wrong with me and that’s why it went on such a long time, before he 
could get treatment. So we never actually managed to get him the appoint-
ment that he needed.23
P.A.’s first treatment in a mental hospital was eventually secured in 1964. 
His route to treatment began during one of P.A.’s psychotic attacks. 
After aimlessly wandering for hours one January night without a coat, 
P.A. was confronted by the police, and he ended up in a Magistrates’ 
Court for hitting a policeman.24 After this, he was remanded in custody 
for the night and the following day:
The magistrate recommended that he go to Brixton Prison hospital for 
assessment by a medical person, for about four weeks […] The prison 
medical officer wrote to mum and he said in his opinion he had observed 
that P.A. was in the early stages of paranoid schizophrenia, which if left 
untreated could lead to certification […] He said that he intended to 
recommend to the magistrate that P.A. be sectioned for one year in  
hospital […] So because of the police he got into the hospital- otherwise 
he wouldn’t have. Not everybody with a mental illness goes banging on a 
surgery door saying will you please assess me- even now they don’t!25
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After receiving treatment in the psychiatric hospital, E.A. describes how 
her brother recovered very quickly in this care setting. When her mother 
first went to see P.A. in the hospital, she was worried he might blame 
her for his situation. However, E.A. narrates how her brother was actu-
ally able to reassure their mother saying—‘it’s okay here, they know what 
they are talking about. They understand. I’ll be alright here.’26 E.A. 
identifies how, ‘from the time he went through those gates with the clas-
sical urns on them, he thought perhaps he could open up,’ noting that 
‘the only person that he had ever opened up to before was me.’27
Talking of her experiences with the medical services in general, 
E.A. stated: ‘So in a way we were lucky… the NHS people were bril-
liant, with us as a family and with P.A., and on the whole, we were really 
quite friendly with the CPNs. And on the whole, we have a lot to be 
thankful for. It isn’t always the case today.’28 Nevertheless, even with 
such a positive experience of mental health services, it is clear that E.A. 
needed more than this for reassurance and assistance for looking after her 
brother on a day-to-day basis. When asked what the real benefit of the 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship was, E.A. stated unthinkingly:
It offered more support- I should have said that. In the beginning, the first 
eight years before Rethink, those first eight years or so the medical people 
were very good, as I told you, but we were completely on our own apart 
from that.29
This notion of being completely alone without any support is really 
important, and E.A. explained how this loneliness was frequently made 
worse by the stigma which attached itself to the diagnosis of ‘schizophre-
nia’ in the mid-1960s.
stigMa and feeLings of LoneLiness
Before joining the Fellowship, E.A. often described a feeling of loneli-
ness, which was inherently linked to the stigma which she and P.A. knew 
were attached to his condition. In periods of ‘wellness’, she argued that 
herself and her brother could easily conceal his diagnosis. She mentioned 
many of P.A.’s friends, stating ‘So for 17 years these friends had no idea, 
and sometimes they’d say “oh P.A. is a law unto himself” or “P.A. is a 
bit eccentric” but that’s all, nothing more. But I shouldn’t have had 
to hide it.’30 The halfway house of wellness and illness which could be 
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experienced by the episodes of schizophrenia has clearly led E.A. to lead 
a life of silence, trying to keep her promise to her brother, whilst remain-
ing interested and wanting to find the release of talking to others.
Anyway P.A. said to me, “promise me, you will not ever mention anything 
to do with me ever being in a mental hospital to my friends.” I mean they 
were good friends, but he didn’t know how they were going to react and 
he wasn’t going to take the chance. And do you know, even now, I’m still 
keeping quiet about it. I mean I do not approve of having to keep quiet 
about it- do you understand? I don’t approve. I support Rethink, they 
know I do… but a promise is a promise, even when a person is no longer 
here. I mean if they hear obliquely about it from some other means, then  
I don’t worry too much, but I will never say anything about it to his 
friends. And so really sometimes it gets a bit awkward or something and 
my poor old brain, you know, I think to myself sometimes I need to put 
my brain into gear before I open [my mouth]. He said that he didn’t want 
me to tell anybody and I said well they may understand or know someone 
else who has had a breakdown, but he said, no, he doesn’t want anybody 
to know. I said, okay, I won’t tell anybody.31
Interestingly in the interview with E.A., it is clear that the stigma and 
keeping quiet were some of the hardest things about looking after her 
brother, harder in some respects even, than managing the illness itself. 
In her interview, she explains ‘it was quite a big thing to cope with- 
who knows and who doesn’t- I mean it is almost like being a hunted 
criminal.’32 By comparing her life of silence surrounding her brother’s 
illness to being a ‘hunted criminal,’ E.A. clearly identifies the difficulties 
and shame involved in her double life. Whilst E.A. saw no reason for this 
stigma, it is clear that she and her family had experienced it first-hand.
You see even one or two neighbours who used to chat to mum before, when 
she said she met her on the street and she said oh P.A. is behaving oddly 
or something and when mum said “oh he’s been in hospital for a mental 
disorder,” that neighbour withdrew. And the next time that she saw mum, 
she walked over on the other side of the road. And this was very hurtful to 
mum, I mean you have enough trouble in the first place, and then that.33
Similarly, she mentioned that family was of little help to bear the weight 
of P.A.’s illness. In a characteristic defence of her relatives, E.A. added, ‘I 
think my family were frightened [they] thought they might be expected 
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to get involved in financial business- which they never were because 
I always worked and paid my way so… that we could still have a quality 
of life- I thought that our happiness was paramount.’34 Nevertheless, her 
family’s response was clearly hurtful to herself and her mother; ‘But, you 
know, I think that mum would have been pleased if our relatives would 
have written occasionally just to say- “oh how’s P.A.? I do hope he’s get-
ting on alright.” But they seemed either embarrassed or I don’t know 
what it was.’35 For many years, the burden of caring responsibilities was 
shared between E.A. and her mother. After her mother’s death however, 
E.A. was on her own to care for her brother for 17 years. Speaking of her 
feelings of isolation, E.A. argued:
When people are very psychotic, they lose their friends, a lot of them. In 
fact, I will say that people not only lose their friends, but there can be dis-
tance from their relatives on both sides. I don’t mean that the relatives 
were nasty, they were both nice families and we had happy childhoods, 
but mental health is too much, apparently, to come to grips with and you 
know, even, extended family, and so we have been more or less on our own 
with the medical authorities, and of course Rethink and special friends who 
can take it.36
The response of her family and the need to hide it from certain friends 
clearly left a gap of loneliness in E.A.’s life, unable to talk to anyone 
about the more troubling symptoms of her brother’s illness, including his 
suicide attempts and periods of hospitalisation. Clearly, this left a mark 
of frustration on E.A. who still worries that she might break her prom-
ise to her brother to this day. These feelings of isolation, expressed by 
E.A. were extremely common. An article published in Mind and Mental 
Health Magazine in 1972 argued that the stigma of the illness isolated 
families from neighbours, communities and even their own extended 
families stating that the ‘sheer disruptive power of schizophrenia over a 
family is fully intelligible only to those who have been through it.’37
a PLea for aCtion
E.A.’s narrative is interesting, but not unusual, and her family were 
clearly not the only family trying to look after loved ones who had been, 
or who were waiting to be, diagnosed with schizophrenia. In 1966, 
two years after P.A.’s diagnosis, it was estimated that 11,419 individu-
als had been discharged from hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
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who had not previously been in hospital before.38 Moreover, the World 
Health Organization’s estimate was that the risk of being diagnosed with 
schizophrenia was one per cent of the population as a whole.39 In 1970, 
it was observed that over half of all of the patients in mental hospitals 
or psychiatric units on any given day are diagnosed as suffering from 
schizophrenia. At the end of 1970, the number of schizophrenic patients 
in hospitals totalled around 58,000.40 If anything, E.A.’s experiences, 
certainly those which have been recounted in the interview, were more 
positive than other stories appear to have been. However, the themes 
of isolation and loneliness prevail in other narratives too.41 On 9 May 
1970, an article featured in The Times. It took the form of a letter, and 
although it was published anonymously, it was written by a man named 
John Pringle. Pringle was a retired university professor, and he was also 
the father of a young man who had been diagnosed with Schizophrenia 
in his early twenties. The letter was a plea for action, a call to know that 
there were others out there who engaged in the same daily battles: bat-
tles not only against the illness of schizophrenia, but against the author-
ities, against the system, against the stigma of the illness and against the 
isolation that the condition created. In the letter, it is clear to hear 
the anguish and anger of a man, alone in a fiercely difficult situation. In 
the letter, he explains:
The word “schizophrenia” is flung about today with flip facility, bob-
bing up in films, television scripts, literary criticism, even political articles, 
mostly as some sort of modish synonym for indecisiveness. But no one 
who has seen the acute medical condition would ever want to use it except 
in its correct context.42
In his second year at Oxford University, Pringle’s son had developed 
what was referred to as ‘depression of adolescence.’ Having lost his 
scholarship through poor attendance, he was eventually expelled from 
the university and sent back to live with his worried, and until that point, 
completely ignorant parents.
A family suddenly faced with this situation has, in my experience, two 
problems, and it is hard to say which is worst. The first is how best to 
cope with this strange, new member of the household whose moods alter-
nate impossibly between sullen lying on his bed in the dark to wild fits 
of aggression, with social manners regressed to an almost animal level. 
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The second problem is how to penetrate the obfuscating fog of hospital 
vagueness and evasiveness to obtain intelligible guidance on the first set of 
problems.43
Pringle’s letter was a heartfelt plea of a man unable to know what action 
to take next. In similarity to the narrative that E.A. presents, Pringle’s 
letter identified that positive diagnosis of schizophrenia took over two 
years. Pringle describes this as a time where his family were unable to 
receive any ‘practical sense out of anybody.’ Practicalities were certainly 
an issue of constant worry and concern for Pringle, who wrote of his 
frustration at not being able to find any suitable answers ‘on almost 
any specific point on which advice was desperately needed.’44 The let-
ter observes the frustration in the lack of communication, but predom-
inantly lack of advice available to family members or caregivers who 
found themselves suddenly in an impossible situation, with a moral duty 
to provide care, but a lack of communication from the medical author-
ities, upon whom they were reliant for information and support to 
uphold this responsibility. Again feelings of isolation were dominant in 
this narrative of caregiving, and similarly to the narrative put forward by 
E.A., Pringle’s letter suggested the segregation that he felt as more peo-
ple ‘gave up’ on his son and his son’s condition.
Schizophrenics tend to leave behind them a trail of people who righteously 
or despairingly, feel they have “done as much as we can” and it should be 
somebody else’s turn. I have quite a collection of sympathetic letters “hop-
ing your son’s condition will soon improve” while regretfully saying “no” 
to some specific request.45
By comparing the schizophrenic patient to other classes of the disabled, 
Pringle suggested that they and, therefore by association, the family or 
caregivers ‘excite none of the sympathy which surrounds other classes of 
the disabled.’46 In total, the letter incited more than four hundred replies 
from people who were touched and moved by his words, feeling them-
selves in similar situations. In reference to the replies that he received, 
Pringle stated that he ‘became involved in a remarkable volume of corre-
spondence which opened my eyes to the sense of isolation and hopeless-
ness to which many families up and down the country [were] living.’47 
As a result of this correspondence, the idea was formulated to look into 
the option of setting up a ‘small group or society, primarily of relatives 
and other non-medical people, specifically devoted to schizophrenia, 
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with the aim of helping families to cope with the manifold problems of 
the condition.’48 The letters clearly echoed the emotions felt by E.A. and 
Pringle.49
Whilst some of the letters acknowledged that parents and relatives 
had approached existing mental health charities such as the N.A.M.H 
for help, often authors felt alone and wanted something practical to 
be achieved. As early as 20 July 1970, Pringle wrote to Christopher 
Mayhew, N.A.M.H’s Chair and serving Labour MP at the House of 
Commons to ask for his thoughts and advice about the proposed pres-
sure group. Setting out his desires and explanation for the necessity 
of such a group, Pringle observed, ‘I do not believe that the kind of 
group that I have in mind would in any way duplicate the work which 
the N.A.M.H is already doing, still less cut across it.’50 In a competi-
tive world of the charitable sector, gaining approval from one of the big-
gest ‘rival’ associations was an important first step. This also suggests 
that the merger of the original charities who amalgamated to form the 
N.A.M.H had failed in its ability to remain personal.51 In his private 
collection, Pringle meticulously kept the notes of the families who had 
originally contacted him, with any information that these individuals had 
supplied about their attempts to elicit help from local authorities or char-
itable bodies. Interestingly, noted under one of these families is the line, 
‘asked N.A.M.H if they would arrange a meeting for relatives, but they 
would not.’52 On the 22 July 1970, Pringle wrote to another M.P. and 
Chairman of the Association of Psychiatric Work (APSW), Mary Lane, 
again asking for advice, this time referring to his endeavours at trying 
to get a ‘self-help group started.’53 Clearly, the desire to start a self-help 
group came from the feelings of the lack of help available elsewhere, 
even from existing mental health charitable bodies.
feeLings of suPPort
One of the many people who saw the letter in The Times and felt strongly 
enough to answer was E.A. Her brother, P.A., was living at home at the 
time, but had been diagnosed for many years. In answer to the question, 
‘how did you get involved in Rethink?’ E.A. answered:
Well, it was about 8 years after P.A. had to go into hospital… I saw a let-
ter, in The Times, and it was from a Mr Pringle. It was outlining the crises 
going on in mental health and his experiences […] When I saw this letter, 
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it so resonated with often how we were feeling and how it could be also 
with other people that I wrote to the PO Box number which they gave 
us. Mr and Mrs Pringle invited me to go over there one evening, which 
I did and they were very nice. And we had a discussion about it and we 
decided that although it was difficult to get help from the authorities, it 
was side-lined, in our opinion, we would make an effort ourselves to form 
a group- a pressure group. And at first we called it the Schizophrenia 
Action Committee.54
Explaining the growth of the support group in its early stages, 
E.A. continued:
By the second meeting we decided that… it would not in fact be done 
in five minutes so we changed the name to the [National] Schizophrenia 
Fellowship, but we still had the same aims. So that is what we did- I still 
have my first membership card- and from that meeting other things fol-
lowed and the word got around and we managed to do meetings in 
either one of the houses. There were quite a few people who had relatives 
affected like us, and we grew and grew.55
The first exploratory meeting was held on 25 July 1970 at the Wellcome 
Building on Euston Road.56 Pringle chaired the meeting, and it was 
decided that steps should be taken, primarily through advertising, to find 
out how many ‘relatives of schizophrenics and others interested would 
be prepared to join a Schizophrenia Society, if formed.’57 Interestingly, 
whilst the meeting unanimously decided that it wanted its membership 
to be ‘as far reaching as possible,’ from the very beginning, this was a 
society for relatives, rather than specifically for those suffering from 
schizophrenia themselves.58 It was stated that the ‘prime objectives of a 
schizophrenia society would be to bring help and support to relatives of 
schizophrenics and to improve public provision, and to enhance knowl-
edge.’59 Indeed, one of their main original aims, in addition to lobbying 
the government for change, was to ‘run a counselling service for rela-
tives.’60 It was even questioned in the first meeting whether membership 
of the society should be solely limited to close relatives and parents of 
schizophrenics. This suggestion was not taken up; it was decided instead 
in favour of allowing mental health specialists and others with a specialist 
interest to partake in membership.61 Nevertheless, despite the inclusion 
of specialists, it is clear that relatives were the primary membership and 
the real reason for the establishment of the society.
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The idea that the Fellowship was able to bring relatives and caregivers 
together was amongst its key success. Together, it was felt that they were 
able to look after each other and beat the stigma of schizophrenia. This 
was amongst the main aim of the society when it was first established. It 
was felt that ‘since the feelings of loneliness by those coping with schizo-
phrenia may sometimes be helped by meeting and talking to others who 
are, or who have been, in the same case, it might be possible to arrange 
local or area meetings.’62 By October 1975, these local meetings were 
in successful operation. It was noted that these group meetings were 
spaces ‘in which problems could be discussed, and members provided 
with advice, support and mutual companionship.’63 In this way, during 
these meetings, the National Schizophrenia Fellowship allowed E.A. to 
open up and be able to talk to people in a safe and non-judgemental 
environment. Here, she was able to talk about her difficulties and about 
her brother, safe in the knowledge that here, her promise could remain 
unbroken.
When these meetings started up, you felt quite cheered up, you felt pos-
itive; it was something. You felt like you were doing something and that 
we would get there somehow and it was so nice to be able to open up to 
people instead of pussy-footing around all the time- I had got fed up with 
it and that was a very strong development eight years after P.A. was diag-
nosed in his condition. At last I had met other people in the same position 
and we didn’t judge each other or anything so that is a very strong thing 
that Rethink do- getting people together.64
On 6 October 1975, the NSF could claim that it had over 1000 mem-
bers, reaching nearly 1500 individuals.65 It was boasted that the 
Fellowship had members across the UK, in Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Republic. Talks were even being held to try to set up similar fellow-
ships in New Zealand, Japan and South Africa.66 By the Annual General 
Meeting of February 1976, there were sixty local NSF groups estab-
lished in local districts.67 The chairman stated his pride that already these 
groups’ ‘views and needs were been listened to and even sought after by 
staffs of the Health and Social Services. Individual members had found 
that they could offer each other help, advice and mutual companionship 
which they had often been without for many years.’68 One member was 
quoted as having stated ‘how marvellous’ the NSF was, claiming ‘I want 
to jump on my roof-top and shout out that I have schizophrenia in my 
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family after twenty years of isolation.’69 However, it was clear that this 
was just the beginning and they already had plans to grow their number 
of sixty support groups. Future plans were not only to increase the num-
ber, but also to increase the scope of the work of these local groups. The 
Annual Report identified that ‘the local groups were looking towards an 
intensification of self-help, befriending, sitting in, arranging holidays and 
so on…’70 E.A. explains;
From then, we had a donation from somebody, I don’t know if I should 
mention their name but they were very well respected in the science world 
and the banking world and they gave us about £3000 to set up an offi-
cial [head-quarters] - she herself was affected by a relative and that money 
helped us to set up an office in Surbiton at the time. So little by little it 
has grown. We set up support groups in various areas and then we tried to 
make it nationwide. And they seem to me to have done a good job.71
Members received a variety of benefits for their £2.50 subscription 
money. They were entitled to receive a regular newsletter, pamphlets 
and leaflets setting out practical guidance for looking after relatives with 
the disease. Families were also entitled to membership at a local group 
meeting. The Member’s Pamphlet explained that members would benefit 
from the ‘sense of belonging to a national society run by relatives for rel-
atives, whose sole purpose is to secure a better life for people with schiz-
ophrenia and their families.’72 In this way, the Fellowship was ardently set 
up as an organisation not solely for the benefit of the schizophrenic, but 
as a release valve and coping mechanism for the healthy-minded relative 
being pushed into an unhealthy life of anxiety and isolation by the illness.
better together
Despite being positive of her own experiences of the medical profes-
sionals, E.A. was exceptionally critical about any attempt to undercut 
funding and reduce services available for mental health work. Her mem-
bership of the National Schizophrenia Fellowship allowed her access to 
Service Review Meetings, and she was critical here of the mindset of 
reducing services to cut costs in the mental health budget.73
I was asked to go along, not because I was a medical person, but because 
a social services for Hammersmith Mental Health Occupation Therapist 
asked me to go along, as her sidekick I suppose you might call it, because 
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she said that I might be able to say things that she as an employee of the 
council might not be able to say. And I remember at one time I really was 
incensed because they said that various inspectors had been going around 
and they had seen nurses playing table tennis with a patient and they were 
regarding it as messing about- really(!)- They were not regarding this as 
therapy! So they were obviously thinking that nurses themselves were not 
on duty- they had not got the mind-set and I was worried. This was before 
the mental hospitals had closed, just as they were coming up for closure 
and I remember saying- to someone-they were trying to work out how 
they could have the minimum in the community- the minimum number of 
CPNs and when I questioned it they said “it’s all very well, but there isn’t 
the money in the NHS and we have got to keep in our budget and we just 
can’t afford to have CPNs playing noughts and crosses … we just cannot 
afford it.” And I said to them… “if you want successful community care 
for people who are mentally ill, you cannot afford not to… They must be 
there!” There was a long silence. Nobody said anymore. The meeting went 
on. I was never asked again to the service review but the Occupational 
Therapist said to me, “I am so glad that you said that- I couldn’t have said 
that… but you’re independent.”74
In other respects, the National Schizophrenia Fellowship was an impor-
tant body which lobbied the government to change the system. The 
Annual Reports document work carried out and early reports set the 
tone for encouraging change. The early publication, The Problem Before 
Us, set out the Fellowship’s claim for the deficiencies in caring for those 
with schizophrenia. The document listed a range of issues that needed 
addressing, such as inadequate spending on research, negative pub-
lic attitudes and stigma towards the illness, ignorance of mental illness 
amongst general practitioners and a basic unfamiliarity with committal 
procedures amongst general practitioners, amongst many.75 In turn, the 
ideas behind this work came from the problems identified in Pringle’s 
original letter, which was so powerful in terms of finding publicity in The 
Times. The early pressure group focused on trying to rectify some of the 
issues put forward in Pringle’s original letter, which highlighted the need 
for a ‘unified national policy’ when it came to trying to deal with the 
problem of schizophrenia. Much time and effort was put into the char-
ity’s efforts to arrange ‘small residential settlements’ where the schizo-
phrenic’s basic needs could be provided for. In turn, the benefits being 
fought for would have had a huge impact on the families and caregivers 
of individuals with schizophrenia. These ideas culminated in a report of 
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recommendations submitted to the Secretary of State, Barbara Castle, on 
the ‘Social Provision for Sufferers from Chronic Schizophrenia.’76
By the late 1970s, a host of different pamphlets and publications had 
been made available by the NSF. These were originally designed for 
members only; however, it soon became apparent that they could attract 
a ‘good deal of publicity.’ The brochure entitled Schizophrenia had 
been handed to the national press, and this had led to a huge demand 
from general practitioners and social workers.77 Further interviews in 
the national press led to publicity on the television, and information 
provided by the Fellowship was screened as part of a ‘Horizon’ docu-
mentary on BBC2 in March 1974. All of this publicity meant that the 
Fellowship was able to grow, both in terms of a pressure group, but also 
in their influence nationally as well as in individual families.
These pamphlets were designed very specifically to meet a perceived 
gap in the market for knowledge. Early in his endeavours to set up the 
Fellowship, Pringle wrote: ‘The bewilderment and loneliness of relatives 
trying to make sense of the appalling thing that hits them is being helped 
very little, if at all. The BMA [British Medical Association] and the 
N.A.M.H. have leaflets for relatives of a primarily soothing and not very 
adequate kind. The society are starting hopes to do better than this.’78 
Talking about the impact that Rethink has on her modern day life, E.A. 
identifies that the explanation of medical information is now one of the 
things she values the most.
What I value about in their journal, Your Voice, is all the information about 
new medications coming on, because they do help. So I very much enjoy 
reading about scientific developments and they are very good at that- fact-
sheets- and things like that… that is one of the things that I still value and 
think how they can help two of my local friends when I read these fact-
sheets. So that has a high priority with me.79
Whilst the pressure that the NSF was able to put on the government 
was not insubstantial in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this work was 
intensified during this period by a collection of other mental health char-
itable groups. The rebranded N.A.M.H., which had changed its name 
to MIND following a successful campaign in 1972, still had a domi-
nant position in lobbying the government for change. It is clear from 
the quote above, however, that the NSF played a special role in thinking 
specifically about schizophrenia. The factsheets and pamphlets that they 
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produced may have had a valuable role in increasing publicity and 
certainly found interest in the media at the time. However, again, it is 
clear that this information was the most valued by the society’s mem-
bership. The fact that Pringle wanted the leaflets to be more ‘adequate’ 
for relatives and caregivers than those available by the BMA and the 
N.A.M.H. is very telling.
ConCLusions
It is clear that to begin with, the NSF was established to respond to 
the loneliness, isolation and stigma felt by relatives and caregivers of 
those suffering from schizophrenia in the 1970s in Britain. E.A.’s story, 
Pringle’s letter and the correspondence that he received, published in 
Living with Schizophrenia: By the Relatives in 1974, all show a remarka-
bly similar story of individuals doing their best but suffering in relative 
isolation. Some people felt abandoned by family, some by friends and 
others by the NHS and medical staff themselves. The NSF was designed 
to bring these relatives and caregivers together and provide them with a 
voice. The Fellowship provided literature and pamphlets, explaining the 
illness, lobbied the government to provide change and worked with the 
media to try to dispel the myths and stigma surrounding schizophrenia. 
However, despite this work, the Fellowship itself remained one of the 
most important things, giving families and caregivers a voice and offering 
the comforting familiarity of friends who have had similar experiences. 
Advice was both scientific—in terms of the factsheets—but also based on 
human experience.
This supportive message of self-help was interconnected with every 
ambition of the Fellowship, including its very name. The aims of the 
Fellowship were cyclical; improving the life of the family member and 
caregiver and offering them information, advice and support would 
improve the life of the schizophrenic person and thereby improve the 
lives of their caregivers. To finish with the eloquent words of E.A. ‘So 
whatever happens, Rethink is there and I feel that they will plug the gap. 
I will never forget the first time that I walked away from that first meet-
ing- the first big meeting with lots of people there- and I thought more 
sort of hopeful and more normal, instead of sort of cut off from people 
and so that…. can all help make a difference.’80 E.A.’s words are sug-
gestive; it would appear that becoming a member of the NSF could help 
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to support relatives struggling with stigma and act as a barrier to this 
stigma, by providing help, mutual friendship and strategies of coping for 
the ‘healthy mind’ of the non-schizophrenic caregiver.
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‘(Un)healthy Minds’ and Visual  
and Tactile Arts, c.1900–1950
Imogen Wiltshire
introduCtion
During the first half of the twentieth century, there were vast changes 
in psychological models of the mind, new psychotherapies and physio-
logical forms of treatment, advances in medical imaging and diagnostic 
technologies that probed the inner body, and a host of new allied health 
professions. The visual arts, including painting, drawing, craft, prints, 
sculpture, architecture, graphic design and photography, in Western 
Europe and the USA were intermeshed with methods of healing, and 
the concepts of the body and mind on which they were predicated, in 
manifold ways. Modernist architects and designers were commissioned to 
produce sanatoria and psychiatric institutions in line with shifting ideas 
about therapeutic environments. Interwar preoccupations with physical 
fitness and mental hygiene, which posited the holistic ideal of a healthy 
mind in a healthy body, were portrayed in and cultivated by visual rep-
resentations of athletic bodies and sport. Art was increasingly conceptu-
alised in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as expressing 
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subjective experiences, based on growing notions of psychological interi-
ority and the self held within. There was a developing interest in explor-
ing the psychologically ameliorative effects of viewing art: laboratories 
tested the psychophysical responses elicited in participants by colour and 
form, while there was a growing articulation of the escapist function of 
visual cultural forms, especially during and after the First World War. 
Meanwhile visual and tactile art-making practices were instrumental-
ised as a means of therapy in a range of healthcare contexts in art, med-
ical, pedagogic and psychiatric institutions in the early to mid-twentieth 
century.
In the context of this volume’s objective to probe the plurality of 
domains in which mental-health care operated, this chapter explores 
the function of art in shaping the treatments and cultural perceptions 
of mental illness both within and outside psychiatric institutions con-
ventionally associated with defining and maintaining mental health at 
this time. Art was understood to contribute to sustaining psychological 
health and to constitute a form of healing in a multitude of ways but 
was also an arena in which professional artists critically engaged with the 
practices and concepts of psychotherapeutic regimes. Indeed, existing art 
historical accounts that examine modern art’s intersection with mental 
health have primarily focused on how psychoanalysis and psychiatry in 
particular provided a means of inspiration and subversion for canonical 
modern artists. In fin-de-siècle Vienna, where modernist art practices, 
mental illness and psychiatric treatments overlapped in distinctive ways, 
as art historian Gemma Blackshaw has shown, artist Egon Schiele, for 
example, was informed by pathological anatomy approaches to psychi-
atry, appropriating diseased bodies in his work as an avant-garde strat-
egy.1 Certainly, while the focus of this book is the multitude of ways in 
which mental health was assessed, created and maintained, some modern 
artists actively resisted the rationality associated with the ‘healthy mind’. 
As is well documented in art history, a core objective of Surrealism, ini-
tiated in Paris in 1924, was to evince the irrationality and taboo of the 
repressed unconscious. Some Surrealists rejected psychiatry, celebrated 
nineteenth-century conceptions of hysteria and developed representa-
tional methods designed to invoke the subversive aspects of the psyche, 
informed by psychoanalysis.2 It is precisely art’s capacity to examine, 
transgress and critique which means that artists were not only informed 
by approaches to mental health and the perceived experiences of illness 
but also challenged and even exploited them. Examining mental health 
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through the lens of art brings to the fore issues of power and agency 
centred especially on who delineates what constitutes the contingent 
concept of a ‘healthy mind’, which voices are emphasised in histori-
cal narratives and how objects pertaining to treatment, including works 
made therapeutically, are handled by therapists and historians.
This chapter aims to offer a broad survey that both provides new 
research on therapeutic uses of art and synthesises for the first time 
wide-ranging forms of existing literature on modern art and psycholog-
ical functions in order to map multifarious and complex intersections 
between art practices, mental illness and mental health. The investigation 
concentrates, with a transnational lens, on three key thematic areas: first, 
how artwork by professional artists was understood to induce beneficial 
psychological effects in viewers; second, the celebration and appropria-
tion by modern artists of mental illness to avant-garde ends; finally, the 
multifaceted ways in which art-making practices were used in the fields 
of occupational therapy and, later in the same century, art therapy. This 
chapter consequently takes a comparatively broad view of art: my con-
cern is not only with paintings and drawings by modern artists, but also 
with experiential and ephemeral art and craft practices in mental-health 
care contexts. The ideas, practices and applications of art that take place 
outside art institutions generally feature less in art historical enquiry, and 
extending the boundaries accordingly beyond professional artists, muse-
ums and exhibitions allows both a broader and more nuanced interroga-
tion of this subject.
One of the most pervasive fascinations on the topic of modern art and 
mental illness is the trope of the psychologically tormented artist, exem-
plified by the prevalent mythologising in scholarship and in popular cul-
ture of Vincent van Gogh’s life and artwork in terms of self-mutilation 
and suicide.3 The culturally constructed myth of the mad and suffering 
artist whose anguish is reflected in his work (I use the pronoun deliber-
ately), a narrative critiqued by feminist art historians in particular, derives 
from early nineteenth-century Romantic notions of the artist as a tor-
tured genius who operates outside of society.4 It is neither the concern 
of this chapter to examine the relationships between creativity and mad-
ness nor to analyse canonical modern art psychobiographically based on 
evidence or speculation about an artist’s mental state. Rather, it looks to 
elucidate historical relationships between art and mental-health care, one 
configuration of which includes how modern artists and art critics con-
sciously and deliberately engaged with and drew on psychotherapies.
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Viewing art, PsyChoLogiCaL heaLth  
and the restoratiVe funCtion of CoLour and forM
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw an unprece-
dented interest in the psychologically stimulating and restorative effects 
that the visual arts could have on viewers. Pre-Freudian psychologi-
cal research in France in the mid- to late nineteenth century posited 
the mind as a dynamic mental chamber susceptible to visual stimula-
tion which informed the production and reception of art, architecture 
and design. Fin-de-siècle art nouveau, characterised often by curvilinear 
forms, was conceptualised in light of this psychologie nouvelle as inciting 
psychological experiences through visual means.5 Concurrently, some 
categories of fine art by professional artists were understood to have a 
mentally restorative function, specifically in some cases as an antidote to 
the modern condition of neurasthenia, defined as nervous exhaustion 
that resulted from urban existence. In 1908, modern artist Henri Matisse 
imagined his landscape paintings as having a mentally calming effect on 
the viewer:
What I dream of is an art of balance, of purity and serenity, devoid of trou-
bling or depressing subject matter, an art which could be for every mental 
worker, for the businessman as well as the man of letters, for example, a 
soothing, calming influence on the mind, something like a good armchair 
which provides relaxation from physical fatigue.6
Compared to the later explicitly provocative forms of early twentieth- 
century modern art, such as the politically driven facets of Dada, 
launched in Zürich in 1916 and foregrounding chaos and fragmenta-
tion to articulate the upheaval and destruction of the First World War, 
Matisse proposed a form of art that was psychologically comforting, 
especially through its subject matter. Two of his most well-known art-
works from this time, The Joy of Life (1905–06) and Blue Nude (Souvenir 
of Biskra) (1907), represented an imagined ideal Arcadia of a harmo-
nious landscape with reclining and frolicking female nudes (a subject 
far from unusual in art), deliberately evading signs of modernity. The 
envisaged beneficiary of Matisse’s art was, as art historian Joyce Henri 
Robinson notes, the bourgeois man whose nerves have been overstim-
ulated by the modern city and mental work.7 The delineation of neu-
rasthenia was gendered: men could suffer from mental fatigue whereas 
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women, considered to be more susceptible to overstimulation in the first 
place, were advised to avoid the city and remain in the domestic inte-
rior to protect their nervous systems.8 The genre of pastoral landscape 
painting was considered an ideal means in bourgeois thought to calm the 
fatigued man whose nerves had been agitated, exemplified further by the 
artwork of artist Pierre Puvis de Chavannes such as Pleasant Land (1882) 
(Fig. 10.1). A less formally innovative artist than Matisse, Puvis’ compar-
atively conservative landscapes, which also depicted female nudes in an 
imagined Arcadia, were similarly attributed contemporarily, as Robinson 
shows, with a mentally restorative function: a catalogue essay for a solo 
exhibition in 1887 declared that, on viewing the artwork, ‘you are in 
peace and calm; what a sensation of well-being!’.9 This conceptualisation 
of painting as a vehicle for psychological tranquillity against the effects of 
modernity, with which Matisse aligned himself, placed emphasis on the 
benign psychological effects of art not in a therapeutic or clinical context 
but as a means of maintaining the everyday mental health of middle-class 
art audiences. This constitutes a specific historical instance of how view-
ing art was understood to play a role in mental well-being, an idea 
that became increasingly prevalent throughout the twentieth century. 
Fig. 10.1 Pleasant Land, 1882, Pierre Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898). Oil 
on canvas, 25.7 × 47.6 cm. Photo Credit: Yale University Art Gallery. Public 
domain
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Similarly, in Britain during the First World War, conservative pastoral 
landscapes in particular were conceived as a means of psychological res-
toration. As James Fox demonstrates, discussions of the idyllic ‘peace 
pictures’ of landscape paintings by artists including Benjamin Williams 
Leader, George Clausen and Tom Mostyn were inflected with concerns 
pertaining to mental well-being, as ‘antidotes’ to war that could ‘purge’, 
‘cleanse’, ‘heal’ and ‘soothe’ audiences.10 Although it is difficult to ascer-
tain that viewers did respond to the artworks in this way, this language 
reveals nonetheless how conceptualisations of art and art criticism dis-
courses were marked increasingly by an interest in psychological health.
There was a fascination in the early 1900s in the effects elicited not 
only by a painting’s subject matter but also by its intrinsic formal prop-
erties. The psychophysiological effects that abstract qualities of colour, 
line and shape could have on viewers was the subject of research cen-
tred in Germany in particular. Experimental laboratories, informed 
by nineteenth-century theories of perception, tested the neuromus-
cular response of individuals to the visual stimuli of form and colour.11 
Formal properties were isolated for their potential to have an imme-
diate and unmediated emotional effect on a person. In this context, 
‘simple lines and colours’ came to be perceived as having ‘therapeutic 
powers’.12 The premise that colour especially could have a beneficial 
impact on human bodily functions had a precedent in nineteenth-cen-
tury chromotherapy (or light therapy) in which visible, coloured light 
was projected onto individuals. As Tanya Sheehan has shown, a pioneer 
of chromotherapy was Augustus Pleasonton who developed blue-light 
therapy in Philadelphia during the 1870s.13 Pleasonton posited that blue 
light, achieved by filtering light through panes of blue glass, had a reju-
venating power when absorbed by the cells of the body. He prescribed 
sunbathing under blue glass for a range of ailments including ‘spinal 
meningitis’, ‘nervous debility’ and ‘rheumatic affections of all kinds’.14 
Working under Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris 
in the late 1800s, where hysteria was intensively delineated and studied 
in relation to women, psychologist Charles Féré also developed a form 
of light therapy, glazing asylum cells with blue or violet glass in order 
to produce calming and curative effects.15 While chromotherapy con-
cerned the impact of coloured light being sensed directly by the surface 
of the skin, the work of Howard Kemp Prosser in medical institutions in 
Britain with First World War casualties centred on the therapeutic poten-
tial of inhabiting spaces decorated by particular colours. Emphasising 
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that surroundings were integral to recovery, Prosser argued that colour 
itself was ‘beneficial to men whose nerves have become unstrung’.16 In 
line with his convictions, he organised the McCaul Ward at St John’s 
Hospital in London and a section of the Maudsley Neurological Clearing 
Hospital according to his constructed colour schemes. As reported in 
The British Journal of Nursing, the wards at Maudsley had ‘soft firma-
ment blue’ ceilings, ‘apple-blossom pink’ walls with ‘anemone mauve 
curtains, introducing the note of concentration’ and ‘Spring-green 
quilts, the bedsteads being painted the same colour’.17 Contemporary 
testimonies to the apparent efficacy of Prosser’s ‘colour medicine’, to 
be approached by historians with caution, included that ‘a patient with 
neurasthenia was cured of headaches by living in the purple room, that 
a man with hysteria recovered in the yellow room, and that crime was 
noticeably less in Prosser’s coloured wards than any others’.18
The perceived psychophysiological effects of painting’s formal prop-
erties became central to strands of modern art and aesthetic theory, most 
notably in the work of artist Wassily Kandinsky, widely considered a pio-
neer of abstract art. Kandinsky noted in his influential treatise, On the 
Spiritual in Art (Über das Geistige in der Kunst) (1912), that: ‘anyone 
who has heard of colour therapy knows that coloured light can have a 
particular effect upon the entire body’.19 He described how the exami-
nation of colour for ‘different nervous disorders’ had revealed that red 
light has ‘enlivening and stimulating effect upon the heart’ whereas blue 
could ‘lead to temporary paralysis’. Extending similar ideas to mod-
ern art, he underscored the potential of pure colour to elicit sensory 
responses in the viewer. Informed by contemporary physiological psy-
chology research, Kandinsky considered the experience of art to begin 
corporeally: painting first stimulated a physical vibration in the view-
er’s body that in turn induced a deeper spiritual vibration in the soul.20 
This response was contingent, he argued, on two factors: that the artist 
uses colour and form as pure composition, and, secondly, that viewers 
cease looking for narrative in artworks.21 This was the context in which 
Kandinsky developed abstraction that extracted painting’s intrinsic for-
mal properties rather than represented recognisable figurative subject 
matter. His semi-abstract painting Cossacks (1910–11) (Fig. 10.2), for 
example, contains some identifiable elements, including sharp mountain 
forms, three cavalrymen in the right foreground, a rainbow and birds, 
but the compositional elements are comprised of simplified colours and 
shapes, and the overall perspective is flattened. Kandinsky’s ideas are best 
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placed within a history of modernist avant-garde interrogation of the 
properties and psychological effects of art, as opposed to its therapeu-
tic application, but reveal nonetheless cross-field intersections of thought 
centred on art’s imagined effects on viewers.
While Kandinsky’s work constituted a modernist exploration that 
extended the boundaries of art by isolating and foregrounding its formal 
properties, aesthetic theories later in the twentieth century assumed and 
sought to explain the enduring psychological appeal of form in art. The 
function of creative processes and nature of aesthetic experience were 
central concerns in psychoanalysis-based art theory in mid-twentieth- 
century Britain, many aspects of which were dominated by Melanie 
Klein’s object-relations theory. Art critic Adrian Stokes theorised the 
attraction of form in painting psychoanalytically using Klein’s theoret-
ical base of the two phases that constituted the formation of the ego: 
the paranoid-schizoid position, dominated by ‘part objects’, and the 
Fig. 10.2 Cossacks, 1910–11, Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944). Oil on canvas, 
94.6 × 130.2 cm. Presented by Mrs Hazel McKinley 1938. Photo Credit: ©Tate, 
London 2019. All rights reserved
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subsequent depressive position characterised by ego integration and a 
desire for reparation. Attempting to account for the appeal of art gal-
leries, Stokes argued that, irrespective of the subject matter, form in 
painting was a mode of repairing the inner world and was analogous to 
psychic integration.22 Contending that art assisted with the drive towards 
psychic reparation, he asserted that visual aesthetic experience was inher-
ently beneficial. Stokes assumed a universal pleasure and psychologi-
cal satisfaction in the viewing of art, and he accounted for this abiding 
mental appeal theoretically using Kleinian psychoanalytic thought. 
Considered together, these divergent instances demonstrate the multi-
faceted interest in the effects of viewing art in relation to psychological 
health, indicating both the expanded function of art and the extended 
reach of mental-health care discourses at this time.
Modern art, Madness and aPProPriating  
MentaL iLLness
Concurrent to early to mid-twentieth-century explorations of the benign 
psychological effects of painting on viewers, there was an avant-garde 
resistance to the rationality connected with the notion of a ‘healthy 
mind’. The most prominent and sustained modernist interrogation 
of the irrational and illogical components of the psyche was offered by 
Surrealism, a movement launched in Paris in 1924, the year in which 
André Breton published the first ‘Manifesto of Surrealism’. Embracing 
a diverse set of artistic practices, Surrealist artists were concerned with 
mental investigation, rejected intellectual and political conventions 
and criticised capitalist and nationalist powers. Breton had become 
acquainted with Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theories of the uncon-
scious which had been translated into French in the 1920s. Inspired 
by the Freudian model of the mind as comprising repressed fantasies, 
anxieties, urges and desires, artists including Max Ernst, Salvador Dalí, 
Joan Miró, André Masson and Hans Bellmer consciously sought out 
and probed the ‘darker’ and at times sinister elements of the psyche and 
developed representational strategies designed to evince the illogical, the 
taboo, the erotic and the subversive elements of the mind. Attempting 
to translate the unconscious into visual representation and to foreground 
chance encounter, Masson and Miró, for example, engaged in automatic 
drawing and painting whereby the hand was allowed to move freely 
without conscious control, notwithstanding the deliberate additions 
that each artist made to their work afterwards. The Surrealists’ interest 
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in dreams as a manifestation of repressed desires is exemplified by Dalí’s 
highly contrived and carefully composed dreamscape paintings, includ-
ing one of his most well-known works, The Persistence of Memory (1931) 
with his now familiar melting clocks. Ironically perhaps, given that fac-
ets of early Surrealism were concerned with rejecting forms of institu-
tional power, Dalí was later commissioned in 1958 by Carter-Wallace, 
a US drug manufacturer, to create a series of paintings to advertise the 
first ‘tranquiliser’, a sedative called Miltown (Meprobamate pharmaceuti-
cally). The artist subsequently designed an image, Crisalida (1958), used 
in a brochure that visualised the transition from psychological agitation 
to tranquillity effected by the drug. That the rise of the pharmaceuti-
cal companies in the mid-twentieth century generated such commercial 
opportunities for artists attests further to the wide-ranging relationships 
between the visual arts and mainstream mental-health systems.
As art historians have well documented, in line with interwar 
Surrealism’s revolutionary objectives, psychic failure was perceived 
and seized upon by artists and writers as a positive subversion of estab-
lished norms and social confines.23 Deployed as an avant-garde strat-
egy, the appropriation and celebration of mental illness took a number 
of forms: foregrounding mental illness in texts and artworks, adopting 
the persona of the ‘madman’, valorising the ‘art of the insane’ and crit-
icising the institution of psychiatry. An historical illness that captured 
the Surrealist imagination was nineteenth-century hysteria, a category 
which was in disrepute by the 1920s but was revived by the Surrealists 
as a transgressive mechanism. As analysed by Briony Fer, the ‘fiftieth 
anniversary of hysteria’ was commemorated in 1928 in the journal La 
Révolution Surréaliste which reproduced photographs of a woman, 
deemed hysterical by Charcot at the Salpêtrière, apparently in con-
vulsion.24 In the accompanying text, Breton and poet Louis Aragon 
placed emphasis on what they saw as hysteria’s  insightful, creative 
and subversive potential: ‘hysteria is by no means a pathological symp-
tom and can in every way be considered a supreme form of expres-
sion’.25 The Surrealists also constructed, foregrounded and identified 
with the ‘madman’ as someone marginalised by society and possessing 
special insights. Surrealist Antonin Artaud described this figure as ‘a 
man whom society did not want to hear and whom it wanted to pre-
vent from uttering certain intolerable truths’.26 Breton, who was por-
trayed in a straightjacket in an etching by Max Ernst in 1923, aligning 
poet with patient, declared in the first Surrealist manifesto: ‘I could 
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spend my whole life prying loose the secrets of the insane’.27 The premise 
that a form of truth was located in insanity and that the madman func-
tioned as a means to view society anew was central to a sonnet enti-
tled ‘Schizophrenia’ by the Dadaist and expressionist Hugo Ball. He 
located himself in the poem as the patient, deploying, as Sander Gilman 
argues, the identity of the mad poet as an ‘exotic’ device to critique 
society.28 This invocation of the madman was not exclusive to Dada 
and Surrealism: the Futurists, who operated in Italy before the First 
World War, rejected tradition and advocated the speed and machines of 
modernity as subjects in art, claimed in the collective ‘Futurist Painting: 
Technical Manifesto’ (1910): ‘the name of “madman” with which it 
is attempted to gag all innovators should be looked upon as a title of 
honour’.29 By emphasising the voices of the ‘mad’ and highlighting the 
peripheral position of the mentally ill in society, modern artists, to some 
extent, valorised the perspectives of those inside psychiatric institutions. 
This identification and privileging was, however, primarily a self-serving 
avant-garde strategy in which the suffering experienced by the mentally 
ill was seemingly to a large extent overlooked.
The Surrealist movement’s investment in mental illness as a cre-
ative and subversive means was also constituted through celebrat-
ing, collecting and exhibiting the ‘art of the insane.’ This aesthetic 
category comprised drawings and paintings by patients in asylums 
who had been given art materials usually for diversional, as opposed 
to therapeutic, purposes; Josef Karl Rädler, for example, a patient at 
Mauer-Öhling psychiatric hospital near Vienna from 1905 until his 
death in 1917, was provided with materials to keep ‘him out of trou-
ble’.30 The largest and most influential collection of the ‘art of the 
insane’ was assembled by art historian and psychiatrist Hans Prinzhorn 
who, in 1919, began to amass objects from asylums across Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland and Austria. Prinzhorn subsequently published his 
book Bildnerei der Geisteskranken (Artistry of the Mentally Ill) (1922) 
which categorised and analysed works in the collection.31 Prinzhorn 
considered the works to occupy an ambiguous position between art 
and diagnostic material: ‘Bildnerei’ connoted ‘picture-making’ rather 
than art (Kunst) but he also argued that, once separated from the 
maker or their diagnosis, an object could not be understood to reflect 
a specific mental illness. Considered at the time of their production 
largely as institutional ephemera, the redefinition of this work as ‘art’ 
was the result of interwar exhibitions and collecting practices that 
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generated a market for such objects.32 Modernist artists including Paul 
Klee, Max Ernst and Alfred Kubin saw the Prinzhorn collection, read his 
text, collected and displayed similar objects and, in some cases, copied 
the paintings and drawings stylistically.33 The ‘art of the insane’ was cel-
ebrated as supposedly visionary and unfettered by academic conventions, 
seen to constitute free, impulsive and spontaneous acts of creativity. This 
assessment coincided with early twentieth-century modernist re-evalua-
tions of the non-western ‘primitive’ and of artwork by children as sim-
ilarly possessing special insight and creative impulse. This constituted a 
rejection and reappraisal of nineteenth-century theories of degeneracy 
which had viewed the mentally ill, the ‘primitive’ and children as insuffi-
ciently developed and, consequently, had considered their drawings and 
paintings as symptomatic of deviation. One of the earliest collections 
of works by the ‘insane’ was assembled by psychiatrist and anthropol-
ogist Cesare Lombroso in the late nineteenth century who viewed the 
objects primarily as visual evidence of mental pathology.34 In contrast, 
Prinzhorn’s collection, to some extent, as Catherine de Zegher sug-
gests, ‘advocated for the aesthetic legitimacy of the works drawn by psy-
chotic individuals who were marginalised by society’.35 The collection 
placed artistic and, ultimately, economic value on the work of psychiat-
ric patients. This appropriation nonetheless idealised the experience of 
mental illness, as Gilman eloquently stresses: ‘Prinzhorn’s patients were 
ill. They were not shamans speaking an unknown tongue, nor were they 
Romantic artists expressing through their art conscious disapproval of 
modern society. These patients were ill, and their artistic productions 
reflected the pain and anguish caused by that illness. This fact was often 
overlooked by earlier commentators on the art of the mentally ill as well 
as by those writers who used the persona of the mad as their alter ego’.36 
The perception, moreover, of the ‘art of the insane’ as ‘expressionist’, 
‘visionary’ and ‘transgressive’, on which its popularity rested, was in the 
first place largely a fiction constructed for avant-garde ends.37
Interwar and mid-twentieth-century exhibitions on Surrealism jux-
taposed examples of modern art with the ‘art of the insane’ in order 
to suggest positive affinities between the two.38 In November 1937, 
Surrealist Objects and Poems (London Gallery) displayed artworks by 
artists including Paul Nash, Julian Trevelyan and Eileen Agar alongside 
what were problematically described in the catalogue as ‘objects by a 
schizophrenic lunatic’.39 A seminal exhibition staged at the Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA, New York), Fantastic Art, Dada and Surrealism 
(1936–1937), comprising almost seven hundred objects, similarly 
10 ‘(UN)HEALTHY MINDS’ AND VISUAL AND TACTILE ARTS, C.1900–1950  223
included works simply categorised as ‘psychopathic watercolours and 
drawings’. The inclusion in Fantastic Art of both ‘the art of children 
and the insane’ as ‘comparative material’ alongside ‘works by mature 
and normal artists’ was explicated by curator Alfred Barr in the cata-
logue as follows: ‘children and psychopaths exist […] in a world of their 
own unattainable to the rest of us […] Surrealist artists try to achieve 
a comparable freedom of the creative imagination’.40 In other words, 
parallels were drawn between the creative insights achieved by modern 
artists and the inherently visionary and liberated perception of children 
and the mentally ill, who were positioned as occupying a place outside 
the parameters of ‘normal’. While this comparison was drawn to articu-
late the innovation of Surrealism and the exceptional creative insight of 
its artists, a clear opposition was concurrently set up, however, between 
the creative intentionality of named modern artists and the uncontrolled 
instinctive activity of the unnamed mentally ill. The Surrealists differed, 
claimed the text, ‘in one fundamental way’ because ‘they are perfectly 
conscious of the difference between the world of fantasy and the world 
of reality, whereas children and the insane are often unable to make this 
distinction’.41 This caveat indicates a fundamental problematic of the 
‘primitive’: while avant-garde modern artists were framed as operating 
intentionally, those viewed as ‘primitive’ were conceived as simply work-
ing instinctively and were consequently denied agency, authority and 
intentionality as makers.
In summary, the Surrealists drew attention to the marginalisation of 
psychiatric patients and questioned pathological definitions of abnormal-
ity, but this embrace of ‘insanity’ was primarily as a source of creative 
inspiration and a vehicle to criticise the confines of social and political 
structures, predicated on a mythologising and idealising of mental illness. 
At the same time, however, some Surrealists also condemned the insti-
tution of psychiatry in a way that is indicative of the capacity of the arts 
to produce and shape cultural meanings around mental-health care. 
An open letter to the directors of asylums published in La Révolution 
Surréaliste criticised psychiatry as a repressive, incarcerating and restrain-
ing institution: ‘the madhouse, under cover of science and justice, is 
comparable to a barracks, a prison, a penal colony’.42 The Surrealists 
were, according to art historian David Lomas, the ‘anti-psychiatry move-
ment of their day’.43 Although the artists romanticised mental illness, 
their criticisms of the psychiatric institution had aspects in common with 
the sustained attacks that took place in the 1960s levelled at the catego-
rising, silencing and controlling mechanisms of psychiatry.
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art and Craft-MaKing PraCtiCes as oCCuPationaL theraPy
Shifting attention away from canonical modern art and art institutions, 
the following discussion considers the formulation of art-making prac-
tices as a means of therapy in healthcare, rehabilitation and pedagogic 
contexts, a comparatively under-researched area in art history.44 The 
field of occupational therapy developed as an allied health profession in 
the early to mid-twentieth century in which patients were prescribed 
creative practices as therapy, such as weaving, embroidery, woodwork, 
leatherwork and print-making. Tactile and visual art forms were applied 
across medical specialities for both physiological and psychological pur-
poses. Occupational therapists advocated, however, holistic approaches 
to illness and treatment and, as such, undertaking arts and crafts was 
often considered to have a psychological purpose even when designated 
physiologically. As psychiatrist Alfred Solomon put it: ‘whether or not 
psychiatric orders are given, a physical therapy is psychotherapeutic in 
character’.45 In line with this, block-print fabric painting, according to 
an orthopaedic account from 1938, impacted on finger flexion and on 
pronation and supination of the forearm but also, psychologically, left 
‘little room’ for ‘personal broodings’.46 Creative practices were adapted 
for different needs: weaving in psychiatry, for example, could involve 
repetitious rhythmic movements using dull colours for a sedative effect, 
whereas interesting ‘pattern’ with ‘various shades of red and yellow’ 
could stimulate the participant.47 Occupational therapy was theorised in 
journals from different disciplinary directions by therapists, physicians, 
artists, pedagogues, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts and nurses, with its 
effects measured in a multitude of ways, including strengthening mus-
cles, increasing concentration and self-confidence and developing posi-
tive habit formation. Claims about the interest aroused in patients and 
their appetite for participation should, however, be approached with 
some caution. In the context of rehabilitation in the USA after the First 
World War, historian Ana Carden-Coyne has shown that although arti-
cles and images published by hospitals, voluntary organisations and 
the White House stressed harmonious relationships between suppos-
edly compliant disabled ex-servicemen and medical staff, some veterans 
resented rehabilitation and refused to participate in occupational ther-
apy.48 While institutional material is crucial for understanding how prac-
tices were perceived to operate, often undocumented in these records 
are the perspectives and experiences of participants themselves, including 
their possible resistance.
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Occupational therapy was first developed, as Virginia Quiroga explains 
in her survey history, within women-led reform initiatives in the USA 
during the 1910s when early pioneers advocated that supervised arts 
and crafts could be used to treat tuberculosis, arthritis and neurasthenia, 
as well as industrial injuries.49 The professionalisation and institutional-
isation of the field happened slightly later in Britain: Elizabeth Casson 
founded the first accredited training school, Dorset House, in Bristol 
in 1930. Prior to this, Gartnavel Royal Asylum in Glasgow was the 
first institution in Britain to open an occupational therapy department 
in 1923, offering at first ‘simple woodwork, basketry, cane chair mak-
ing, raffia and pine needlework, china painting, metalwork, rugmaking, 
embroidery and decorative colour craft work’.50 As the asylum’s occu-
pational therapy department grew, tasks were differentiated and patients 
were divided into distinct classes ‘according to mental condition and pre-
scribed occupation’.51 An advertisement for an occupational therapist at 
Gartnavel in the Lancet in 1924 asked for a ‘well-educated, intelligent, 
refined girl’.52 As this call suggests, the profession was considered to be 
one best suited to women, based on socially constructed and prescribed 
gender assumptions which attributed them with the qualities of obedi-
ence and self-sacrifice to support such adjunctive treatments. As historian 
Beth Linker notes, well into the twentieth century occupational thera-
pists, like nurses, maintained the ‘Victorian roots’ of their roles, based on 
nineteenth-century views that women were ‘the weaker yet more nurtur-
ing sex’.53 Indeed, the profession was still considered in the 1940s to be 
suited to a woman who was, according to one article, ideally: ‘sensitive 
to herself and to others, emotionally responsive […] of few words, of 
good judgment, and of a comfortable disposition’.54
Early occupational therapy in the 1910s was based on two core 
premises: that healing could arise through productive occupation and 
that art and craft practices were intrinsically restorative. In view of how 
mental-health care has been shaped by a multitude of fields, it is signif-
icant that these predicates were derived from education reform princi-
ples and the Arts and Crafts movement that originated in Britain in the 
1860s and 1870s. The Arts and Crafts movement was associated most 
prominently with designer, writer and activist William Morris and the-
orist and art critic John Ruskin, who both advocated a unity between 
labour and art, driven by concerns about the detrimental effects of cap-
italist industrial production. They argued that machine-made objects 
were impersonal and offered no pleasure to the maker or the user. 
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In contrast, handwork was restorative: pleasure in the process of making 
by hand would lead to pleasure not only in that object but also in other 
aspects of life. Accordingly, arts and crafts proponents promoted the 
revival of traditional handicrafts and hand-made decorative and applied 
arts, including tapestries, furniture, ornaments and furnishings. These 
ideas and practices were disseminated internationally by societies, guilds 
and workshops, including the Chicago Arts and Crafts Society in the 
US which was formed at social-reform settlement Hull House in 1897. 
Co-founded by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr in 1889, Hull House 
was a secular community that sought to improve the social, health and 
economic conditions of working-class areas of Chicago. At the centre of 
women-led reform, Hull House was a meeting point for organisations 
and social projects that shaped the development of occupational ther-
apy.55 Handicrafts were central to the educational programmes at Hull 
House as a means to withstand the tyranny of the machine and to revive 
work as a pleasurable process. Aiming to alleviate the alienation and 
tensions that workers were considered to experience, the Hull House 
Labour Museum enabled working-class women to engage in textile 
work, for example. Emphasis on the benefits of hand-making individu-
alised objects, on the importance of pleasure in work and on creativity 
as an essential component of wellness were subsequently central to the 
therapeutic application of arts and crafts.
As occupational therapy developed, its institutionalisation was contin-
gent on an alliance with mainstream medicine, an association that was 
not, however, entirely frictionless. A key symbol of the field’s status as 
a modern healthcare profession was that occupation was prescribed by 
physicians and psychiatrists, a process which located the arts and crafts 
at the junction of art and medicine, as both creative and therapeutic 
practice.56 The accredited training of therapists was divided between 
instruction in arts and crafts and, for example, anatomy, physiology, 
first aid and psychology. The position and perception of arts and crafts 
as instruments of treatment were not, though, entirely unequivocal in 
the 1930s and 1940s. One tension, as Ruth Ellen Levine notes, was that 
while scientific reductionist approaches to treatment increasingly divided 
medicine into specialisms, occupational therapists maintained a holis-
tic approach, underpinned by its Arts and Crafts and reform pedagogy 
origins.57 For some therapists, the perception of craft as frivolous and 
superfluous undermined occupational therapy’s claim to a modern scien-
tific paradigm. One way to articulate the success of occupational therapy, 
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especially in its infancy, had been to demonstrate a patient’s mastery of a 
craft and the artistic quality of the work they had produced. To this end, 
Gartnavel hospital reported in the mid-1920s on the ‘greater proficiency 
[…] attained’ by patients and the ‘aesthetic’ quality of the resultant 
objects.58 Foregrounding the aesthetic value of a craft object, however, 
risked undermining the therapeutic imperatives and medical legitimacy of 
the profession. In 1944, one occupational therapist described their desire 
to avoid being ‘damned once more with the “Arty-Crafty” label’.59 
Another therapist, Mary Atwater, argued that the purpose was ‘not to 
produce a good basket [or] rag rug […] but a cured patient’.60 She min-
imised the significance of the objects produced to emphasise the overar-
ching therapeutic objective of recovery. Eventually, the creative paradigm 
of occupational therapy was replaced in the 1960s by a functional basis 
concerned mostly with social assessments and activities of daily living.61 
With fewer patients treated as mental hospital in-patients and shorter 
hospital stays, occupational therapy was refocused in the second half of 
the twentieth century on discharge planning, domestic independence 
and community events rather than on creative practices.
art theraPy: Painting, exPression and agenCy
Another field, distinct from occupational therapy, in which visual art 
practices were applied to create and sustain healthy minds was art ther-
apy, a field which was developed in Britain and the USA during the 
1930s and 1940s and professionalised in the 1950s and 1960s.62 Unlike 
the broad remit of occupational therapy, art therapy focused on fine art: 
painting, drawing and, to a lesser extent, sculpture. Compared to craft 
practices that usually involved following defined procedures or copying 
established models, art therapy tended to comprise what was perceived 
to be a freer kind of painting, including the representation of imagined 
subjects. As a result, it was more closely associated with articulating 
an inner self. Informed in part by the Freudian wave of the 1920s and 
1930s that consolidated the idea of art as an articulation of the uncon-
scious, which was disseminated and popularised further by mainstream 
Surrealism as we saw above, early art therapy was based broadly on the 
notion of art as a means of self-expression. What was considered to con-
stitute ‘expression’ was not monolithic and varied between programmes, 
but early art therapists operated broadly on the premise that art allevi-
ated tensions by releasing internal psychological forces or traumatic 
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memories or acted as a means to communicate visually something that 
might not be articulated in words. The main purpose of art therapy, 
however, was not usually to generate images that could be read diagnos-
tically. Emphasis was directed on the psychologically healing effects of 
the art-making process, rather than what might be extrapolated subse-
quently from resultant images. This focus on the therapeutic as opposed 
to diagnostic potential of art differentiated art therapy from psychoan-
alytic approaches prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s in which works by 
patients were treated as case material, simplified reductively as illustra-
tions of psychoanalytic mechanisms.63 Concurrent psychopathologi-
cal approaches similarly examined how art could manifest mental illness 
symptoms visually. At Maudsley Hospital during the 1930s, Erich 
Guttmann and Walter Maclay characterised drawings by schizophrenic 
patients, arguing that psychiatric disorder could be read in the individual 
components and composition of an image.64 Unlike psychoanalytic and 
psychopathological positioning of patient-made visual material as mani-
festations of mental disorder, art therapy centred on the psychologically 
curative possibilities derived from making art.
Artist and educator Adrian Hill first coined the term ‘art therapy’ in 
Britain in 1942 to describe his work at King Edward VII Sanatorium 
in Midhurst. According to Hill’s own account, he offered initially ‘sim-
ple instruction in drawing and painting’ to members of the Navy, Army 
and Air Force ‘to whom the other crafts made no appeal’ which he 
expanded into a distinct practice categorised as art therapy.65 The field 
was also developed in psychiatric hospitals, military medical hospitals 
and therapeutic communities as well as in art schools. Unlike the pri-
marily diversional painting and drawing in asylums in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, art therapy posited art-making as a constitu-
tively healing process. Many early pioneers were artists and pedagogues, 
like Hill, whose approaches were driven by convictions that art-making 
and art-viewing were intrinsically salubrious activities, rather than pred-
icated on understanding of psychological mechanisms. The mentally 
healing function of art-making practices was often intertwined rhetori-
cally with notions of art as broadly reparative and restorative, especially 
in the context of the Second World War when creativity was endorsed as 
being socially vital as a symbol of individual freedom.66 The discourses of 
early art therapy often posited the nourishing and rejuvenating capacity 
of art. Arthur Segal, for example, another artist-pedagogue who pio-
neered art therapy in Britain in the late 1930s, claimed painting a ‘life-giving 
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source’ that ‘feeds and replenishes our individual selves with fresh 
energy’.67 An émigré from Nazi Germany, Segal explored how painting 
could be used therapeutically at his Painting School for Professionals 
and Non-Professionals which he opened in London in 1937 with his 
wife Ernestine and daughter Marianne Segal. What differentiated Segal’s 
approach practically at the time was that it centred not on painting imag-
inative subjects or articulating thoughts or emotions to cathartic effect 
but on representing external objects. He understood therapeutic effects 
to derive from methodical examination of the construction of three- 
dimensionality by light and shade. Students were led to paint naturalistic 
still-lifes and portraits by focusing on light, form and colour, an inter-
est evident in Segal’s own artworks after 1930, such as Apples in a Bowl 
(1938) (Fig. 10.3).
Psychotherapists referred patients to Segal’s school, and the institu-
tion worked closely with an organisation called Q Camps which estab-
lished an innovative therapeutic community camp called Hawkspur in 
rural Essex in 1936. Described as a self-governing educational com-
munity for young men aged between 16½ and 25 with ‘behaviour 
problems’ or who were ‘unable to fit into normal society’, Hawkspur 
pioneered ‘planned environment therapy’ which prefigured the post-war 
therapeutic community movement.68 The camp regime itself was the 
holistic instrument of rehabilitation with responsibilities shared between 
members to facilitate democratic decision-making, self-discipline and 
social integration. There were in addition individual ‘special treatments’ 
which most commonly constituted regular psychotherapy but which for 
some members included attending Segal’s painting classes. One young 
man went to the school regularly, the results of which were measured 
primarily in terms of his overall disposition, social adjustment and psy-
chological and behavioural changes. The painting lessons led, according 
to one report, to ‘marked improvement in all symptoms. [He] became 
articulate, intelligent in conversation, thoughtful, sensitive, industrious 
and much less unstable’.69
A critical site for power and agency in the history of art therapy is 
the interpretation and ownership of the objects made in this type of con-
text. Analysis of artworks by therapists can disempower the maker since 
it implies, as art historian David Lomas notes, that ‘without the inter-
vention of the expert’, the participant ‘knows not what they say’.70 Non-
directive and non-interventionist approaches, prevalent in the 1950s, 
argued that the role of therapists was to facilitate rather than to direct 
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practices and to interpret images. One of the most influential art thera-
pists working in this vein was Edward Adamson who was appointed ‘art 
master’ at a long-stay psychiatric hospital at Netherne in Surrey in 1946. 
Initially Adamson was employed to contribute to psychiatric research 
into art as a means of treatment and diagnosis, whereby the patient-made 
works were analysed by doctors in clinical meetings. Adamson himself, 
however, emphatically rejected psychopathological and diagnostic read-
ings of the works.71 Once the original experiment had ended in 1951, 
he had greater autonomy and continued to run his non-intervention-
ist art studio in the hospital’s grounds until 1981, allowing residents to 
paint freely.72 Having joined Netherne when lobotomies, electric shocks 
and insulin coma treatments were still widely used, Adamson conceived 
painting as individual and humane, operating in opposition to the hos-
pital’s institutional routine. His work constitutes a significant example 
Fig. 10.3 Apples in a Bowl, 1938, Arthur Segal (1875–1944). Oil on panel, 
39 × 50 cm. Guildhall Art Gallery, City of London Corporation. All rights 
reserved
10 ‘(UN)HEALTHY MINDS’ AND VISUAL AND TACTILE ARTS, C.1900–1950  231
of art practices being deployed to provide a critical mediation within an 
established mental-health treatment context.
The largest collection of art therapy works in Britain is the 
Adamson Collection, amassed at Netherne and now mostly housed 
at the Wellcome Collection (London). In line with the shift towards 
patient-orientated medical histories, artworks by patients, like those in 
the Adamson Collection, have been considered in recent years as valu-
able articulations of individual experiences that counter homogenis-
ing diagnosis-cure institutional histories of psychiatry.73 The capacity 
of these objects to represent the voices of their marginalised makers is, 
however, fundamentally contingent on how they are treated and dis-
played contemporarily. In terms of the proprietary status of the objects, 
the Adamson Collection Trust (ACT) delineates its role not as the owner 
but the ‘caretaker’, ‘rescuer’ or ‘guardian’ of the works.74 The decision 
has also been made, where possible, to name the makers of the art-
works, as was the case in the exhibition Mr A Moves in Mysterious Ways 
(Peltz gallery, Birkbeck, University of London, 2017). Co-curator Fiona 
Johnstone argued that naming was essential in order to foreground ‘indi-
viduals with their own personal histories’ rather than a ‘generic mass 
of psychiatric patients’, a position informed by Richard Sandell that in 
a museum context ‘anonymity can be construed as dehumanising’.75 A 
point of comparison to this approach is a psychiatric ‘objective scientific 
investigation’ of the Prinzhorn collection that took place in 2017 which 
used modern art in public collections as ‘control samples’. This ‘com-
puter-based analysis’ compared ‘schizophrenia’ artworks with ‘artworks 
by healthy artists’ and found that images in the Prinzhorn collection by 
six of the fourteen artists selected possessed ‘image properties that devi-
ate from the range of values obtained for the control artworks’.76 In this 
case, the possibility of reading the artworks as articulating the individ-
ual experiences and voices of those in asylums is curtailed by the study’s 
pathological premise which implied from the start that the objects could 
reveal symptomatic formal properties. Ethical questions about owner-
ship, naming and terminology are, crucially, not only historically embed-
ded in the production of the work but are by necessity present-day 
concerns about how material should be read, displayed, interpreted and 
labelled responsibly. This is a key instance, then, of how probing men-
tal-health care through the lens of its entanglement with art brings to the 
fore the importance of power and agency in histories of mental illness 
and treatment.
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ConCLusions
In conclusion, art was an arena in which practices, concepts and objects 
of mental-health care were not only circulated and shared but also inter-
rogated and produced in the first half of the twentieth century. During 
this period, there was a fascination in the actual and imagined psycholog-
ical effects of viewing and making art, conceptualisations of art became 
increasingly inflected at this time with issues pertaining to psychological 
health, while avant-garde artists seized on psychotherapeutic regimes as 
a means of creative inspiration and subversion. The discourses and prac-
tices of art not only supported but also challenged therapeutic routines: 
Adamson operated within a psychiatric institution but offered an influen-
tial intervention in its methods through his art studio. Surrealist artists 
mythologised and exploited mental illness, but aspects of their work can 
be understood to some extent as a cultural strand concerned, albeit prob-
lematically, with questioning psychiatric labels of ‘normal’. This chapter 
has also shown that art was a centre for defining and creating healthy 
minds in a multitude of ways. The historically contingent instances of 
how viewing art by professional artists was perceived to contribute to 
mental well-being resonate with the well-recognised idea today that the 
visual arts and museums can play a role in supporting psychological wel-
fare, particularly in the context of health being increasingly understood 
as a societal concern.77 The incorporation of divergent visual and tactile 
art-making practices into a range of different therapeutic systems and 
institutional contexts in the newly emergent fields of occupational ther-
apy and art therapy in the first half of the twentieth century attests to the 
varied positions of art within broadening mechanisms of prevention and 
remedy. Moreover, the fact that these therapeutic applications of art were 
driven by diverse ideas concerning the role of handicrafts, holistic con-
cepts of the body and the nourishing and socially regenerative function of 
creativity, as opposed to models of the mind, evidences how psycholog-
ical health has been directed by a broad set of discourses. Art informed 
and constituted methods of healing and shaped perceptions of mental 
illness both within the psychiatric institutions that are conventionally 
associated with treatment and outside in museum and pedagogic con-
texts that consequently formed part of the expanded terrain across which 
twentieth-century mental-health care operated.
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The Myth of Dream-Hacking and ‘Inner 
Space’ in Science Fiction, 1948–2010
Rob Mayo
introduCtion
Christopher Nolan’s 2010 science fiction action film Inception was a 
commercial blockbuster, making back over five times its $160 million 
budget at the box office. It is also an enduring pop-culture reference 
point, parodied in episodes of South Park and Rick and Morty, and has 
even been recognised as the source of a neologism, with the suffix ‘-cep-
tion’ becoming shorthand for the film’s multi-layered plot. It remains 
one of the most memorable action films of the century due to the unor-
thodox setting of its heist plotline in the minds and dreams of its charac-
ters rather than in the film’s real world, an aspect which has been more 
reverently carried by later television series such as Sherlock and Legion. As 
influential as it has become in contemporary culture, however, Inception 
is not the originator of this trope. Consciously or not, Nolan’s film 
enters into a thematic tradition which had existed in Anglophone science 
fiction for over half a century before 2010. The trope of rendering a per-
son’s mind as a physical ‘inner space’ or landscape which can be explored 
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and interacted with is therefore a kind of modern myth: creative works 
which adopt this theme reflect contemporary society’s ideas and beliefs 
about how the mind works, how it may become damaged and how it 
may be fixed.
Like many other cultural tropes—superheroes, vampires or zombies, 
for example—‘dream-hacking’ fluctuates in popularity. Although this 
timeline begins with a short story from 1948, a small canon of inner 
space fiction first appears in the 1960s, among the writers whose work 
formed the ‘new wave’ movement in science fiction literature. One such 
author, J. G. Ballard, popularised the term ‘inner space’ in his criti-
cal writings and interviews, defining it as ‘an imaginary realm in which 
on the one hand the outer world of reality, and on the other the inner 
world of the mind meet and merge’.1 Typically this ‘realm’ is a virtual 
manifestation of ‘the inner world of the mind’ which does not ‘meet’ the 
outer world so much as co-opt properties of it. Aspects of outer-world 
physical space such as landscape, architecture and atmosphere thereby 
become metaphors for elements of intangible, ineffable mental experi-
ence. Ballard’s concept of inner space is clearly reflected in the works of 
his contemporaries John Brunner and Roger Zelazny, which I consider 
alongside Peter Phillips’s 1948 short story ‘Dreams are Sacred’ in the 
first part of this essay.
The second golden age of inner space fiction, examined in the second 
part of this essay, occurs in the 1980s. This period is one of diversifica-
tion for the genre; the texts surveyed here include not only novels by Pat 
Cadigan and Greg Bear but also the first inner space film, Dreamscape 
(1984). Although still concerned in each case with exploring psycholog-
ically disordered minds, these texts each expand the potentials of inner 
space exploration beyond the asylum or psychiatrist’s office; Dreamscape, 
for example, imagines the technology being co-opted by political con-
spirators, while Mindplayers (1987) imagines ‘pathosfinding’ as merely 
one service among many in a future world in which mind-altering tech-
nology is available recreationally. The final part of this essay examines 
inner space texts of the twenty-first century, which continue the trend 
established in the 1980s of moving from the page to the screen. In 
addition to Inception, I examine The Cell (2000), which covers ground 
later trodden by Nolan’s blockbuster. I also explore the world(s) of 
Psychonauts (2006), a platform game directed by Tim Schafer, whose 
levels are each a virtual-physical representation of a character’s mind. 
Although Inception is the end-point of the timeline traced here, 
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I conclude with a brief consideration of where the genre may go next, 
based on trends identified across the three sets of texts.
Before charting the course and future movements of inner space 
fiction, however, we may consider where it comes from.2 Although 
‘Dreams are Sacred’ is the starting point for this timeline, there are of 
course earlier texts that prefigure some generic elements. Many of the 
texts examined here contain echoes of psychomachia, the medieval genre 
of poetry and drama which includes the poem of the same name by 
Prudentius and the morality play Everyman. Although now readily asso-
ciated with the mind, the prefix ‘psycho-’ derives from the ancient Greek 
word (psukhē) for ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’. The concept of a conflict (makhē) in 
which the soul may be both the prize and the battleground may be seen, 
updated to refer to the mind instead of the soul, in many of these texts. 
Another early precursor is Leibniz’s ‘mill argument’, which attempts to 
demonstrate the inviolable division between mental and physical phe-
nomena. Leibniz asks his reader to:
suppos[e] there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have 
perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the 
same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being 
so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work upon 
one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.3
Although Leibniz presents this as absurd, the image of someone 
‘enter[ing]’ into a ‘thinking machine’ (i.e. a mind) and ‘examining its 
interior’ in order to infer its function recurs throughout these texts. 
Finally, the most immediate conceptual influence is of course psycho-
analysis. The prevalence of ‘dream-hacking’ as the method of entering 
and exploring inner space is no doubt traceable to Freud’s assertion that 
‘[t]he interpretation of dreams is the […] royal road to knowledge of 
the unconscious in the life of the mind’.4 Even more fundamental to the 
genre, Freud’s oeuvre provides a series of metaphorical models for the 
mind’s functions, the most influential of which—conventionally known 
as Freud’s ‘topographical’ and ‘spatial’ models—represent the mind as a 
varied and demarcated space (Figs. 11.1 and 11.2).
In Freudian accounts of the mind, there are strata of mental activity, 
with conscious thought elevated (or perhaps perched precariously) above 
a chaotic underworld of unconscious mental processes. This element of 
depth, which is common to both the topographical and spatial models, 
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is echoed in many of the texts examined in this essay. The influence of all 
of these precursors, from Psychomachia to Freud, is evident from the first 
inner space fiction.
1948–1966: the eMergenCe of a genre
A relative unknown among the inner space authors surveyed here, Peter 
Phillipps produced a series of short stories between 1948 and 1958 
before retiring from creative writing. ‘Dreams are Sacred’ was among 
the earliest and remains his best-known due to its origination of the 
dream-hacking trope. The anonymous protagonist/narrator is untrained 
in psychiatric medicine, but meets with ‘a college friend […] who’d 
majored in psychiatry’ and is swiftly persuaded to enter ‘the phantas-
magoria of a brilliant mind driving itself into insanity through the sheer 
complexity of its own invention’.5 The narrator is deemed capable of this 
due to both his professional distance and his ‘cast-iron non-gullibility 
complex’, and Phillipps makes much of the comic conflict between the 
patient, a pompous fantasy author and the narrator’s deadpan ‘icono-
clastic manner’.6 The technology facilitating this miracle is the enceph-
alograph, used for its conventional purpose until ‘one of [the doctor’s] 
assistants stepped up the polarity-reversal of the field – that is, the fre-
quency – by accident’.7 Phillipps affords far greater attention to the pos-
sibilities of this technology than to the (pseudo)science behind it, and 
Fig. 11.1 A diagram 
of Freud’s model of the 
mind in ‘Ego and the Id’ 
(1923). Public domain
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the world of Marsham Craswell’s mind vividly reflects his manic condi-
tion. The narrator initially finds himself in a desert landscape under two 
suns, surmising that ‘this heat [is] generated by Craswell’s imagination’. 
The blasted desert landscape is arguably a poor metaphor for Craswell’s 
hyperactive mind, but the narrator’s remark is telling; the atmosphere 
is ‘generated by Craswell’s imagination’ in that he has imagined it, but 
it also recalls his doctor’s diagnosis that his catatonic state is caused by 
his imagination operating in ‘high gear’ and suggests that this ambient 
Fig. 11.2 Illustration of the iceberg metaphor commonly used for Freud’s 
model. Public domain
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heat is symptomatic.8 The Citadel of the Snake provides a more visual 
metaphor:
like a wedding cake designed by Dali, in red plastic:– ten stories high,  
each story [sic] a platter half a mile thick, each platter diminishing in size 
and offset on the one beneath so that the edifice spiralled towards the 
brassy sky.9
Craswell and the narrator continue on through many other imagined 
spaces, each reflecting Craswell’s insanity through an environmental met-
aphor: ‘the Hall of Madness, where strange music assaults the brain’, for 
example, and ‘a great, high-vaulted chamber [where the] lighting effects 
[…] were unusual and admirable – many colored shafts or radiance from 
unseen sources’.10
The narrator is immune to all danger while he is aware of the fantasy 
of his surroundings and, like a lucid dreamer, he can create allies and 
objects to help him survive. The only instance in which he is endan-
gered is when he stops to consider ‘whether the whole business was 
quite – decent’, a momentary doubt which ‘negates confidence. With 
confidence gone, the gateway is open to fear’.11 The danger of the sit-
uation is not that any of Craswell’s imagined perils might genuinely 
cause harm, but that the narrator might mistake the fantasy for real-
ity and ‘let [his] mind go under’, which would result in him ‘wak[ing] 
up as a candidate for a bed in the next ward’.12 Although untrained 
in psychiatry, the narrator is evidently aware of Freudian theory and 
speculates firstly that ‘[Craswell’s] affronted ego had assumed the 
whole power of his brain’, and secondly that ‘the death-urge [which 
is typically] buried deep, but potent, in the subconscious […] was not 
buried deep here’.13 This latter diagnosis suggests a territorial shift 
in the topography of the mind, with an element of the subconscious 
rising up to the conscious ego level, thereby taking over ‘the whole 
power of his brain’. This image is also reflected in the virtual mani-
festation of the death-urge, ‘[a]n obscene hulking gob of animated, 
semi-transparent purple flesh’ which looms over Craswell and the nar-
rator once they arrive in ‘the center of an enormous, steep-banked 
amphitheatre’.14 Analogous to ‘[a]n ant in the bottom of a washbowl 
with a dog muffling at it’, the spatial relation between the men and ‘the 
Beast’ also demonstrates the change that has occurred in the structure 
of Craswell’s mind.15
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Once the beast is defeated in psychomachia and Craswell’s mind 
is returned to health, the story shifts to speculate on the wider signifi-
cance of this technology, beyond the controlled psychiatric environment 
in which it is initially contained. The narrator discovers that characters 
summoned by him and Craswell to the dream world were not entirely 
artificial but drawn from their memories of the real world, and that 
real people have experienced strange dreams which reflect their roles in 
the story. The narrator and Dr. Blakiston conclude that the machine, 
unknown to them, ‘became a transmitter’.16 Contrary to the narrator’s 
concern for the ‘decency’ of invading other minds, the story concludes 
with him ominously telling a young woman who rejects his romantic 
advances, ‘I can wait. I’ll be seeing you. Happy dreams’.17 Phillipps’s 
story thereby suggests that while the speculated technology may be val-
uably applied to treat mental disorder, it is liable to be abused if applied 
beyond the psychiatric world.
As Phillipps ended his literary career, many themes of ‘Dreams are 
Sacred’ were taken up in John Brunner’s 1958 story ‘City of the Tiger’, 
which later formed part of his novel The Telepathist (1964; also pub-
lished as The Whole Man, outside of the UK). As the UK title suggests, 
Brunner’s fiction differs from Phillipps’s in that telepathy—that is, com-
munication between minds without technological broadcast—is a funda-
mental aspect of the plot throughout. Aside from a brief dalliance with 
organised crime before the protagonist, Gerald Howson, truly under-
stands his abilities, the power of telepathy is primarily associated with 
psychiatry. The plot of the novel is structured around a series of mis-
sions undertaken by Howson, and his colleagues within a professional 
institution, to fix disordered minds. While following the psychiatric 
premise of its precursor, then, The Telepathist expands the application of 
dream-hacking to present several minds which are disordered in different 
ways. In the first mind which Howson explores, for example, the subject 
is a deaf-mute girl who is not intellectually disabled—‘the lack was in the 
nerves connecting ears and brain, and in the form of her vocal cords’—
but whose mental structures have nevertheless been uniquely shaped 
by her physical disabilities.18 Exploring various ‘areas’ of her memories, 
Howson observes that ‘because she had never developed verbal thinking 
[…] she used kinaesthetic and visual data in huge intermingled blocks, 
like a sour porridge with stones in it’.19
The spatial description is more explicit in later episodes, when 
Howson—now trained as a telepath—is tasked with extracting other 
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telepaths from ‘catapathic’ states.20 Echoing the premise of ‘Dreams are 
Sacred’, this occurs to telepaths who ‘retreat into fugue and make a fan-
tasy world which is more tolerable [than reality]’.21 This is first demon-
strated by Phranakis, a Greek general who avoids the consequences of 
defeat by creating a world, ‘nurtured in his subconscious’, where he is 
celebrated as a victor.22 In contrast to the deaf-mute’s—and indeed to 
‘the chaos of [the] subconscious’ in a neurotypical, able-bodied character 
later—Phranakis’s inner space is clearly figured as a recognisably human 
structure: ‘Down the streets of his brain a procession moved […] The 
city was safe’.23 Ilse, the telepath who precedes Howson into this world, 
laments that Phranakis’s secure mental city ‘hasn’t left room for intrud-
ers’ and is overwhelmed by his mental defences which manifest as mili-
tary guards.24 Although it is a symptom of her peril rather than its cause, 
Ilse becomes ‘uncertain where the illusion ended’ as she is overwhelmed 
by Phranakis’s mind, echoing Phillipps’s story.25 With Howson’s assis-
tance, Ilse escapes and completes her mission; Phranakis experiences 
extraction from his dreamworld as an image of ‘the sky rolled back, 
like a slashed tent, and the gods were manifested’.26 The imagery here 
clearly evokes his Greek heritage, but more subtly the spatial relation 
between Phranakis and the rupture in his inner space reflects his location 
in the Freudian subconscious and his imminent upwards travel towards 
consciousness.
This first period culminates in the first iconic work of inner space fic-
tion, Roger Zelazny’s 1966 novel The Dream Master (a novella-length 
version, ‘He Who Shapes’, was published in Amazing Stories in 1965). 
Unlike ‘Dreams are Sacred’ and The Telepathist, which devote significant 
proportions of their total lengths to establishing the premise of inner 
space exploration and offering some explanation for its practice in their 
speculative worlds, Zelazny’s novel begins in media res and only depicts 
the ‘real’ world after several pages. The novel’s first inner space is a vis-
ually symbolic pastiche of Roman/Shakespearean history, as the protag-
onist Render (‘the Shaper’) partakes in the stabbing of Marcus Antonius 
while a perplexed Caesar looks on and protests ‘I want to be assassinated 
too […] It isn’t fair!’.27 This bizarre scene is explained when, in the real 
world, Render ‘lift[s] off his crown of Medusa-hair leads and micromin-
iature circuitry’ which connects him to the ‘ro-womb’, an ovoid device 
containing his patient, Representative Erikson.28 Like his precursors, 
Render is an uncommonly qualified ‘neuroparticipant therapist’, ‘one 
of the two hundred or so special analysts whose own psychic makeup 
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permitted them to enter into neurotic patterns without carrying away 
more than an esthetic gratification from the mimesis of aberrance:’; 
recalling ‘Dreams are Sacred’ particularly, Render’s gift is his resistance 
to his patients’ neuroses.29
In my reading of the Phranakis episode in The Telepathist, I identi-
fied visual symbolism which reflects the specific character and neuroses 
of the dreamer, and spatial imagery which calls to mind Freudian models 
of the mind which are theoretically common to every human mind. The 
opening scene of The Dream Master also displays this variation, as the 
assassination of Marcus Antonius reflects both the patient’s real-world 
career as a senior politician and his baseless ‘fears of assassination’, while 
the ‘darkness […] constrict[ing]’ at the ‘periphery’ of the dream appears 
to be an environmental manifestation of the sense that the dream is 
‘about to end’—that is, it is suggested to be inherent to the dream 
setting rather than particular to the dreamer.30 Interpreting these met-
aphors, however, is complicated by the role of Render as the ‘shaper’ of 
the dream. Erikson protests that Render’s interpretation of this dream is 
not really valid since his ‘ability to make things happen stacks the deck’, 
and Render confirms that he ‘supplied the format and modified the 
forms’.31 Render’s ability to appear from behind ‘a previously unnoticed 
corner’ as a different character and then disappear ‘around another sud-
den corner’ is therefore not symbolic of Erikson’s fragile hold on real-
ity or the mental contortions required to maintain his paranoid fantasy, 
but simply a display of Render’s directorial control over the dream.32 
Render clarifies that although he created the dreamspace it is Erikson 
who ‘filled [it] with emotional significance, promoted [the events] to the 
status of symbols corresponding to [his] problem’, and Erikson’s con-
cession that the dream had ‘strong meaning’ for him demonstrates that 
Render’s diagnosis of Erikson is correct and that the visual symbolism 
is ‘a valid analogue’.33 The form of inner space explored in The Dream 
Master therefore corresponds to those of ‘Dreams are Sacred’ and The 
Telepathist, but with the new development that the psychiatrist’s role 
is to craft a symbolic space which aids in their treatment of the patient, 
rather than searching for diagnostic clues or attempting to fix ‘aber-
rance[s]’ in a space which is created entirely by the patient’s mind.34
Unlike The Telepathist, The Dream Master focuses on just one patient 
after Render concludes his business with Erikson. Dr. Eileen Shallot is 
another gifted psychiatrist, who seeks Render not for psychiatry but 
professional development; she is born blind and seeks to overcome this 
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disability by training as a shaper. Render warns that her unfamiliarity 
with visual stimuli means that she must deal ‘constantly […] with the 
abnormal’ when treating patients in this way, and that ‘[i]f the therapist 
loses the upper hand in an intense session he becomes the Shaped rather 
than the Shaper’.35 This reasserts a didactic point connecting Phillipps’s 
and Brunner’s works, that immersion into another person’s mind, par-
ticularly a disordered mind, entails the risk of annihilation. This common 
aspect of the inner space trope calls to mind both the classical mytheme 
of catabasis—the heroic descent into the underworld—and an inversion 
of the myth of Daedalus and Icarus: rather than flying too high and inev-
itably falling back down, the dream-hacker risks descending so far down 
into the mind that they are unable to emerge again. All of Howson’s 
missions in The Telepathist end in success, and despite its pessimistic twist 
ending the inaugural inner space trip in ‘Dreams are Sacred’ concludes 
without harm to the protagonist. The Dream Master, in contrast, breaks 
new ground for the genre by depicting this disaster instead of merely 
suggesting its threat.
Ignoring his own counsel, and tempted by the prospect of pioneering 
work, Render agrees to give Eileen her first experience of sight by train-
ing her in neuroparticipation. The worlds which he creates for her are 
mundane, realistic environments, which is appropriate to Render’s task 
of accustoming her to sight rather than of addressing a neurosis through 
symbolic tableaux. In their final session, Render creates from memory 
a cathedral but discovers that he is losing control and notices ‘the altar 
[which he] had never seen before, anywhere […] The organ chorded 
thunder under invisible hands’.36 Panicking, he runs from Eileen and 
finds it to be ‘like running through a waist-high snowdrift’, and soon 
thereafter finds himself stood right next to Eileen again.37 This image of 
motionless running recalls Erikson’s feeling of having ‘moved far from 
the circle of assassins, but the scene did not diminish in size’, confirming 
Render’s loss of control and new status as the ‘shaped’ rather than the 
shaper in Eileen’s dream.38 The scene of this final dream is either the 
lakeside cathedral conjured from Render’s memory or the black void that 
remains when Render banishes his images, until he attempts to ‘break 
the entire illusion’ by refusing Eileen’s amorous feelings.39 Declaring 
his hatred of her transports him to a new space ‘in the midst of a white 
plain. It was silent, it was endless. It sloped away towards the edges of 
the world’.40 This blank, blasted landscape soon changes into a muta-
ble and threatening world, quite unlike the controlled and everyday 
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environments of his previous dreams with Eileen. Render is pursued by a 
monstrous wolf ‘over crevasses and rifts, through valleys, past stalagmites 
and pinnacles – under the edges of glaciers, beside frozen riverbeds, and 
always downwards’.41 This downward motion is emphasised by a change 
in Render’s physical movements, as he runs ‘through veils of snow which 
now seemed to be falling upward from off the ground – like strings of 
bubbles’.42 As these snowflakes do indeed become bubbles, and Render’s 
running motion is transformed into a headlong dive—‘[l]ike a swimmer 
he approached’—it seems that this chaotic inner space alters to encour-
age his immersion in the chaotic Freudian subconscious.43 Even after 
Render finds himself on solid ground again his downward motion is 
seemingly irresistible, as a ‘chasm open[s] behind him’ and he willingly 
topples into ‘Vernichtung’ (‘annihilation’), bringing ‘[e]verything […] 
to an end’.44
1981–1990: the seCond age of inner sPaCe
After the initial blossoming of the genre in the 1960s, inner space fiction 
seems to lose its appeal for SF writers for over a decade. The next author 
to take up the trope is Pat Cadigan, who in 1981 published the first 
of several stories featuring a protagonist named Deadpan Allie. These 
stories were reworked to form parts of her debut novel, Mindplayers. 
Although Mindplayers is predated by Dreamscape, I examine Cadigan’s 
work first as many of her novel’s depictions of inner space derive from 
the earlier stories.
Allie is introduced to the reader experiencing temporary and rec-
reational psychosis using an illegal device called a ‘madcap’ which, like 
all other inner space directed devices in the novel, functions via elec-
trical connections which go ‘under [her] eyelids and around [her] eye-
balls to the optic nerve’.45 This brief introductory scene establishes that 
Allie is uninitiated and unqualified in psychiatric work, although when 
the authorities discover her ‘unique brain organization’ they decide to 
offer her employment, instead of a more punitive sentence, as a means 
for her to atone.46 While Allie is therefore akin to the other protago-
nists examined so far, in that she accesses inner space by virtue of excep-
tional innate ability, Mindplayers presents a more egalitarian vision of 
the future in which the experience is available outside of the psychiat-
ric institution. In this sense, Mindplayers is most like The Telepathist, and 
it also shares with it an episodic structure that depicts different minds 
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through the exploration of inner space. Cadigan’s first innovation is to 
begin this series with an image of Allie’s own, healthy mind. Cadigan 
also considers the ethical implications of the technology—more thor-
oughly than ‘Dreams are Sacred’—but Allie is eventually persuaded by 
her trainer that ‘[i]t’s not going to be anything like rape […] we’ll meet 
in mind-to-mind contact. But I won’t be in your mind’.47 Having con-
sented to the training, Allie finds herself at ‘the edge of a broad field 
bounded by a low, flimsy wire fence; a roughly made sign […] read[s] 
WATCH THIS SPACE’.48 Since her trainer, Segretti, is also present 
here, it seems that this is the neutral space of ‘the system’ that he prom-
ised they would meet in, although Allie describes it as both her ‘point of 
departure’ and ‘home’.49 Less ambiguous is the cathedral which bears a 
sign stating ‘YOU ARE HERE. And below, in smaller letters: WHERE 
DID YOU THINK YOU WERE?’; Allie identifies this simply as ‘what-
ever area of [her] mind [she] was in’, but the sarcastic sign suggests that 
this represents her ego.50 Accordingly, Segretti is unable to join her when 
she ventures inside, in keeping with his promise that he could not enter 
inner space which is entirely hers. The cathedral, observed from outside, 
is constantly ‘shifting and changing’, presenting a pulsing mass of differ-
ent architectural styles including ‘traditionally Gothic’ and ‘log cabin’.51 
Inside Allie discovers a room, ‘nothing like the interior of a cathedral’, 
which contains an assemblage of significant objects and images from 
her life, ‘things [she]’d owned or wished [she] had, souvenirs of things 
[she]’d done or seen’.52 This TARDIS-like space suggests that Allie’s 
sense of self is illusory; her ego is inconstant and diverse, and her under-
standing of herself as a coherent and constant persona is primarily based 
upon these memories.
This depiction of Allie’s healthy mind is an ingenious contrast for 
those which she later explores as a ‘pathosfinder’—one who, like a psy-
chotherapist, searches for the causes of mental disorder. Her first assign-
ment is Marty Oren, a reclusive actor whose mind initially manifests as 
‘a bare, sterile room [with] no windows, no doors, nothing, just smooth 
white walls’.53 The contrast to the more pastoral scene in her own mind 
is striking, but Allie declares that the ‘Infamous White Room’ is a com-
mon phenomenon.54 As she takes ‘a walk through his life’, however, this 
blank space is shown to be significantly apt.55 This biographical explora-
tion is manifested as ‘a long hall lined with locked doors’, which are dis-
covered to be ‘all empty. There was nothing to see in any of them and no 
sign of anything ever happening there’.56 In contrast to Allie’s cathedral, 
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which contains vibrant reminders of her fondest memories, this corridor 
is ‘just a space in [Marty’s] mind. His body was an instrument rather 
than a live thing, his face a device […] He just couldn’t care’.57 Allie 
does not definitively diagnose Marty—unlike Render, she does not typi-
cally employ a psychiatric discourse—but the contrast between his inner 
space and hers clearly suggests a lack of sense of self and connection to 
the world, akin to anhedonia or even psychopathy. Accordingly, when 
Marty attempts to exert control over the space and form a new landscape 
‘all he could manage was a bare earth under a colorless, sunless sky’.58
This dismal, barren space in turn provides an illuminating contrast 
with another space that Allie explores later, belonging to a schizophrenic 
poet. Kitta Wren’s inner space is ‘awash in lazy spiral rainbows and har-
lequin rivers’, a fantastical and hallucinatory landscape. As in Marty’s 
mind—and like Howson’s exploration of the deaf-mute girl’s memo-
ries—Allie experiences units of thought as physical objects, and ‘move[s] 
in among a jumble of unfinished ideas’ when she ‘beg[ins] to get the 
feeling [she is]n’t alone’.59 Since Kitta is dead she is not present in her 
inner space, but Allie’s intuition is verified by a manifestation of Kitta’s 
psychosis, which strikes ‘like a concentrated, highly localised storm’.60 
This functions in much the same way as a real-world storm, and Allie 
experiences it as ‘the hard beat of the rain’.61 However, it is of course 
also symbolic; the psychosis which ultimately drove Kitta to violent sui-
cide is also credited with driving her career as a poet, as ‘[t]he seizure 
[tears] into her ideas and images and they scattered in all directions […] 
a literal brainstorm […] stirring her thoughts into new and better pat-
terns’.62 The notion of a connection between madness and creativity is 
a long-held one, but Cadigan innovatively imbues it here with a spatial 
aspect that depicts how sublimely terrifying the experience of a psychotic 
episode might be.
While Cadigan was publishing the stories that would eventually form 
Mindplayers, The Dream Master found a second life when inner space 
fiction made the leap from the page to the screen. Dreamscape, written 
by David Loughery and directed by Joseph Ruben, began as an outline 
written by Zelazny in 1981 based on his novel. The film stars several 
prestigious actors, including Max von Sydow and Christopher Plummer, 
but unfortunately lacks the impressive visual effects of contemporane-
ous SF films such as Blade Runner (1982) or Aliens (1986). While the 
film in general and its first two brief inner space scenes in particular have 
dated very badly, it deserves to be remembered for more than simply 
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being the first inner space film.63 Its climactic conflict is based around 
the question only alluded to in ‘Dreams are Sacred’—what happens 
when this revolutionary technology, designed for psychotherapeutic use 
in a controlled medical environment, escapes the psychiatric institution? 
Although Dreamscape also briefly (and gracelessly) considers the poten-
tial for technology to be used for sexual manipulation, its core premise 
is that those killed in a dream die in real life, and so Plummer’s mach-
iavellian character plots to assassinate the US president.64 Before dis-
covering this, the protagonist Alex carries out psychiatric work to aid 
a child troubled by recurring nightmares. The boy’s inner space is pre-
sented as a darkly lit house, which he anticipates will be invaded by a 
half-man, half-snake monster.65 In an uncharacteristically artistic touch, 
this besieged domestic space is rendered with sharp and irregular angles, 
recalling the iconic sets of the German Expressionist classic Das Cabinet 
des Dr. Caligari (1920). When the monster strikes, Alex and the boy flee 
down a staircase which appears to descend endlessly and float in the mid-
dle of a black void.66 Their panicked flight through twisting corridors at 
the eventual base of these stairs is accompanied by flickering overhead 
lights and several cuts from the camera filming them from behind to 
face-on, effectively conveying a sense of disorientation.67 Their down-
ward motion, recalling that of Render in The Dream Master, suggests a 
descent from a disordered ego/conscious deep into a chaotic and over-
whelming id/subconscious. In accordance with much of Freud’s theory 
regarding this model of the mind, it is in the subconscious that Alex and 
the boy can effect therapeutic change and kill the monster.
This stand-out set piece is in many ways recreated, with less visual 
flair, for the film’s climactic psychomachia as Alex attempts to rescue the 
president from the assassin, Tommy.68 The president’s journey with Alex, 
pursued by Tommy, follows a familiar itinerary: they begin in an enclosed 
space (a train car instead of the boy’s house); when a malevolent out-
sider arrives, they escape by moving downwards (a train station esca-
lator instead of the floating staircase); they arrive at a dead end having 
descended as far as possible, and, as in the boy’s dream, it is here that the 
dreamer can arm himself and kill his attacker, despite the apparent hope-
lessness of the situation. The president’s subconscious space is even more 
chaotic and hostile than the boy’s, as he and Alex are chased by red-eyed 
wolves which seem endemic to his mind rather than a manifestation of 
Tommy’s assassination attempt, and the environment presents hazards in 
the form of loose electrical cables and rifts in the ground.69 If, as the 
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repeated set-piece elements suggest, this space should be interpreted as a 
physical manifestation of Freudian subconscious, then psychotherapeutic 
intervention is both necessary for the alleviation of mental disorder but 
also a distressing and dangerous experience.
A thoroughly more effective depiction of inner space is provided by 
Greg Bear’s 1990 novel Queen of Angels, the final entrant in this mid-
dle period. The narrative is composed of four parallel plotlines emerg-
ing from a brutal mass murder carried out by Emmanuel Goldsmith. In 
one, a pioneering and ‘O.V.F.&I. – Once Very Famous and Influential’ 
psychiatrist, Martin Burke, is hired by the wealthy father of one of the 
murder victims to examine Goldsmith (and his inner space, or ‘Country 
of the Mind’) to try to discover the reason for the massacre.70 Bear’s 
speculative future reflects the passage of thirty-plus years since the pub-
lication of ‘Dreams are Sacred’; the procedure is facilitated by a ‘vial of 
nanomachines’ mapping Goldsmith’s brain, and the explorers interact 
with the world with the help of a ‘toolkit […] a simulated bright red box 
within which floated a display of circumstances of the probe’, calling to 
mind the menu window of a video game.71 Bear seemingly draw influ-
ence from Brunner, as Burke’s declaration that ‘[i]n most of [his] previ-
ous incursions into the Country the central symbol of the mind had been 
a city’ recalls the Phranakis episode in The Telepathist.72 Of course, this 
violent murderer’s inner space is unlike Burke’s previous patients’, even 
though the medical and psychological tests carried out on Goldsmith 
by Burke’s team prior to the procedure show that ‘[w]ithin certain lim-
its [his] brain and body functions are normal’.73 Burke observes that 
Goldsmith uses ‘[n]o personal pronouns at all’ when discussing the mur-
ders, a tic which he (mis)construes as evasion of responsibility.74
The chapter depicting Burke’s and his colleague Carol Neuman’s 
journey into Goldsmith’s mind is a narrative tour de force, and perhaps 
the most sustained depiction of a mental landscape in fiction. Recalling 
Render’s fateful expedition at the end of The Dream Master, Goldsmith’s 
inner space becomes chaotic, hostile and surreal, and Neuman is incapac-
itated; although she regains consciousness by the novel’s coda, she and 
Goldsmith seemingly bear psychic scars from their traumatic experience. 
In contrast to the Brunner-esque inner spaces previously encountered by 
Burke, Goldsmith’s mind initially manifests as ‘torrid blue sky and end-
less desert’, mysteriously concealing Goldsmith’s ‘deeper psychologi-
cal processes’ which Burke expects to be laid bare.75 Instead of Freud’s 
‘royal road to […] the unconscious’, they follow an ‘excruciating[ly]’ 
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monotonous highway which abruptly ends at ‘a vast canyon’.76 In place 
of a city, there is ‘a crystal-lined pit, the crystals resolving into build-
ings’.77 This submerged/inverted city presents an unprecedented degree 
of ‘contraction and desolation’, which variously suggests ‘[a] pathology 
like the shrinking of tissue’, ‘major mental dysfunction’, and ‘internal 
genocide’—and, indeed, an erasure of the ego which Goldsmith’s verbal 
tic suggested.78
Although Queens of Angels is unique among these texts in that the 
(living) person whose mind forms the landscape does not appear within 
it, Goldsmith’s mind is not entirely uninhabited. Burke and Neuman 
anticipate ‘figures symbolising Goldsmith’s subpersonalities, his major 
mental organons, [who] would use speech’, an idea which recurs in 
Inception.79 There should also be ‘a vivid population’ in Goldsmith’s 
city, comprising his memories of everyone that he has encountered in his 
life.80 When Burke and Neuman arrive at the city centre, however, they 
discover a ghostlike population, among which ‘the inhabitants [have] 
very little real individuality’.81 Descending ‘down several flights of stone 
steps’ into an analogue of Grand Central Station—or, perhaps, into the 
anticipated ‘deeper psychological processes’—they find a nightmarish 
scene of figures jumping to their deaths, the mounting corpses dan-
gling from the cables on which they land.82 As with the scene composed 
by Render for Erikson at the start of The Dream Master, this symbolic 
image defies and distorts physical distance, as Burke and Neuman per-
ceive the corpses with ‘nauseating conviction’ and ‘visual acuity […] as if 
they were only a few meters away’.83 Burke reassures Neuman that ‘space 
[is] a true fiction’ here, but spectral figures from Goldsmith’s mind soon 
intercept and overwhelm them, demonstrating the truth of his predic-
tion that ‘being in direct connection with Goldsmith’s mental symbology 
could conceivably disturb their own interior landscapes’.84
2000–2010: the breaKthrough of a genre
The success of Inception marks the transition of inner space fiction from 
a marginal genre (SF literature) to a viable mainstream (Hollywood 
cinema). I have so far traced the development of the inner space trope 
throughout the mid-to late twentieth century and demonstrated that 
precursors to Nolan’s film exist, mostly in literature. However, although 
it has greater cultural impact than all of these texts, Inception is not 
even the first inner space fiction of the twenty-first century. This most 
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recent age was inaugurated instead by The Cell, another Hollywood film 
directed by Tarsem Singh. It begins, like The Dream Master and, later, 
Inception, in an inner space rather than in the real world, a distinction 
suggested almost immediately by the surreal transformation of Catherine 
Deane’s horse into a two-dimensional replica after she dismounts.85 This 
desert space is where she meets a boy whom she attempts to persuade 
to go sailing. The boy’s resistance to this is reflected by the ships that 
he creates (and, arguably, by the desert setting in general); the first is a 
dilapidated tanker half buried in the sank, the second a small toy boat. 
After the boy runs away in anger, his and Deane’s bodies are shown sus-
pended by a mysterious machine, revealing that this shared simulation is 
part of a therapeutic attempt to extract the boy from a coma caused by a 
rare form of schizophrenia.
Deane’s journeys into this space bookend the film’s main narrative, 
which follows Queen of Angels’s lead; Carl Rudolph Stargher is a serial 
killer who is rendered comatose by the same disease, and whose latest 
victim is trapped in a hidden lair. Although she and her team are wary of 
exploring such a mind, Deane consents in order to find clues to the loca-
tion of Stargher’s victim. Singh’s visual flair is most effectively deployed 
in the scenes of Deane’s first venture, beginning with a sequence that 
represents her experience of being transported into Stargher’s mind.86 
Singh cuts from Deane’s eye to a close-up of the cloth covering her face 
for the procedure, zooming into and through an opening in the embroi-
dery. The camera then rises out of a pond to reveal the baptism of a 
child, maintaining focus on the scene as the camera loops over and, now 
upside-down, submerges again on the other side. The unorthodox cam-
era motion here suggests that incursion into another’s mind requires first 
a transcendence of one’s own inner space and secondly a disorienting 
re-submergence. This remarkable shot is followed by a continuing pan 
as the camera re-emerges in what appears to be a sewer. Maintaining the 
theme of disorientation—and reflecting, perhaps, the drastic recalibration 
that one might have to undergo in experiencing a mind like Stargher’s—
Deane is revealed lying unconscious on the left hand ‘wall’, the camera 
finally turning anti-clockwise to match her gravity. This perspectival trick 
is repeated on Deane’s later excursion, when she awakes in a glass box on 
top of a stone tower.87 As she pushes on the ceiling of the box it opens 
and she falls out, upwards, the gravity in Stargher’s mind having sud-
denly changed as the box opens.
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Stargher’s inner space is not simply deceptive but atmospheric and 
dangerous. Although Dreamscape and Inception feature intertextual 
visual references, to Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari and the Penrose steps 
(popularised by M. C. Escher), respectively, Singh demonstrates a far 
greater familiarity with visual art. Scenes set in Stargher’s mind recreate 
visual artworks by H. R. Giger, Damien Hirst, and Odd Nerdrum, all 
of which are tonally appropriate for the dark atmosphere of Stargher’s 
mind.88 These are not simply tableaux but spaces which Deane and 
Special Agent Peter Novak must navigate: this is particularly evident 
in the scene in which Deane must walk between the glass sheets divid-
ing the sections of a freshly dissected horse. This scene also emphasises 
the mechanical aspect of Stargher’s mind, echoing Liebniz’s depiction 
of the mind as a mill which one might enter. After passing through the 
horse Deane finds a room full of glass screens, where she ill-advisedly 
pulls a lever and presses a button.89 Singh’s camera jumps from mech-
anism to mechanism, showing the consequences of Deane’s actions in a 
Leibnizian inspection that she regrettably neglects.
Deane’s teammate warns that going ‘very deep into [Stargher’s] 
world’ entails the risk of ‘[coming] to believe that [his] world is real 
[and] theoretically her mind could convince her body that anything that 
was done to it there is actually done’.90 Continuous with the premise 
of Dreamscape, this means that ‘[if] you die in your dream, you die in 
real life’.91 Deane demonstrates this by being overwhelmed by Stargher’s 
mind and is rescued by Novak. The Cell breaks from generic tradition, 
however, in introducing the concept of ‘reversal’, in which the men-
tally disordered individual is brought into the therapist’s mind instead 
of vice versa.92 This ploy extracts Stargher’s ‘king’ persona from his 
‘very twisted kingdom’ and allows Deane to kill him; although this does 
indeed kill Stargher in the real world, along with the innocent child per-
sona in his mind, this is presented as a redemptive moment for them 
both.93 Recalling her enthusiasm to attempt reversal on her first patient 
at the start of the film, in order to ‘show him a different place’ from his 
own ‘world which is not healthy’ (i.e. his isolated mind), the film con-
cludes with Deane and the boy in a space which merges aspects of both 
of their inner spaces (Deane’s cherry trees blossom in the boy’s desert 
landscape).94 Here, Deane successfully simulates a sailing trip with the 
toy boat and a billowing blue cloth, suggesting the imminent success of 
her therapeutic strategy.
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Just as inner space fiction first appeared in cinema in the 1980s, 
another significant jump to a new medium occurs in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Psychonauts, a computer game developed by designer Tim Schafer 
and released in 2005, exploits the video game form to provide vibrant 
new explorations of inner space. The player controls Raz, a young boy 
attending a psychonauts training camp for children. The psychonauts 
gain access to minds using a small door (or ‘portal’) that they attach to 
people’s heads. Although the leaders of the camp are depicted as adven-
turing spies—an application of inner space technology which anticipates 
Inception—the context of the game is often psychiatric, particularly 
in later levels based on the minds of people encountered in an aban-
doned mental asylum. (This is the only asylum depicted in these texts, 
and it is tellingly dilapidated and hazardous.) Psychonauts uses a vari-
ety of video game genres, but is primarily a platformer, a genre which 
involves traversing hazardous landscapes. Like many platformers since 
(and including) Mario Bros (1983), Psychonauts features collectible 
items. In the case of Mario Bros, these were coins, which could earn the 
player more lives. In Psychonauts the collectibles—figments of imagi-
nation, mental cobwebs, emotional baggage and mental vaults—have 
more thematic than functional value, although the vaults contain slide-
shows which reveal hidden information about the character whose mind 
is explored. These are often off of the path that the player needs to take 
to complete the level, suggesting that these memories are those that a 
character would rather forget and as such are kept remote spaces of the 
mind. One particularly effective instance of this is a whole hidden room 
which is impossible to access on the first pass through one of the psycho-
naut trainers’ minds. More powerful abilities gained later provide access a 
room containing writhing demonic figures trapped behind a fiery barrier; 
read alongside information from Milla’s mental vaults, one may infer that 
this hidden space represents the traumatic memory of surviving a fire in 
which the other children at her orphanage died.95
The use of space in other levels is even more sophisticated, if less dark. 
Another early level, in the mind of Milla’s fellow trainer, Sasha Nein, is 
simply a large cube, reflecting Sasha’s reserved nature and ostensible 
self-control.96 The training exercise undertaken here leads to the explo-
sion of material and adversaries from various faces of the cube; the mate-
rial’s emergence from below and formation in the shape of a crib or other 
items from Sasha’s childhood present a visual depiction of Freud’s notion 
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of repression. (The player’s task of sealing these ruptures suggests that 
Freudian repression is a natural process and not always unhealthy.) Even 
in the most chaotic moments of this level, the centre of gravity is always 
at the center of the cube; if Raz walks over the edge of the cube, that 
edge becomes the floor, so the danger of falling to one’s death which is 
so common in platformer games is negated here. This is quite unlike the 
game’s most disordered mind, which Raz encounters later at the asylum. 
Boyd Cooper is a security guard for the asylum but is overwhelmed by his 
obsession with conspiracy theories. On first entrance to his mind, this is 
visually depicted by the interior of Boyd’s home, which features stereotyp-
ical newspaper cuttings and scrawls of handwriting on the walls.97 This is 
the sanest area of Boyd’s mind though—given the presence of Boyd him-
self there, perhaps this represents the ego—as leaving the house reveals 
a suburban street which twists and floats in a turquoise void. The polar 
opposite of Sasha’s well-adjusted mind, this level exaggerates the generic 
threat of falling; the street not only features gaps that Raz must jump 
over, but its twists and turns mean that the gravity is not consistent: grav-
ity always pulls Raz towards the pavement, but an adjacent street might 
be at a 90° angle to another, meaning that Raz must jump at it rather 
than across to it. As with the sequence introducing Stargher’s mind in The 
Cell, the disorientingly inconsistent gravity reflects the disruption of a for-
merly normal, healthy mind, and the difficulty and dangers of exploring it.
Finally, the release of Inception in 2010 brings this latest phase of 
inner space fiction—and this timeline—to an end. Cobb and Arthur 
are ‘extractors’, corporate spies employed to steal information from 
business competitors’ minds. A powerful businessman, Saito, employs 
them to perform ‘inception’, i.e. implanting an idea in someone’s mind 
rather than extracting information, in the hope of convincing his rival, 
Fischer, to dissolve his late father’s business empire. Not only does 
Inception imagine inner space technology applied to a novel purpose, 
it also presents the only speculative future in which the technology is 
truly separate from psychiatric institutions; Arthur states that ‘the mil-
itary developed dream sharing. It was a training program for soldiers 
to shoot, stab and strangle each other and then wake up’, and the only 
passing allusion to psychiatry is Eames’s facetious suggestion that the 
team should charge both Saito and Fischer for their services, given the 
catharsis that they induce pertaining to Fischer’s strained relationship 
with his father.98 In service of the corporate espionage theme and the 
heist-like plot of the film, Inception follows the example of Psychonauts 
11 THE MYTH OF DREAM-HACKING AND ‘INNER SPACE’ IN SCIENCE FICTION …  259
and frequently includes vaults and safes in dreams, which Cobb says ‘the 
mind automatically fills […] with information it’s trying to protect’.99 
In the same scene Cobb explains that ‘[y]ou can literally talk to my 
subconscious. That’s one of the ways we extract information from the 
subject’.100 Although this is a minor element of the plot, this strategy is 
more success for Cobb’s team than Burke’s and Neuman’s interaction 
with Goldsmith’s ‘organons’ in Queen of Angels.
Inception’s greatest innovation is its nested narrative structure. When 
Arthur protests to Saito that inception is impossible Cobb insists ‘you 
just have to go deep enough’, and this is achieved not by a physical 
descent (as in the submerged city in Queen of Angels, or the staircases 
of Dreamscape) but by repeating the process of entering a shared dream 
state while already within a dream.101 In one of the opening sequences, 
Cobb and Arthur attempt to steal secrets from Saito, and it is established 
that—in contrast to Dreamscape and The Cell—dying in a dream merely 
wakes the sleeper up. However, the mission into Fischer’s mind requires 
them to descend three levels of dreaming, which necessitates a power-
ful sedative whose side effect is that anyone who dies will instead go to 
limbo, which is ‘just raw, infinite subconscious’, i.e. a wasteland filled 
with the ruins of buildings created by Cobb and his dead wife Mal when 
they previously ventured there.102 It is from this biographical detail that 
the film derives its emotional core, and its hidden link to the psychiatric 
background of inner space fiction. Mal appears in any dream that Cobb 
inhabits, as his psychic projection of her is so powerful that it manifests 
and sabotages his mission by killing Fischer, sending him to limbo before 
he can open the vault in the final dream level. After Ariadne first encoun-
ters Mal while training in a dream with Cobb, she warns Arthur that 
‘Cobb has some serious problems that he’s tried to bury down there’, in 
a ‘prison of memories’ which is physically manifested in Cobb’s dream as 
a lift shaft, with the scene of Mal’s suicide kept on the basement floor: as 
in Freud’s schema of the mind, repressed content is submerged deep in 
the subconscious, and like Freudian psychotherapy the speculative dream 
technology allows access to this.103 By encountering Mal in limbo while 
rescuing Fischer and rejecting her appeals to stay with her, Cobb perhaps 
achieves catharsis and relief from his guilt over her death. If, as the film 
implies, both he and Fischer achieve a therapeutic benefit as a side effect 
of the heist, then Inception seems to join ‘Dreams are Sacred’ in sug-
gesting that the depths of psychiatric probing required to relieve neurosis 
entail dangerous risks to all involved.
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ConCLusions: ‘whiCh way to inner sPaCe?’  
(J. g. baLLard, 1962)
I have traced the development of inner space fiction here among various 
media and across over sixty years, from ‘Dreams are Sacred’ in 1948 to 
Inception in 2010. Like many cultural tropes, inner space has experienced 
bursts of popularity—in the 1960s, then the 1980s, and finally, the first 
decade of the twenty-first century—and comparative absence from popu-
lar culture in the years in between. In the interests of covering sixty years 
in the space of an essay, I have limited the scope of study to anglophone 
SF texts and selected texts which I deem most germane or significant 
in the three periods examined. This regrettably entails the omission of 
non-anglophone texts such as Satoshi Kon’s 2006 animated film Paprika 
(or the original 1996 novel by Yasutaka Tsutsui), texts by more main-
stream authors such as Doris Lessing and Will Self, or SF texts which fit 
less comfortably into Ballard’s definition of inner space, such as Clans 
of the Alphane Moon by Philip K. Dick. The readings that I have pro-
vided here highlight elements of continuity and diversity in these texts’ 
conceptualisations of psychiatry and mental health through the theme of 
inner space, but not exhaustively. It is hoped that each of these texts and 
more may receive further attention through this critical lens, thereby fur-
thering our understanding of the texts themselves, inner space fiction as a 
whole, and contemporaneous psychiatric thought.
From this sample, however, some clear observations emerge. The 
repeated appeal of the genre attests to a consistent desire on the audi-
ence’s part to see the mind—an ineffable and ethereal realm, in the pre-
vailing philosophy of Cartesian dualism—rendered in physical form. This 
desire is catered to by a shared symbology of spaces: landscapes, archi-
tecture and atmosphere, which attempt to translate the private experience 
of thought into terms more typically used to describe the physical world 
which we share. The texts examined here are also evidence of a lasting 
interest in mental disorder, as the genre typically depicts psychotherapists, 
or other characters whose minds are implicitly healthy, experiencing an 
explicitly disordered mind as a space which they must explore and interact 
with in order to provide therapeutic treatment. I suggest that this trope 
constitutes a modern myth not simply because it recurs in different media 
and time periods but because it frequently serves a didactic purpose. Some 
of the moral questions or lessons which connect many of the texts studied 
here, across the three time periods, include: the ethical propriety of attain-
ing access to another person’s private thoughts; the potential misuses of 
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such a technology should it be removed from the psychiatric institution, 
and the notion that exploring another person’s mind—particularly a men-
tally ill person’s—entails a risk to the health of the explorer’s own mind. 
The genre is, in this sense, frequently pessimistic; the idea of exploring 
another person’s mind is consistently appealing, but the texts examined 
here often punish their protagonists for this transgression against natural 
order. The trope therefore echoes the classical myths of Prometheus or 
Icarus, who are each punished for their hubris. Conversely, however, sev-
eral of these texts offer optimistic images of their protagonists overcom-
ing the adversity of inner space and cultivating healthy minds, particularly 
those of the twenty-first century such as The Cell.
Scientific understandings of the material brain have advanced sig-
nificantly since 1948, but unless and until neuroscience can account for 
all mental phenomena it seems likely that the concept of the mind and 
the symbology developed across these texts will retain their cultural cur-
rency. It has now been almost a decade since Inception was released which, 
according to the pattern established by this timeline, suggests that another 
surge of popularity for the genre may be imminent. It is perhaps also due 
to appear in a new media, given the jump to cinema in the 1980s and 
the transition to platformer computer games with Psychonauts in 2004. A 
sequel to Psychonauts is (at time of writing) planned for release this year, 
and a short single-episode connecting the two games, Psychonauts in the 
Rhombus of Ruin, was released for Playstation VR (a virtual reality video 
game headset) in 2017. Although it does not feature any inner space 
exploration, this highlights an intriguing possibility for the genre’s future. 
If the symbology of the mind developed in SF texts since 1948 is ren-
dered in the format of a virtual reality adventure game, inner space may 
in a sense become reality, allowing players to experience immersive worlds 
which, through landscape, architecture, and atmosphere, attempt to com-
municate the experience of mental disorder. Perhaps, despite a frequently 
reactionary tone throughout its history, inner space fiction may thereby 
conceivably come to have a practical therapeutic application.
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